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ABSTRACT
Disasters such as Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, in April 2010, continue to blight the oil
and gas industry despite a significant amount of research effort carried out by academia,
regulatory bodies, and oil and gas companies to understand how safety-related incidents,
especially disasters, can be prevented. While these have contributed to the discussion around
reducing risk, they often lack the systemic influences that determine the value drivers affecting
decision-making, and the ability to achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in safety
performance. Consequently, this research aims to provide a more holistic approach to
understanding the nature of disasters in the oil and gas industry, and identifying how future
disasters can be prevented by establishing more cost-effective strategies. Quantitative research
was carried out to determine the type and validity of the data used to construct trends in major
accident safety performance, and qualitative research was carried out to assess the key factors
that influence safety performance, and whether these are effectively applied. The conclusions of
this research are that the industry has not demonstrated effective implementation of an
Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OH&S-MS). Historically safety performance
shows wide annual variations where trends are difficult to define and extrapolate, making it
difficult to provide any significant benefit for major accident prevention. There is no evidence to
indicate that moving from a prescriptive, to a goal-setting regime, has improved safety
performance, and reduced the prospect of future major accidents. Disaster investigation reports
have shown that the role of the regulator has been ineffective. However, the adoption of a more
comprehensive, and effective approach to inherently safer designs, and the way projects are
managed, have the potential to make safety management more cost-effective and reduce the
prospect of future disasters.
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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH
1.1 Introduction
The global oil and gas industry has experienced a number of disasters with loss of life, large
financial losses and, in some cases, huge environmental impacts. The actual final costs of major
accidents are very rarely made public. They are difficult to quantify, as companies may report
their losses differently, and they may be too complex to provide final amounts due to the
combination of direct and indirect costs, and long term liabilities [1]. However, the European
Commission (EC) estimates the annual average cost of all major accidents, including those in the
non-oil and gas sector, to be between £171 million and £764 million [2]. Data is available that
illustrates the general costs of accidents, and the associated adverse impact on society, employers
and employees, for UK general workplace injuries and illnesses [3]. For example, the annual cost,
based on 2009/2010 data, and 2009 prices, is estimated at £14 billion. This comprises an
estimated 700,000 workplace injuries, 166 fatalities, and 500,000 work-related illnesses, Table 1
[4].
Table 1 Average Cost of UK Accidents per Case
Category • Event Total Cost In £5 (rounded) • •
Costs to Society per Case Workplace fatality 1,502,000 -
Reportable incidents 17,400 -
Minor injuries 290
III health 16,100 -
Costs to Individ ua Is per Case Workplace fatality 1,221,000
Reportable incidents 10,900
Minor injuries 50 -
III health 8,000 -
Costs to Employers per Case Workplace fatality 160,000 -
Reportable incidents 3,100 -
Minor injuries 30 -
III health 4,000 -
Costs to Government per Case Workplace fatality 120,000 -
Reportable incidents 3,400 -
Minor injuries 210 -
III health 4,100 -
B d nth re ortin re uirements of the Re ortin of tnlurles Diseases and Dan erous Occurrences Re ulati -1 ase 0 e p g q p g J g g ons (RIDDOR),2 Not comparable with previous estimates as new costing methodology applied
3 Total costs comprise non-financial human costs (an estimate of the monetary values that individuals would be willing to pay to avoid
risk of death or ill health or injury) and direct financial costs
Page 1
More than two years after the Deepwater Horizon disaster (June 2012) the costs are still ongoing
and British Petroleum's (BP's) accounts for 2010 show that they put aside $41bn to pay for the
spill, which is more than two and a half times BP's entire profit in 2009 [5, 6). In the UK sector of
the North Sea the first disaster of note, the Sea Gem disaster, occurred in 1965. Details of this
disaster are given below, but, as demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, the
global oil and gas industry is still not immune from major accidents. This history is illustrated
below by a small sample of disasters, which occurred between 1965 and 2010.
Figure 1 Sea Gem
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
On 27 December 1965, the drilling rig (see Glossary) Sea
Gem (Figure 1) was located approximately 67 kilometres
off the coast of Lincolnshire. The crew were in the
process of moving the rig to another site approximately
two nautical miles away, when two of the legs crumpled
and broke, causing the rig to capsize and equipment and people to slide off into the freezing cold
of the North Sea. Altogether, 13 men lost their lives and five were injured [7].
Figure 2 Alexander Kielland
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
In March 1980, Alexander L. Kielland (Figure 2), a
Norwegian semi-submersible drilling rig, capsized whilst
working in the Ekofisk oil field killing, 123 people. The
capsizing was the worst disaster in Norwegian waters
since World War II. The rig was located approximately
320 km east of Dundee, Scotland [8].
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Figure 3 Ocean Ranger
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
On 15 February 1982 Ocean Ranger, a semi-submersible
mobile offshore drilling unit, sank in Canadian waters. It
was drilling an exploration well in the Grand Banks area,
267 kilometres east of St. John's, Newfoundland, for
when it sank. There were no survivors of the accident [9).
Mobil Oil of Canada with 84 crew members on board
Figure 4 Piper Alpha before the disaster
(Source: Picture Piper Alpha, Google Images)
On 6 July 1988, Piper Alpha (Figure 4 and Figure 5), a
North Sea oil production platform operated by
Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd, experienced
explosions and fires that destroyed the platform,
killing 167 men, with only 61 survivors. The total
insured loss was about £1.7 billion (US$3.4 billion).
Figure S Piper Alpha during the disaster
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
The accident was instrumental in bringing about the
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations. A
safety case is a written document in which a company
must demonstrate that an effective safety
management system (SMS) is in place on a particular
offshore installation. At the time of the disaster the platform accounted for approximately ten
percent of North Sea oil and gas production [10).
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Figure 6 Petro bras 36
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
In the early hours of March 15, 2001 there were two
explosions onboard the Petrobras 36 (P-36) (Figure 6).
The first explosion was caused by an overpressure
event, the second by ignition of leaking hydrocarbon
vapour. At the time there were 175 people on the rig;
11 were killed. Petrobras 36 (P-36) was the largest
floating semi-submersible oil platform in the world prior to its sinking on 20 March 2001 [11).
Figure 7 West Atlas
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
In August 2009, there was a blowout and fire
(Figure 7) on a wellhead platform in the Montara
field off Western Australia. The cantilever jackup
West Atlas was operating over an adjacent well at
the time and all 69 workers were safely evacuated.
The well was eventually killed after leaking for 74 days. It is considered to be one of Australia's
worst oil disasters. The West Atlas rig was owned by the Norwegian-Bermudan company Seadrill,
and operated by PTTEPAustralasia (PTTEPAA), a subsidiary of PTT Exploration and Production
(PTTEP). Houston-based Halliburton was involved in cementing the well. The Montara field is
located off the Kimberley coast, 250 north of Truscott airbase, and 690 kilometres west of Darwin
[12).
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Figure 8 Deepwater Horizon
(Source: Derek Park, Never say never again, Oil and Gas iQ)
On 20 April 2010, while drilling at the Macondo
Prospect, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig
experienced an explosion caused by a blowout which
killed 11 crewmen and ignited a fireball visible from
35 miles away. The resulting fire could not be
extinguished and, on 22 April 2010, Deepwater
Horizon sank, leaving the well gushing at the seabed and causing the largest offshore oil spill in
u.s. history. Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, semi-
submersible offshore oil drilling rig owned by Transocean.
On Sunday zs'' March 2012, Total lost control of a well in the Elgin-Franklin field, 240km east of
Aberdeen. The installation was evacuated before any lives were lost but current estimates are
that the major accident will cost the French group billions of dollars in lost revenue and associated
costs. As yet (June 2012), the causes of the accident, and the means of regaining well control have
not been identified. Consequently the installation remains shutdown and unmanned [13].
Advanced systems played a key role in the rig's operation, from pressure and drill monitoring
technology, to automated shutoff systems and modeling systems for cementing. Litigation, the
ultimate assessment of damage and the scope of final insurance recovery are all unknown at
present, i.e. 2012. However, analysts report that the aftermath is of unprecedented scale and
complexity compared to previous disasters which themselves took many years to resolve, Figure
8, [6].
The seven disasters described above, spanning 45 years to 2010, resulted in the loss of 409 lives
and yet represent only a small fraction of the number of lives lost in oil and gas operations
globally during that period. So, are these disasters simply random, infrequent events that were
impossible to predict, or were they reasonably foreseeable and therefore should have been
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prevented? In this thesis it is reasoned that the historical and current approach to safety
management in the oil and gas industry is ineffective and that significant change is required to
make continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance. If the oil and gas industry
fails to make this transition, it is likely to continue to experience major accidents, such as those
described above. Furthermore, the ability of the oil and gas industry to prevent future disasters is
further exacerbated by the current (2012) challengesfacing the industry, suchas:
• moving from mature assets in politically and economically stable environments to less
stable operating environments such asNigeria, Russiaand the Former Soviet Union (FSUs)
states;
• more demanding locations, both geographically and technically, such as the Artic,
deepwater areas, including the Gulf of Mexico, and the severe environmental conditions
in the CaspianSeain Kazakhstan,Central Asia;
• greater competition from within the industry and externally from sources such as
renewable energy suppliesand nuclear energy;
• the continued volatility of the oil price (often linked to the gasprice); and
• maintaining or improving margins by minimising costs and maximising production
(revenue).
Consequently, the combination of the above factors, and other internal (e.g. shareholder) and
external influences (e.g. regulatory authorities) warrant changes to make safety management
more effective.
1.2 The future of the 011and gas Industry
It can be said that oil and gas exploration and exploitation is essential to continued economic
growth, particularly in developing countries [14]. The economic, geographical and political
environments, in which future oil and gas exploration and exploitation are necessary, present
significant challengesto companies.
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In addition, often, due to the complexity of remaining reservoir characteristics, the technical
challengescan generate much higher risks when working in these locations compared to previous
developments. In search of oil and gas, many companies have become multinational in order to
satisfy global demand for growth and to acquire adequate reservesof hydrocarbons. Shell and BP,
in particular, have historically been seen to be relatively successful when measured by various
financial criteria in comparison with other multinational organisations, although, since the
Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, BP's reputation and financial status has been severely
adversely impacted. Generally, the financial successof oil and gas companies is mainly achieved
through managing margins, e.g. maximising production and minimiSing costs, as suggested by a
BPAmoco financial and competitive strategy casestudy (15]. These two factors are always likely
to have a significant weighting in comparison with other business objectives, such as safety
performance, especially when shareholder value is often about short-term profit maximisation in
an environment where there is always considerable uncertainty about the future oil price (Oil
price is considered relatively synonymouswith gasprice in this research) (16].
Nevertheless, under UK legislation, organisations, rather than individuals, are still primarily
responsible and accountable for the management of safety, and in support of their legal
obligations, generally implement a safety management system (SMS) to help achieve safety
objectives.
While the SMS(referring to an Occupational Health and Safety Management System, OH&S-MS,
in this research) provides the theoretical framework for effective safety management, it does not,
for example, identify how the management of resources,e.g. time, money, effort, is administered
to achieve safety performance objectives. Resource allocation is often commensurate with the
level of safety performance an organisation aspires to, and is generally dependent on various
factors, suchas the financial margin being targeted by an organisation, and the level of regulatory
compliance and safety culture.
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This should be seen in a context where multinational oil and gasorganisations work in a dynamic
operating environment undergoing constant change, e.g. due to the cyclical oil price and varying
unit costs of production, legislation from prescriptive to goal-setting, and cultural changesrelating
to the organisation (people and competencies, etc.).
1.3 Inherent hazards in oil and gas exploration and exploitation
However, irrespective of the changes that influence organisational behaviour, the industry has
inherent major hazards, e.g. hydrocarbons under pressure that it cannot eliminate and has to
manage. Therefore organisations, including oil and gascompanies, which are responsible for the
creation of major hazards are required to implement controls to reduce both the likelihood and
consequencesof a failure, e.g. to reduce residual risk to a level that is both tolerable and as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP)[17]. ALARPis a concept applied in UKsafety legislation and often
used globally by oil and gascompanies with international operations. However, achieving ALARP
is generally subjective, and therefore oil and gas companies, particularly in a goal-setting
legislative regime, have significant freedom to decide the level of safety-related risk they are
prepared to tolerate to achieve their overall businessobjectives.
1.4 Safety Performance
At a global level the industry has relied on the voluntary but often restricted disclosure of incident
information that is generally dominated by reactive criteria to provide safety performance data
and allow the industry to benchmark performance. This has limited benefit, and arguably, can be
misleading, to the extent that it might suggest a safety performance which is better than actually
achieved, as demonstrated by the Texas City [2005] (19) and Deepwater Horizon disaster
investigation reports [6, 20]. This can have the effect of reducing the resources allocated to
making improvements in safety performance, and/or the ineffective use of limited organisational
resources by targeting safety improvement strategies that yield little value.
Page 8
It is evident from four case studies (Piper Alpha (1988), TexasCity (2005), Buncefield (2005) and
Deepwater Horizon (2010) [6, 10, 18, 21]) that safety has been significantly compromised despite
the fact that TexasCity and Buncefield occurred about 17 years after Piper Alpha, and Deepwater
Horizon 22 years post-Piper Alpha. In all four cases there is evidence that when the culture of
maximising margins becomes too dominant, safety performance isoften sacrificed.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, analysis of the global industry safety performance
also suggeststhat these events are not random, but indicate an endemic failure within the oil and
gas industry to achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance.
1.5 Purpose ofthls Research
A significant amount of research effort has been carried out by academia, regulatory bodies, and
oil and gas companies to understand how safety-related incidents, especially disasters, can be
prevented. While significant authoritative work has been published, particularly post-Piper Alpha,
and is available in the public domain, disasters such as Deepwater Horizon continue to blight the
industry. However, much of the previous research has been relatively esoteric and discipline_
based, e.g. human factors, fuzzy logic, computational fluid dynamics, etc.
While these studies have contributed to the discussion around reducing risk, they often lack the
systemic influences that determine the value drivers affecting decision-making, and the ability to
achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance. Consequently, this
research aims to provide a more holistic approach to understanding the nature of disasters in the
oil and gas industry, and to identify how future disasters can be prevented by establishing more
cost-effective strategies.
As oil and gas companies face significant technical, economic and safety challenges, the
management of safety has to be shown to be cost-effective in order to maximise its value in the
context of limited resources. Cost-effectiveness can be described as 'being effective without
wasting time or effort or expense [22]'.
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1.6 Hypotheses
The hypotheses are that:
• the global oil and gas industry has not achieved continuous and sustainable
improvements in safety performance and consequently remains vulnerable to future
major accidents;
• effective implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems is
compromised by management factors, such as maximising financial margins and poor
safety culture;
• the methods and criteria used by the industry to measure and publish safety
performance yields are of limited value and may inhibit improvement in safety
performance; regulators have been ineffective in their role to support the industry to
reduce work-related death and serious injury; and
• The industry is not robustly capturing lessons learnt from previous disasters and
therefore is liable to repeat them in the future.
In this research the emphasis relates to the safety component of an OH&S-MS,but since there are
various synergies between improvements in anyone, or combination, of health, safety and the
environment, the term OH&Swill continue to be applied. It is argued that if the current approach
to OH&Sis continued, in combination with the predicted development challenges, it is extremely
unlikely that safety performance will achieve continuous and sustainable improvements that
might prevent, or reduce the frequency of, future major accidents. Therefore, a different
approach to OH&Smanagement is required.
The aim, and motivation for the research, is to identify how the industry can achieve continuous
and sustainable improvements in occupational health and safety to reduce the number of major
accidents and, by implication, the number of fatalities and serious injuries within the oil and gas
industry.
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Other than the moral or ethical factors driving this objective, it would be of significant benefit to
the industry if it can reduce its costs by implementing a more cost-effective system for managing
safety. This could help extend the life of the industry when it is becoming more vulnerable to
competition, both from within, and externally.
In the general context of the global oil and gasexploration and exploitation industry, the research
objectives are to:-
• Assessthose management factors that might have an impact on the ability to deliver
OH&Sobjectives. This includes the scope and role of an OH&S-MS in managing risk. In
most countries there is already a legal framework that requires organisations to manage
activities to prevent harm to people. An OH&S-MS seeks to supplement the legal
requirements by providing guidance on how the management of safety can be integrated
with the management of other business objectives to minimise risk, improve business
performance and establish a responsible image in the marketplace;
• Evaluatethe role of safety legislation and the safety regulator as it is often assumed that
the role of regulatory agencies is simply to bring about compliance with regulation.
However, they are also required to encourage improvements in safety performance;
• Considertypical hazardsand ascertain how the industry currently approachessafety [risk]
management, during the lifecycle of a typical development. In particular, examiningwhen
decisions should be made to cost-effectively achieve safety goals over the lifecycle of a
development;
• Examine the industry's historical safety performance to assess whether it can
demonstrate a continuous and sustainablesafety performance;
• Reviewrelatively new concepts of inherent safety, high reliability organisations, resilience
engineering and human factors to assesstheir potential value in meeting industry safety
objectives, and how well they have been implemented by the industry; and
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• Review selected disaster case studies which have occurred over a suitable period, that
should have allowed lessons learnt to be embedded in industry hazard management
systems and prevent future disasters.
1.7 Importance of the study
Four disasters, described more fully later, have been evaluated and compared to assesswhether
the lessons that should have been learnt were adequately captured and could have prevented
further disasters. The Piper Alpha disaster where 167 personnel died occurred in 1988. The
second disaster, Texas City occurred in 2005, and 15 people died. The third, at Buncefield,
occurred in 2005; there were no fatalities but the economic cost was huge, given the damage to
the site and its surroundings, and the disruption to transportation and businesses in the area. The
fourth, the Deepwater Horizon disaster, occurred in 2010, and 11 people died.
These types of disaster are often quoted as being rare and random events, and by implication,
unpredictable or unforeseeable. Therefore, the conventional view is that there is very little that
can be done to prevent them. This research examines this theory to determine whether they can
be predicted and therefore prevented. This would save lives, improve financial performance and
enhance reputations.
1.8 Scope of the research
The study primarily covers the safety performance of the upstream (exploration and exploitation)
operations, as opposed to downstream (comprising refining and marketing) activities. Within the
context of upstream operations the research has a global dimension, but focuses on offshore
activities, since:
• many of the major accidents in the oil and gas industry have occurred in the offshore
sector; and
• the design, installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance and abandonment of
offshore facilities is generally more challenging than for onshore facilities.
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The research is also focused on UKoil and gasactivities since the global industry tends to use the
UKasa benchmark for safety management.
Safety can be assessedthrough major accident hazards or occupational hazards (the difference
being the severity of the outcome of failure and the number of people affected). This ignores the
implications of asset damage, environmental impacts and reputational issues. This research
focuses on major accident hazards since it is argued they are a symptom of a wide catalogue of
failures but with greater single event consequences. Finally, the focus of the research relates to
the design phase of oil and gas facilities, on the premise that it is this stage that largely governs,
from a major accident hazard perspective, the safety performance of the facility during its
remaining lifecycle phases.
Also, it is at this stage that the most cost-effective decision making occurs, as subsequent changes
in designare likely to be of comparably higher cost.
1.9 Limitations of this research
The advantages and disadvantages of goal-setting compared with a more prescriptive approach
are not the specific subject of this research, as arguably, the organisations that have inherent
hazards have an ethical responsibility to employees and the public (society) to manage their
residual risks to levels that are socially acceptable, irrespective of the legislative regime.
Therefore, in this model, legislation should oniy be applied where this responsibility is unlikely to
be properly discharged.The potential impact of organisational change, suchas 'right-sizing' is also
not considered in depth, since one of the goals of private enterprise is to analyse market
mechanisms that establish relative prices amongst goods and services, and allocate limited and
often competing resources amongst many alternative uses. Resources, in this context, include
labour, but are representative of other costsof production.
The commercial conditions in which oil and gas prices are set are not considered in depth other
than the impact price decisionsmight have on the safety performance of the industry.
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There is an underlying assumption that all incidents and accidents, whether major or minor, can
be prevented. In theory this may be true. In practice, the problem of obtaining zero incidents or
accidents on a sustainable basis is extremely difficult, and some might say impossible or
impracticable. However, it is considered that there is a moral imperative that organisations should
seek to achieve zero accidents. Consequently, this research takes the view that all incidents are
preventable.
1.10 Summary
Despite decades of global oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the oil and gas industry still
experiences disasters that affect both employees and the public. Globally fossil fuels are still
necessary for economic growth, and demand remains an important part of the global energy
portfolio in energy markets. However, there are inherent hazards associated with oil and gas
activities that cannot be eliminated and this presents a constant threat to people who are directly
or indirectly affected by these operations. To date it is argued that the industry remains as
vulnerable to a major accident as it did several decadesago.
Consequently, this research aims to understand the factors that influence safety performance in
order to assesswhether change is needed to deliver more continuous and sustainable safety
improvements, particularly in preventing major accidents. The recent, 2010, Deepwater Horizon
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico illustrates the importance of this research.
The research will primarily cover global upstream oil and gas operations but is more focused on
oil and gas operations in the offshore UK sector of the North Sea, as this tends to provide a
benchmark to the industry in terms of safety management. There are limitations to the research,
perhaps the most important being the assumption that all incidents can be prevented.
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2. TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
2.1 Introduction
This section covers:
• management factors that influence safety performance. This includes Occupational
Health and Safety Management Systems (2.2) and Margins, Profits and Resources
Allocation;
• a review of the role of UK safety legislation and the Regulator;
• the factors that guide project and risk management, particularly during the design phase;
• major accidents and how the industry measures safety performance and its implications;
and
• a review of recent theories and concepts influencing safety management.
The aim of the review is to capture as much as possible of the existing relevant literature on oil
and gas industry safety management, including safety-related internationally-recognised codes
and standards, and relevant legislation. Much of the material is 'published' work, defined as: all
papers or articles of an academic, professional or general nature, published for a wide readership,
and has three principal aims:
• To introduce a broad or general background to the subject matter in terms of reading and
consultation.
• To assist in the acquisition of general and specific knowledge relevant to the subject
matter being researched.
• To assist in formulating and developing a broadly-based research framework, and model .
upon which a sound research methodology could be based [23].
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2.2 Occupational Health & Safety Management Systems (OH&S-MSs)
2.2.1 Systems and processes
Management system literature reveals many different definitions of a system; suchas:
• Reactivesystems, e.g. air conditioning;
• Responsivesystems,e.g. computers; and
• Purposeful systemsthat choose their goalsand adapt to their environment.
In this context, an OH&S-MS is seen as a purposeful system that with the help of people,
determines the mission from analysisof stakeholder needs, adapts to its operating environment,
and enables the organisation to deliver goals that satisfy its stakeholders. There are many
different definitions of a process but the key features are that a process transforms inputs into
outputs, to achievesome desired results (24).
2.2.2 OH&S-MSs
Global offshore production of oil and gas is technically and financially challenging, but is essential
as part of an overall global energy portfolio, to sustain economic growth in the industrialised
world and for future growth in developing countries [14, 25). However, while there are potential
benefits from oil and gasproduction, there are also significant risks, suchas those associatedwith
hostile operating climates, and the technological complexities of the structures and organisations
required to safely, and economically, recover these reserves [26). These risks have been
demonstrated by disastersshown in the Introduction to this research.
In a report published 20 years after Piper Alpha, the International Association of Oil and Gas
Producers (OGP) [27) made a number of important observations with respect to OH&S-MSs
including:
• "Incidents such as Alexander Kielland and Piper Alpha occurred at a time when the
importance of having in place an integrated and robust SMS was still relatively
unappreciated".
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• "Following disasters such as Alexander Kielland and Piper Alpha, the majority, if not all,
Exploration and Production (E&P) organisations operate an OH&S-MS based on
internationally recognised standards and guidelines".
• "A functional OH&S-MS should provide the framework within which all significant hazards
are identified and measures put In place to manage the risks they pose. Hence,
theoreticolly at least, the management of major incident risks (arguably all OH&S risks)
requires little more than the appropriate application of the risk assessment tools and
management processes impliCit within any exploration and production (E&P) relevant
Safety Management System (SMS)".
OGPthen state, 'While certain major Incidents that have occurred within the E&P industry suggest
a failure ta put in place the basics of an adequate OH&S-MS (or ports of it) many others point
towards the challenges of applying such systems to low frequency, complicated failure scenarios,
where, on occasion, the hazard or risks may not be recognised".
2.2.3 The Rote of the OHaS-MS
A management system can be defined as a system to establish policy and objectives, and provides
the framework to achieve those objectives [28, 29].
The principles of a management system are similar for quality [30], environment [31] and OH&S,
with continuous improvement being a key goal. For example, HSG 65 (Successful Health and
Safety Management) was prepared by the UK HSE's Accident Prevention Advisory Unit (now
Operations Unit) in 1991, as a practical guide for directors, managers, health and safety
professionals and employees [32]. It is aimed at those who want to improve health and safety in
their organisations and states that, "organisations need to manage health and safety with the
same degree of expertise and to the same standards as other core business activities, if they are
effectively to control risks and prevent harm to people".
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Consequently, OH&S-MSs should be designed to provide continuity with a consistent and
structured approach to identifying improvement opportunities, and are used to demonstrate that
adequate controls are in place to provide suitable and sufficient management of risks. The key
features of an OH&S-MS are illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9 Key Features of an OHS-MS
(Source: Based on HSG 65 and BS8800:2004)
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An OH&S-MS describes the wayan organisation is managed to enable it to meet its safety
objectives. However, in the oil and gas industry, there appears to be conflicting evidence about
whether OH&S-MSs are achieving their intended objectives, either in terms of reducing numbers
of incidents and/or the rate at which improvement is taking place, or the reduction in the severity
of the incidents, e.g. major accidents [33].
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The general characteristics of an OH&S-MS include a basic 'plan', 'do', 'check' and 'act' (PDCA)
loop (Figure 10) and this approach has generally been applied by the oil and gas industry since, at
least, the early 1990s [27].
Many organisations manage their operations with the application of a system of inter-related
resources and activities which transform inputs into outputs, and which can be referred to as the
'process approach'[34]. Processes in an organisation are generally planned and carried out under
controlled conditions to add value.
Figure 10 PDCA Cycle
(Source: Based on the PDCACycle in 9001Quality.com)
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The Quality standard ISO 9001 (see 2.2.6 for more detail on ISO standards) promotes the use of
the process approach when developing, implementing and improving the effectiveness of a
quality system. Indeed an OH&S management system can enhance customer satisfaction by
meeting customer requirements [35]. In this context, customers can refer to internal members of
the organisation as well as external customers.
The OH&S-MS is considered to be part of an organisation's [overall] management system used to
develop and implement its OH&S policy and manage its OH&S risks.
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Therefore, it should include organisational structure, planning activities (for example, risk
assessment and the setting of objectives), responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and
resources [28].
The importance of an OH&S-MS has been identified in a number of reports including the
Flixborough [36] and Piper Alpha [10] disasters, and by the UK HSE in a number of their
publications, such as 'Success and Failure in Accident Prevention' [37], 'Managing Health and
Safety' [38-41], 'Effective Policies for Health and Safety' [42], 'Successful Health and Safety
Management' [32] and 'The Costs of Accidents at Work' [4].
The introduction of these systems is required in some areas by legislation. For example, in the
UK,a statutory requirement for formal safety management systems was introduced following the
Piper Alpha disaster [10]. Irrespective of local legislation, many companies have a corporate
OH&S-MS, or its equivalent, that applies globally [27] to ensure consistency and continuity of
policies, standards and procedures, and therefore avoids applying double standards that might be
unethical and difficult to follow for employees who work internationally. Furthermore, contracts
between oil and gas operators and service companies normally require compatibility of their
respective OH&S-MSs to ensure there are no conflicting standards that could weaken
performance. The effect is to generally align many of the OH&S-MSsbeing used in the industry
[43]. OH&S-MSmodels are well established and documented in the current literature [28, 29, 44].
2.2.4 Objectives of an OH&S-MS
The primary aim of an OH&S-MSis to protect people. To achieve this, companies are required to
develop, implement, maintain and record OH&Sobjectives for all relevant departments within the
organisation. The objectives must be measurable and support the OH&Spolicy (particularly those
aspects associated with the commitment to prevent injury and ill health) and comply with
legislation and the processof continual improvement.
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The objectives should also consider the nature of the organisation's risks, together with its
technological, financial, operational and business requirements and the views of its stakeholders.
BSOHSAS18001:2007 [28) defines OH&S objectives as the, "goal, in terms of OH&Sperformance,
that an organisation sets itself to achieve". However, a crucial and often unanswered question is,
'to what degree must people be protected'? Therefore, by implication, what constitutes a
successful OH&S-MS? In this context there are two factors to be considered; one is the absolute
requirement to prevent all injuries and ill health. This has to be an organisation's primary
objective as it satisfies the moral imperative that underpins BS OHSAS 18001:2007, etc. The
second factor is to achieve a tolerable level of risk, to as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP).
The use of risk recognises that there are inherent hazards in most, if not all, work environments,
and that to achieve, on a sustainable basis, zero accidents or instances of ill health, is extremely
complex. Particularly, In the case of health, there is often a significant period between exposure
to a hazardous substance and the onset of symptoms. This is particularly relevant, but not
unique, to the 011and gas Industry given, for example, the geographical and cultural diversity in its
activities, and the complex techniques and technologies required to explore for and exploit
hydrocarbons. However, a fundamental principle underpinning the UK 1974 Health and Safety at
Work Act [45,46) Is that those who create risks from work activity are responsible for protecting
workers and the public from the consequences, but this is not at any cost; it must reflect the
values of society at large on what risks are unacceptable, tolerable or broadly acceptable. For a
company operating internationally this may pose a dilemma, since social acceptance of risk might
vary between, and sometimes within, countries, due to, for example, various cultural differences
relating to religious or ethnic groups. This raises ethical, social, economic and scientific
considerations, for example:
• whether certain hazards should be entertained at all;
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• how to maximise benefits to society by taking into account advances in scientific
knowledge and technology, while ensuring that undue burdens with adverse economic
and social impacts, or consequences, are not imposed on the regulated;
• how to achieve the necessary trade-offs between benefits to society and ensuring that
individuals are adequately protected; and
• the need to avoid the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of the
individual.
2.2.5 OH&S-MS Applicability
The OH&S-MS must apply to all relevant functions and levels within an organisation in order to
achieve its common goal(s) associated with the development of its activities. In process terms, all
developments, irrespective of size or complexity, tend to go through a similar lifecycle and, are
generally project related since they require change and projects are considered to be the 'engines
of change [48)'. It should be noted that different industries have their own terms to describe the
development lifecycle phases. Table 2 shows the typical phases of a development lifecycle based
on British Standard (BS) 6079-1:2010 Project management.
Table 2 Typical Development lifecycle Phases
BS6079-1:20021 European Process Safety Centre 1994'
Inherency
Conception Concept Selection
Feasibility Front End Engineering Design (FEED)
Realization Detailed Design
Construction and Commissioning
Operations Start-up
Post start-up Review
Termination Abandonment
1 BS 6079-1:2010
2. Inherency and abandonment added after 1994, re: Optimising the Lifecycle Safety, Health and Environment Impact of New Products,
F. K. Crawley, Trans IChemE, Part B, November 2004
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During each of these phases OH&S objectives should be set, which may not necessarily be
common to each phase, or Indeed the various departments or disciplines within an organisation,
to ensure that the overall OH&S goal(s) of the organisation can be achieved throughout the life of
the development.
"Principles and guidelines for the management of projects" [341 are as relevant to small
organisations and for small projects as they are to major organisations with multimillion pound
projects spanning several years, and aim to help an organisation achieve a desired outcome of a
project efficiently and effectively. It also aims to contribute to the learning within projects and so
continually improve an organisation's project management capability.
In projects spanning several years, there is the potential to unwisely make sacrifices during the
early phases of the project, e.g. quality, safety, cost, or schedule, which could compromise the
ability of the organisation to meet its OH&S goal in subsequent phases.
2.2.6 Comparison of Management Systems
There are a number of OHS-MSs and associated quality and environmental management systems
available to organisations for reference and implementation. In principle, all provide a framework
based on the PDCA cycle. However, their applicability and intent varies according to the
designation of the standard and its intended audience. There are three International Standards
Organisation (ISO) publications covering Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Management
Systems:
• BS OHSAS 18001: 2007 Occupational health and safety management systems. This
supersedes 18001:1999 and is a management system standard for health and safety for
which organisations can be audited and obtain third party certification;
• BSOHSAS18002: 2008 Occupational health and safety management systems. Guidelines
for the implementation of OHSAS18001:2007; and
Page 23
• BS18004: 2008 Guide to achieving effective occupational health and safety performance.
This replaces BS8800:2004 Occupational health and safety management systems guide.
18001 and 18002 are pre-fixed as British Standards (BS) Occupational Health and Safety
Assessment Standards (OHSAS),whereas 18004 is a BSbut without the OHSAS,since it is a guide
not directly connected with certification but is intended to be used in conjunction with BSOHSAS
18001 and SSOHSAS18002. The history of the development of the standards is relevant since it
reflects the changes required by industry to help support their management system objectives.
For example, BSOHSAS18001:1999 was classified as a specification but has now been replaced by
BSOHSAS18001:2007 which is a certifiable standard. The development of BSOHSAS18001:2007
was influenced by SS8800:1996, which is turn was influenced by HSG65: 1997 (which superseded
HSG 65: 1991), the quality standard ISO 9001, and the environmental management system
standard ISO14001.
A key feature of BSOHSAS18001:2007 is that it now defines a hierarchy of controls to be used,
i.e. elimination, substitution, engineering controls, signage/warnings/administrative controls and,
personal protective equipment. In this context it is thought to be more consistent with the
principles of inherent safety, and a step ahead of HSG65. The British Standards Institute (BSI)also
has case studies that outline the problems companies were facing prior to accreditation to SS
OHSAS18001:2007, and improvements after the introduction of BS OHSAS18001:2007. For
example, the construction company AMEC saw reportable incidents reduced by 10%, while
another construction company, Mansell, claimed that it led to a 16% improvement in staff
productivity. Furthermore, computer company Compaq achieved a 30% reduction in employee
injuries in eight months (49). However, the history or level of safety performance, in these
companies, before the introduction of the standard was not given, (e.g. it is generally easier to get
significant improvements if the starting point or historical safety performance is poor) nor was
any information given on whether any other drive to improve safety performance could have
yielded the same, or better, results.
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BSIsuggests that BSOHSAS18001: 2007 can be readily integrated with ISO9001 and ISO 14001,
and to help this integration BSI have published, PAS 99: 2006 Specification of common
management system requirements, as a framework for integration [50].
The choice of which system to use depends on the needs of the organisation. For example, if an
organisation already has accreditation under BSEN ISO9001 and BSEN ISO14001 it may consider
adopting BSOHSAS18001:2007 as part of an integrated approach [51]. However, an organisation
may prefer to use a more Industry-specific system such as that of the E&P Forum (now OGP) for
the oil and gas Industry. Currently, discussions are being held at international, European and
national levels on the possible development of a single International standard (ISO standard) for
occupational health and safety management systems for the oil and gas industry.
The UK HSEhave carried out a comparison of the following management systems [52] against
HSG65 [32]:
• BSEN ISO9001:2008, (Quality Management standard) [35]
• BSEN ISO 14001:2004 (Environmental Management standard) [31]
• BSOHSAS18001:2007 (Occupational Health and Safety Management standard) [28,44]
• ILOOSH: 2001 (Guidelines on Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems) [53]
• CIA Responsible Care Management System Framework [54]
The UK HSEsummarised their findings, from this comparison, as follows:
• "there Is a high degree of similarity in their content at a high level
• they all reflect the common principles based on the 'plan/do/check/act' model of quality
management, sometimes referred to as the management 'control loop'.
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• the route taken in all the standards, in essence, for organisations to:
o identify the issues that need to be addressed,
o set the direction/standards to be achieved,
o plan what needs to be done,
o organise who is going to do it,
o equip them to carry out the activities,
o do it,
o check it has been done,
o check that it worked; and
o learn from feedback lessons from this exercise to (continually) improve (the
process and outcomes}".
Themain characteristics of the documents are:
• HSG 65 describes the systematic 'POPMAR' (policy, organisation, planning and
implementing, measuring, auditing, reviewing) model for managing health and safety.
• SSEN ISO9001:2000, SSEN ISO 14001:2004 and SS-OHSAS18001:2007 are certifiable
'standards', the purpose of which is to help organisations create management systems
and to demonstrate to their stakeholders that they have introduced management
systemswhich have the required characteristics.
• SS EN ISO 14001:2004 is an environmental management system (EMS) standard.
Environmental control standards/issues tend to be a little less complex than those
associatedwith health and safety, which means environmental management can be more
amenable to the systemsapproach.
• The main differences in the scope of the standards relative to HSG65 are that there is
little in the former on risk assessment, and no specific requirements for employee
involvement.
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• SS OHSAS 18001:2007 is a health and safety management system standard. It shows
close alignment with SS EN ISO 14001:2004, quite close alignment with ILO OSH 2001,
and some alignment with ANSI Z10 [55], an American National standard for health and
safety management.
• ILO OSH: 2001 aligns closely with HSG65 and the superseded standard SS8800:2004 but
has greater emphasis on employee involvement - reflecting the European emphasis on
worker involvement and the tri-partite nature of its development.
• 'Responsible Care' is a programme sponsored by the Chemical Industries Association
(CIA). It aims to promote good management of health and safety, environment and some
aspects of quality in the chemical industry, for the purposes of demonstrating good
performance to stakeholders. It draws on and cross-references earlier editions of the
other standards outlined above.
This picture may be complicated where organisations have sought to integrate the requirements
of one or more of the above (or other) standards into a single system.
2.2.7 Success factors for the Implementation of an OH&5-MS
A survey by Dr Maneesh Kumar of the University of Strathclyde on the use of quality management
techniques in Scottish manufacturing provides an insight into success factors, and also barriers
that affect quality improvement, which could equally be translated for OH&S-MSs [56].
Given the relative commonality of management systems, the success factors, barriers and ranking
are likely to be consistent for OH&S-MSs.
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Table 3 lists and ranks both the success factors and potential barriers identified by in the
publication "Total quality management - the critical success factors" [57].
Table 3 Quality improvement success factors and barriers
(Source: Based on an article in Total Quality Management - the critical successfactors, Volume 4, Issue 1)
SuccessFactors Barriers
Factor Ranking Barrier Ranking
Management support and commitment 1 Lack of management support and 1
commitment
Employee involvement 2 Wrong people applying tools and 8
techniques
Appropriate training 3 Lack of effective training 6
Good communication 4 Failure to communicate 2
Understanding by management of the 5 Lack of management understanding and 3
nature of the problem acceptance
A conducive and cooperative workforce 6
Employee skills and experience 7 Lack of knowledge regarding analysis and 7
interpretation of collected data
Establishing the genuine need for tools and 8 Employees attitude towards the use of 4
techniques quality improvement tools and techniques
Lack of awareness and understanding on 5
the use of quality tools and techniques
2.2.8 Analysis of the effectiveness of OH&S-MSs
An OGP report [27] implies that the role of an OH&S-MS in managing major accidents is unclear as
these incidents are too infrequent (or random) and complex to be prevented by an OH&S-MS.
However, analysis of three, post-Piper Alpha, Disaster investigation reports does not show
criticism of the OH&S-MSs but their ineffective application.
It has also been argued that the current approach to safety management requires a more
systemic approach as current systems place too much emphasis on management functions,
guidelines and national and international standards and quality principles [58].
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The UK HSEview of risk management is that it should be as low as is reasonably practicable
(ALARP)through compliance with recognised Codes and Standards, hence demonstrating good, if
not best, practice [59, 60]. This presupposes a more proactive and dynamic management system
that enables organisations to predict change, and therefore react more effectively and efficiently,
to it, similar to the Resilient Engineering approach [61]. The use of an OH&S-MS for small
businesses is also criticised as it is seen as being fraught with difficulty and too bureaucratic,
thereby making the application overwhelming. The UK HSEpropose that small businesses must
simply focus on three main control strategies: safe place, safe person and safe systems [62].
However, the criticism appears to relate to the extent of the application of an OH&S-MS, rather
than the principles that underpin the OH&S-MS. Given that the OH&S-MS is simply a framework
and the principles are universal, the application of the OH&S-MS and how far action is needed will
depend on the size of the organisation, the hazards presented by its activities, products or
services, and the adequacy of its existing arrangements. This should work for any organisation,
irrespective of size and complexity. This approach is also adopted by the nuclear, rail and aviation
industries since the general characteristics of an OH&S-MS and PDCA are equally relevant [63]
[64] [65] [66] [67].
A further criticism of the current OHS-MS models is that they fail to adequately deal with safety
during the lifecycle of a development, and therefore lack emphasis on the ability to benefit from
cost-effective strategies during design when considered over the lifetime of a development. In
this context the models are less specific about risk transfer between lifecycle phases and the
likelihood that it will be less attractive, e.g. financially and operationally, to design out failure in
later stages of the lifecycle (e.g. the operational phase) with an increased tendency to rely on
lower order controls, such as procedures.
In any event, it is clear that major accidents still occur, as demonstrated by the Deepwater
Horizon disaster in 2010.
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The ethos that underlies an organisation's approach to safety is contained within its OH&S-MS. In
the case of offshore operations, in the UK, the requirements for an OH&S-MS followed
recommendations contained in the Piper Alpha Inquiry Report. This recommended, amongst
other things, the requirement for a Safety Case,and that the Safety Caseshould confirm that the
OH&S-MS of the company and that of the installation were adequate to ensure that (a) the
design, and (b) the operation of the installation and its equipment, were safe [10]. There were a
number of other recommendations associated with the OH&S-MS, but in particular they required
that the OH&S-MSshould set out the safety objectives and the system by which thes~ objectives
were to be achieved, and, that this should draw on quality assurance principles similar to those
stated in BS5750 and ISO9000. Note that British Standard 5750 was superseded by ISO9000 but
was relevant at the time of the Piper Alpha Enquiry.
The principles associated with quality assurance and safety management are relatively aligned
and this led some organisations to consider the application of total quality management (TQM),
and the OH&S-MSwas seen to be a subset of the TQM. It is of interest that it was suggested to
the Piper Alpha Inquiry that the oil and gas industry adopt TQM to support improvements in
safety. However, this was not recommended by Cullen as the implications could not be justified
simply on the basisof safety [68].
It could reasonably be assumed that an international oil and gas company would apply its
corporate OH&S-MS across its entire global operation, accepting any national or regional
statutory limitations.
This would be ethical since it would recognise good, if not best, industry practices, thereby
universally ensuring consistency and continuity in order to meet safety objectives. However, the
Deepwater Horizon investigation proved that BPdid not apply its corporate OH&S-MS across its
global network of operating companies, and that if it had effectively applied its UKOH&S-MS,the
disaster could have been prevented [6].
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2.3 Margins, profits and resource allocation
2.3.1Introductlon
The following review considers certain components of OH&5-MSs. While organisations, in theory,
would need to effectively implement all elements of an OH&S-MS to achieve all the benefits
advocated by these systems, this research focuses on those components that are likely to have
the greatest impact in meeting research objectives, but nevertheless remains indicative of the
degree to which the entire OH&S-MS is being applied.
2.3.2 Economics
The economic, geographical and political environments, in which future oil and gas exploration
and exploitation will be necessary, present significant challenges to companies. In addition, often,
due to the complexity of old and depleted reservoirs, technical challenges can generate higher
risks compared to previous operations, due to factors such as ageing, as companies attempt to
maximise hydrocarbon recovery, and extend their search for new reserves of oil and gas.
The European Commission states that, "based on frequency analysis of industry [oil and gas]
performance in Europe to date and on documented costs of past accidents, the estimated average
annual economic losses and damage from offshore oil and gas accidents in the Union range from
€205M to €915M" {69]
Furthermore, keeping up with demand and meeting safety and environmental regulations is
becoming more difficult as existing physical infrastructure (assets) ages and breaks down. Oil and
gas companies have large amounts of physical capital (refineries, offshore installations, pipelines,
IT systems, etc.) that needs to be maintained and upgraded over time, representing a huge cost
investment for the company, while at the same time, revenue from oil and gas production is
generally declining [70]. However, despite these challenges companies still need to maintain
financial margins and this has previously involved mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies
of scale, etc.
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For example, on 31 December 1998, BPmerged with Amoco. BPAmoco's competitive planning
strategy aimed to identify critical value drivers. Stonham conducted a case study that identified
the approach to 'winning strategies', in the context of competition, and which lay in the discovery
of value drivers and connecting these to business strategy [is]. Stanham described a Four-
Quadrant Value Proposition (FQVP) that an organisation can apply to create value, i.e.
shareholder value. However, compromises are normally involved in the application of the FQVP
and therefore an organisation has to choose between, often, competing demands in an attempt
to maximize shareholder value. In this model a dominant value driver is seen as efficiency in
production with a major aim of reducing costs. Consequently, as a company has no direct
influence on oil price, it can only influence margins, and these depend on costs and throughput
volume.
According to the FQVP,major oil companies are placed in the model where competition is
intense, and new markets, geographically, are continually being sought and the allocation of
resources adjusted accordingly. Speed in reaction to changing market conditions is also
important, especially given the volatility of oil prices and the need to maximise margins. However,
rapid change can also have a negative impact. For example, in 1990 BPappointed Robert Horton
as chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO).While he inherited strategic inconsistency his
subsequent pollctes of restructuring and reorganisation were too rapid, and the implementation
too confused. Consequently there were significant job losses, and BP's profits fell 20 percent
against the oil sector and 33 percent against the london Stock Market. Horton was dismissed in
1992 and the new chairman and CEOchanged the strategy. From 1992 onwards, BPconcentrated
on cutting costs so that it could return a margin even at the lower end of volatile oil price cycles.
BPalso introduced a concept of 'gain-sharing' an alliance with contractors to drive development
and reduce operating costs. Costswere also attacked in employment. The peak year for layoffs in
this period was 1992 when 14,500 jobs were cut. Between 1993 and 1995, a further 9000 jobs
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were eliminated, and a target of 5000 more out of a total of 56,650 employees worldwide was set
In 1995.
Early in 2000 the price of Brent Crude oil peaked at $32 a barrel, virtually tripling the 1998 price.
This allowed BP to introduce the strategy of 'rebalancing' cost reductions with growth [15, 71].
However, it is argued, in the BP Texas City [2005] and Deepwater Horizon investigation reports,
that this culture of cost-cutting became so entrenched and endemic in BP that eventually it
contributed to both the Texas City and Deepwater Horizon disasters as discussed later in this
thesis [6, 18].
The Economist Research Unit has published a report, 'The Long View: getting new perspective on
strategic risk', that suggests a short term focus on profits is downgrading the agenda given to risk
and opportunity in the boardroom [72]. It is expected that the competitive and financial strategy
used by BPAmoco, during this period, will have been consistent with the approach taken by other
companies operating in the private sector of the oil and gas industry. This assumption is
considered valid, given the intense competition between companies and their Inability to
independently influence the 011 price. Consequently, In the case of the oil and gas industry, where
private companies cannot dictate oil price, optimising margins by minimising costs and
maximising production, and therefore revenue, is a necessitv, especially given the often
unpredictable and cyclical nature of the oil price.
In these circumstances it Is also realistic to consider that the cost centre, or overhead, associated
with safety management, may be compromised since it does not generate revenue and tends to
increase operating costs. The margins that organisations can achieve, and in turn their
profitability, largely determines the allocation of resources available to satisfy business objectives.
However, margins and profitability are also inextricably linked to the perpetual conflicts between
the oil and gas companies and the nations that control the reserves, the variability of supply and
demand, the politics of national and international energy strategy, including the arguments over
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climate change and renewables, the influence of the oil and gas traders, and the personal
ambitions of the chief executives who manage those organisations [73].
Oil and gas companies also operate in a mode of constant change. For example, not only are
there uncertainties about future oil and gas prices but organisations are perpetually changing, not
only through acquisitions and mergers, but also as people are recruited, leave, or move internally
through a company.
Oil and gas prices have been extremely volatile [74-77] (Figure 11 and Figure 12), using crude oil
as an example. Figure 11 shows a relatively steady increase in production and consumption of oil-
based products while prices show much greater volatility. Variations between supply (production)
and demand (consumption) are often due to rounding of data, the classification of materials, and
stock changes over time [78].
Figure 11 World Crude Oil Data, 1980-2006
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The oil price (Figure 12) shows a much more variable performance, partly due to some of the
crises illustrated on the chart [79,80).
Figure 12 Oil Prices 1946 - 2008
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Since organisations have a finite sum of money to support their operations and there is often
internal competition for funds from a limited resource, the allocation of funds has to take account
of various factors relating to business objectives, e.g. growth maximisation, research and
development (R&D), and new projects, etc. Consequently, firms may need to make sacrifices in
one part of their business to benefit others. The total resource, e.g. money, and the way it is
apportioned is largely influenced by the company culture and the margins it has achieved
together with the prediction and confidence associated with future market conditions and
stakeholder/shareholder expectations [81).
For example, a company that sets high health and safety standards may allocate, as a proportion
of a finite sum of money, more funds to seek improvements in safety than a comparable company
that might be relatively indifferent to safety performance. However, this may change year-on-
year, depending on company dynamics and its safety culture.
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2.3.3 Safety Culture
The relatively recent introduction of the term 'Safety Culture', often used interchangeably with
'safety climate' reflects, in part, the move within the industry, from technological solutions to
improvements in safety performance, to more psychological and behavioural strategies [82].
However, there is no universal agreement or definition on what constitutes safety culture, but it
tends to include concepts such as shared norms, values, attitudes, perceptions and behaviour,
with assumed relevance for safety [81-85].
It is recognised that major oil and gas companies operate on a global basis and therefore have to
deal with many cultural differences in everyday business. It is therefore argued that while
organisational safety culture may be a universal value, its importance, in terms of organisational
attributes and practices, may vary acrossnational and regional cultures [86].
It is suggested that perceived management commitment and support reflecting employee care in
the organisation will lead to more positive safety behaviours and, in turn, improvement in safety
performance [86, 87]. This also suggeststhat demonstrating commitment has a greater beneficial
impact on safety performance than rhetoric about fundamental values. Research has indicated
the importance of safety culture as a determinant of safety performance, and this requires that
safety culture is fully integrated with polices, practices and procedures at all levels in a company
[85, 87-89]. However, it is also suggested that it would be sensible to allocate more attention to
safety culture during the design process, since weak design requires costly compensating
arrangements at later stages in a development, which may be less effective and efficient when
considered in the overall development lifecycle [82, 90]. A summary of the key findings from a
Health and Safety Laboratory study, 'Safety Culture: a review of the literature [91]' is that safety
culture is considered part of the overall culture of the organisation which affects attitudes and
beliefs, such as health and safety performance, and that management had a key influence on an
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organisation's safety culture. However, different levels of management could influence safety
culture in different ways.
While much of the literature relating to safety culture explores its esoteric elements, variations
and implications in relation to safety performance, it often fails to develop the connection
between safety culture and resource allocation that permits organisations to adequately fund the
application of their OH&S-MS, and therefore to achieve safety performance objectives. For
example, many oil and gas companies have targets of zero injuries. Furthermore, a manager may
wish to increase expenditure to improve safety performance but may be limited by the funds
available.
The impact of poor risk management is likely to adversely affect an organisation's management,
staff, shareholders, customers and other stakeholders. In BS 33110 it is stated that, "risk
management has to continuously, systematically and proportionally address the risks surrounding
an organisation's activities. It cannot be separated from the culture of the organisation [92}". Risk
management, an intrinsic component of an OH&S-MS, also comprises a framework and process
that enables an organisation to manage uncertainty in an effective, efficient and systematic way
from strategic, programme, project, and operational perspectives, as well as supporting continual
improvement. Riskmanagement applies at all levels of an organisation and to all activities.
In an article, "Improvements are badly needed offshore", it was stated by Ian Whewell of the UK
HSE, at the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF) that, "The key to embedding a
successful health and safety culture Is strong and active leadership from the top. Those who create
risks are best placed to manage them ...but we should not underestimate the range of challenges
the industry faces" [93]. In this context, one challenge relating to safety culture is about retaining
'corporate memory' and continuous enforcement of safety good/best practices to avoid
complacency or forgetfulness.
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This was reinforced by Magne Ognedal, Director-General of Norway's Petroleum Safety Authority
(PSA)who said, "The hard learned lessons from catastrophic incidents like the Alexander Kielland
capsizing and the Piper Alpha explosion and fire seem to be getting forgotten by the industry
[94]". The Deputy Director-General of the Danish Energy Agency, Anne H!3jerSimonsen, added
that processsafety improvements are badly needed and that it is essential that lessonsare known
and understood. She continued, "to be a zero-incident industry we need to learn from best
practices not only in the offshore industry but also from other industries in the North Sea countries
and other parts of the world. Best practices can be gauged by using the right key performance
indicators (KPls). It is, therefore, essential that we focus on further development of KPls in the
offshore sector".
Oil and gas companies are responsible and accountable for the management of safety and
typically implement an OH&S-MSto help set and achieve safety objectives [28, 32]. However,
there may be different levels of implementation of an OH&S-MSwithin a large multi-national
organisation. For example, there may be a corporate OH&S-MSwhich sets the high level policies,
principles and standards to be applied, although some of these may not be mandatory and there
might be deviations from mandatory standards, if justified. This also allows 'local', e.g. national
and regional, statutory requirements and cultural expectations to be taken into account.
Irrespective of the culture that influences organisational behaviour, the oil and gas industry has
inherent hazards, e.g. hydrocarbons under pressure, that it cannot eliminate and has to manage
[95]. Oil and gas installations and drilling rigs, both onshore and offshore, due to the inventory of
hazardous materials, are generally defined as major hazard installations [96, 97] that invoke
additional controls, either directly or indirectly, through legislation [65]. In these cases,
organisations responsible for major hazards are required to implement controls to reduce both
the likelihood and consequences (risk) of a failure and, depending on the regulatory regime or
company policy, to reduce residual risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
[17].
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In the Norwegian petroleum industry attempts have been made to identify relationships between
different data sources and the root cause of major accidents, Figure 13 and Figure 14, but these
have been inconclusive, although a study carried out in 2007, while not identifying any correlation
between leaks and safety climate, did identify a significant correlation between the number of
leaks and activity levels, but this relationship is not recognised in current quantitative risk analysis
(QRA) models [98].
However, a more recent study appears to have identified a correlation between leaks and safety
climate, because the data collection, which includes major accident precursor data and biannual
questionnaire survey data, is seen to be more extensive than in previous studies [99].
Figure 13 Overview of major hazard precursor categories
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The survey did not identify any correlation between barrier performance and leak frequency.
Figure 13 shows that there were, on average, 32.9 incidents involving non-ignited hydrocarbon
leaks, well kicks, and loss of well control, between 2003 and 2008. These incidents are directly
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influenced by the platform management systems, whereas incidents relating to vessels on a
collision course with the installation are generally outside the scope of the Operator's OH&S-MS.
Figure 14 Relative numbers of faults for selected barrier elements, 2008
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In the study, variations in the number of potential leak paths were taken into account since larger
installations are assumed to have a higher leak frequency.
The survey data analysed was limited to personnel that could influence the likelihood of
hydrocarbon leaks, i.e. process operators and maintenance personnel. It was shown that virtually
all the correlation and linear regression results were significant in relation to leak frequency.
Figure 14 shows the relative number of faults for selected barrier elements. It is evident that
many of the important safety critical components, i.e. those components where failure can result
in a major accident, such as the DHSV, BDV and PSV,have relatively high failure rates.
J.E.Vinnem, argues that personnel tend to focus their response based on a relatively high number
of injurious incidents and therefore it is much more difficult to identify correlations between
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safety climate and major hazard precursors that tend to be process-related, particularly given the
large number of influencing variables [98].
This research provides some clues to this relationship, i.e. between safety culture and major
accidents, since, for example, any organisation or design that departs from the characteristics
exhibited by high reliability organisations (organisations that are able to manage and sustain
almost error-free performance despite operating in hazardous conditions where the
consequences of errors could be catastrophic) or tails to effectively implement inherent safety
(Inherent Safety is an approach to hazard management that tries to avoid or eliminate hazards, or
reduce their magnitude, severity or likelihood of occurrence, by careful attention to the
fundamental design and layout) and resilient engineering (Resilience Engineering looks for ways
to enhance the ability of organisations to create processes that are robust yet flexible, to monitor
and revise risk models, and to use resources proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing
production and economic pressures) is more vulnerable to failures [100-102]. Depending on the
nature and extent of the deviations, this can lead to failures that may have the potential for
escalation to major accidents.
2.4 Regulation and the role of the regulator
2.4.1 Bacqround
Exploding steam boilers emerged as a public hazard, in the United States of America (USA) in the
mid-19th century, to the extent that, in 1836, 496lives were lost in 14 explosions, which resulted
in Congress passing a law requiring boiler Inspectors and imposing severe fines and prison terms if
owners and employees were negligent [103]. The problem was not so significant in the United
Kingdom and similar laws were not passed until 1852. These illustrate state intervention in private
enterprise as employees could not necessarily rely on employers to protect them from specific
hazards and therefore government intervention was required through regulation to control some
industrial risks.
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However, since the is" Century and, with the rapidity of technological development, e.g. the
industrial revolution, and its associated hazards, the public has increasingly influenced the type
and extent of safety regulation, with less emphasis on scientific argument and more credence
placed on public perceptions of risk. The extent of regulation is very much based on national
cultures and the valuesof successivegovernments; although within the EuropeanUnion there has
been a drive to minimize competitive anomalies by implementing common standards through the
use of European Directives that are translated into national regulations. In the UK, particularly
following the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, organisations are
accountable to satisfy relevant safety-related legislation, but compliance is varied as
demonstrated by enforcement actions by the UK safety regulator (UK HSE)and prosecutions by
the UK Crown Prosecution Service (see Figure 41). The regulator and public-organisation
relationships should help reconcile any differences. Within a prescriptive regulatory regime this is
relatively easysince the state, in effect, dictates the level and nature of risk control.
However, in a goal-setting regulatory regime there is greater emphasis on self-regulation, which
makes proactive regulatory intervention more difficult, since the degree to which risks are
controlled is more reliant on those that create them, and therefore the regulator generally only
intervenes if things go wrong. However, despite decades of offshore activity, and prescriptive,
and goal-setting safety legislation the European Commission is proposing new regulations [69]
which are justified on the basis that, "the risk of a major offshore oil or gas accident occurring in
Union waters is significant and the existing fragmented legislation, and diverse regulatory, and
industry practices do not provide for achievable reductions in the risks throughout the Union".
Much of the proposed regulation is based on the existing UKoffshore Safety Caseregime and EU
onshore COMAH Regulations. However, the proposals extend current regulatory regimes by
adding key safety objectives to ensure consistent use of best practice for major hazards by all
offshore oil and gasoperations in Union waters, and to implement best regulatory practices.
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Furthermore, there are variations in international regulatory safety regimes although most oil and
gas companies operate globally. For major hazards, a report for the Commission for Energy
Regulation (CER), the independent body responsible for Ireland's electricity and gas sectors,
"Review and Comparison of Petroleum Safety Regulatory Regimes for the Commission for Energy
[onshore and offshore] Regulation", compared regulation in the UK, Denmark, Norway, Australia
(Western) and Canada (Nova Scotia) [104J. The report conduded that while all have risk-based
approaches and a permissioning regime (e.g. a safety case regime where the regulator has to
accept and approve a case for safety before allowing a relevant operation), there are also three
key differences. These are the indusion of occupational hazards in their major hazards legislation,
except the UK, the use of third parties for compliance assurance activities, where only the UK
extends this to indude operations, and the level of detail in the legislation where there is a wide
range of differences in the guidance provided to accompany the legislation.
2.4.2 The UK Resulator
The role of the UK regulator is largely subject to government influence and the economic
conditions, since these affect the level of public expenditure and in turn public sector staffing. The
level of regulator Involvement, and enforcement, is reflected in their available resources. Often, in
times of recession, public expenditure is cut and so are staff numbers (lOS, 106]. Safety may be
compromised, either by lack of inspection, as evidenced by the Piper Alpha, BP Texas City and
Deepwater Horizon Investigation reports, or, the Inability to obtain advice and support from
either the regulator or company safety professionals [107J. It is noted that as a result of the Piper
Alpha Enquiry responsibility for offshore safety was transferred from the Petroleum Engineering
Directorate (part of the then Department of Energy) to the UK HSE,since it was not considered
independent and well-fitted to carry out the functions of a regulatory body with regard to safety.
This is a recurring theme, as it was similar to the situations regarding BP Texas City and
Deepwater Horizon.
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To support the regulatory process, risk analysis is significant in policy making since it produces a
systematic approach to evaluate risks, particularly at the macro-level, by typically bringing
together various bodies representing the issue being assessed.There are four generic approaches
to risk analysis:
• The original engineering approach geared towards the quantification of risks;
• Decision analysis that takes account of other contributory factors, such as
environmental and economic issues;
• Risk-perception studies that seek to understand why people have different values,
and therefore priorities, that might be contrary to those based on scientific
evidence; and
• Policy-analysismethods that try to explain how social and political influences affect
risk policies [108].
Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, a hearing was held by the UK House of Commons
Energy and Climate Change Committee, to look into the implications of the disaster. The
committee were told by Malcolm Webb, Chief Executive of Oil and Gas UK, representing the
North Seaoil and gas industry, and Paul King, Managing Director of Transocean Drilling UK, that
the UK regulations are 'superior' to the approaches of other nations, and they argued against a
pan-European regulatory body [109]. This implies that companies operating globally do not
necessarily apply common standards and practices across their operation, and reinforces the
assertion that the UK provides a safety benchmark of good, if not best, practice. However, since
Oil and GasUK represent the UKoil and gas industry and the U.S.parent company of Transocean
Drilling UK were subject to litigation in the United States as a result of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, it is unlikely that either would suggest otherwise. The UK HSE discharge their
responsibilities by applying a Compliance Code which is a statutory Code of Practice to encourage
regulators to meet their objectives in a way that minimises the burdens on business [110]. The
Code encompasses a risk-based, proportionate, targeted, and flexible approach to regulatory
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inspection and enforcement, to ensure effective and efficient use of resources, and since the early
1990s, the UK HSEhas followed the Code's five principles of good regulation, that are:
• "proportionality,
• accountability,
• consistency,
• transparency, and
• targeting".
The Code applies when regulators determine their general policies or principles about how they
exercise their regulatory functions but does not apply them to individual enforcement
decisions. The Code is also based on the seven principles of inspection and enforcement set out
in the report "Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement' [111]". In
summary key requirements are that regulators only intervene when they is a clear case for
protection (therefore not without reason) and avoid unnecessary disruption to economic
progress. They should prosecute habitual offenders but proactively provide cheap and readily
accessible advice, and be accountable for the conduct of their activities.
These principles are not wholly consistent with good practice in that they reflect reactive rather
than proactive safety management.
2.4.3 The U.S. Regulator
The U.S. equivalent to the UK HSE is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
[112], whose mission is to prevent work-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths. OSHA presently
(2012) has a staff of 2,200 inspectors, 10 regional offices, and 90 local area offices. In 2011 their
budget was $573,096,000 and they inspected 40,215 workplaces. OSHA state that reports of
imminent accidents are their top priority, second are fatalities or accidents serious enough to send
three or more employees to the hospital, and third are employee complaints. Referrals from other
government agencies are fourth, and fifth are targeted inspections such as through the 'Site
Specific Targeting Programme', which focuses on employers that report high injury and illness
Page 45
rates, and special emphasis programmes that zero in on hazardous work. Follow-up inspections
are the lowest priority. Typical OSHA programmes include an Alliance Programme designed to
involve employers, labour unions and trade/professional groups in the prevention of accidents and
illnesses in the work place, and a Voluntary Protection Programme (VPP) that recognises
exemplary safety programmes to use as a demonstration of best practice for other industries and
communities.
Under the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, OSHA's role is to ensure safe and
healthful working conditions for working men and women, by: authorising enforcement of the
standards developed under the Act; assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure
safe and healthful working conditions, and providing for research, information, education, and
training in the field of occupational safety and health.
OSHA states that, "it is determined to use its limited resources effectively to stimulate
management commitment and employee participation in comprehensive workplace safety and
health programs," and" because workplace inspections are one of OSHA's principal activities and
because voluntary efforts to improve working conditions ultimately depend on strong
enforcement, our surveys focus primarily on the inspection process".
Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the then United States Minerals Management Service,
came under fire for what its critics described as lax oversight of the oil industry [113]. Examples
given were:
• no surprise inspections of any of the 50+ deepwater offshore installations Were carried
out, despite the number of deepwater wells increasing (from 256 to 602 in a decade) and
a law requiring periodic unannounced inspections, and therefore safety violations may
have been present but not adequately managed, Figure 15;
• inspectors spent 62 hours onboard the Deepwater Horizon in 2009, and the same again
three weeks before the disaster in 2010, both of which were announced inspections, but
no citation was issued. Congress is considering drafting a bill in the wake of a deadly
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mining disaster in West Virginia, to make it punishable by five years in prison to tip off an
operator about an unannounced inspection [114) ;
Figure 15 GoM Regulatory Inspections 2000 - 2009
(Source The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2010)
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• the government and inspectors have been faulted by internal investigators for being too
close to oil companies; and
• Donald Howard, a former MMS regional supervisor, required inspectors to give 24-hour
notice before inspecting many of the largest installations because of new security
regulations following the 9/11 attack. However, the u.S. Coastguard, which oversees
security rules, said it could not justify this requirement.
The Interior Secretary Kenneth Salazar also promised extensive changes and named a new
Director with a broad mandate covering overall policies and enforcement practices. Some of
these issues have a certain parallel with the outcome and recommendations of the Piper Alpha
Enquiry, e.g. the transfer of safety responsibilities from the Department of Energy to the Health
and Safety Executive.
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2.4.4 Enforcement
Pre-Piper Alpha, safety regimes were, traditionally, prescriptive [115-123] and therefore the role
of the regulator was to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. However, unlike the penalties
given to drivers who exceed speed limits, the initial approach taken by regulators was to
negotiate with employers to seek compliance on the basis that if the organisation had ownership
of the problem, compliance would be more sustainable. Depending on the nature of the risk,
organisations would be given time to remedy non-compliances, and only when there was a
continued failure to act appropriately would the regulator resort to prosecution.
Typically in this scenario, the regulator is more liable to prosecute following an incident, although
it is believed that the prosecution is often retributive, Le. aimed at satisfying public demand,
rather than deterring further offences [124].
In the U.S., following the enactment of the Federal OHS Act in 1970, a policy was adopted of
penalising all regulatory violations discovered by inspectors. There is good evidence that this
policy was successful in reducing accident rates [125]. The penalties were essentially on-the-spot
fines. There is also general agreement that prescriptive regimes which rely primarily on
persuasion have been relatively ineffective in securing compliance with regulatory requirements.
Another reason which has been identified, as to why prescriptive safety regimes have been
ineffective, as evidenced in the Piper Alpha Inquiry, is that prescriptive legislation lags behind the
development and introduction of new technologies and techniques, and therefore, in some
instances, becomes irrelevant as a means of securing adequate health and safety performance.
In the UK, the above factors led a move away from the prescriptive approach, to a goal-setting
regime, although various prescriptive legislation still exists [126-130]. This is an idea that has been
taken from common law and turned into a regulatory requirement.
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Therefore, the owner or duty holder remains, in principle, free to decide just how to comply,
although compliance with good practice, e.g. codes of practice and standards, is seen to be a
means of demonstrating this requirement [131]. In the UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations 2005 this means the operator in the case of a production installation. Unlike
prescriptive legislation, it is much harder for the regulator to establish whether an organisation
has achieved its duty of care, and therefore a suitable level of compliance within the goal-setting
regime. However, the move from prescriptive to goal-setting is likely to be adopted in the U.S.
For example, in a recent article in the UK publication "Health and Safety at WorK' it is stated; "The
Deepwater Horizon disaster seems to have convinced the US to drop its largely prescriptive
approach to offshore safety as investigations into disasters such as Alexander Kielland, Ocean
Ranger and Piper Alpha criticized over-reliance on prescriptive regulation, with an inspection
model that is fundamentally reactive and incapable of driving continuous improvement. A similar
charge is now levelled at the regulator overseeing the companies involved in Deepwater Horizon"
[132J.
Whether the role of the regulator is effective and meets aspirations, as described above, may be
in doubt. For example, in the BP Texas City (2005) investigation by the U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board, it is stated that; "OSHA enforcement at the BP TexasCity refinery was
also examined. In the years prior to the incident, OSHAconducted several inspections, primarily in
response to fatalities at the refinery, but did not Identify the likelihood of a catastrophic incident,
nor did OSHAprioritize planned inspections of the refinery to enforce process safety regulations,
despite warning signs. After this incident, OSHA uncovered 301 egregious, willful violations for
which BP paid a $21 million fine, the largest ever issued by OSHA In its 35-year history. Prior to
OSHAissuing citations, the refinery had two additional serious incidents. Despite the large number
of major violations on the Isomerization unit (150M) unit, and these two additional serious
incidents in 2005, OSHAdid not conduct a comprehensive inspection of any of the other 29 process
units at the Texas City refinery. OSHA's national focus on inspecting facilities with high personnel
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injury rates, while important, has resulted in reduced attention to preventing less frequent, but
catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City. OSHA's capability to inspect
highly hazardous facilities and to enforce process safety regulations is insufficient; very few
comprehensive process safety inspections were conducted prior to the 150M incident, and only a
limited number of OSHA inspectors have the specialized training and experience needed to
perform these complex examinations". While it is accepted that regulator inspections do not
guarantee the identification of all potential safety violations, it is also acknowledged that an
inspection regime of zero or limited inspections is unlikely to incentivise the industry to manage
safety appropriately.
An article in, "Health and Safety at Work" (September 2010) quotes a report entitled "Regulatory
Surrender: Death, Injury and the Non-Enforcement of Law", published by the UK Institute of
Employment Rights. Basedon a study by researchers at the University of liverpool and liverpool
John Moores University [133] it states that since 1997:
• "Deregulation by the Labour government's business friendly agenda has damaged its
ability to enforce health and safety legislation, therefore there has been a collapse in
HSE inspection, investigation and enforcement activities in pursuit of better
regulation;
• Across the whole period 1997/1998 to 2008/2009 HSEprosecutions fell by almost a
third, although statistics for the 10 years 1999/2000 to 2008/2009 show there was a
drop of 48%;
• Since 1997/1998 there has been a 29% decline in Prohibition Notices, but a small rise
of 10% in the number of Improvement Notices;
• HSEinspectors now only conduct a third of the inspections they did 10 years ago;
• Most serious injuries are now not investigated;
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• There has been a 6396 fall in investigations following mandatory reporting of injuries
in the period 1999/2000 to 2008/2009; and
• The HSEdoes continue to investigate 10096of fatalities".
On 1 October 2008, Part 3 of the UK Regulatory Enforcement Sanctions Act 2008 came into force.
The Act aims to make regulations easier to administer by allowing regulators to impose civil
penalties instead of prosecuting in the criminal courts.
The UK HSEis thereby empowered to use the following penalties:
• "Fixed monetary penalties, intended to penalise minor non-compliances;
• Discretionary requirements ( paying a viable monetary penalty, the amount being
decided by the UKHSEto help prevent repeat offences); and
• Stop Notices, similar to Enforcement Notices (Improvement or Prohibition), which
stop recipients from carrying on with the activity specified in the Notice" [1341.
Appeals are available for any of the above penalties.
They can also accept voluntary enforcement and undertakings, i.e. giving the offender the
opportunity to make an offer to take steps to correct Its behaviour, and make amends for any
effects that behaviour has already had.
2.5 Project and RI.k Management (Including Safety In oe.lgn)
2.5.1 Project Manalement
The design of process plants, particularly large complex plants, processing hazardous substances, is
carried out over a period of time, and involves a large number of different disciplines and discrete
development phases. When considered over the lifetime of a development, the decisions made
during the early stages of design can have a profound impact on the subsequent performance of a
facility. From a safety perspective, the aim should be to eliminate hazards rather than devise
methods to control them [135J. The greatest opportunities to reduce risks, in terms of cost-
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effectiveness when considered over the lifecycle of a development, are during the early design
phases. Once into detailed design there may be limited scope to apply hazard avoidance (as
opposed to prevention) methods since the costs are likely to escalate and the implemented safety
measures will be less effective than inherent safety measures, as passive controls will be
substituted by active controls, and operating procedures [951.
Project management is, by definition, management of any activity that introduces a new objective
or causeschange, and has a definite start and finish time. BS6079-1:2002, Project Management,
Part 1Guide to project management [341, states;
"The application of sophisticated project management techniques to projects in government and
industry has become necessary to ensure the achievement of business, economic, environmental,
strategic and political goals".
Notably here no specific mention is made of safety. The benefits of good project management are
not restricted to large projects sinceproject management principles are not necessarilysize related,
and all projects follow a similar sequence,suchas:
• Conceptual (this addressesquestions such as: is the project technically realistic? is it
commercially and financially acceptable? is it sufficiently profitable?);
• Feasibility (this evaluates all potential options and involves the selection of the
optimum solution). Optimum generally means in the context of an evaluation of
technical, financial and HSEissues
• Implementation (this covers design, construction and commissioning of the selected
option);
• operation; and
• abandonment
However, the precise description and therefore activities associatedwith each stage or phase can
vary. For example, the project phases, defined in BS62198 Project RiskManagement (136), are
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given different headings to those in BS 6079 Project Management. BS 31100:2008, Risk
Management Code of Practice states that effective risk management can help an organisation
achieve its goals by, for example, reducing the likelihood of adverse events and increasing the
likelihood of positive events, identifying where taking risks may be beneficial, improving
accountability, transparency and decision-making, managing change in complex organisations,
ensuring statutory compliance, improving margins and profitability, and protecting reputation and
enhancing [92].
However, this standard does not make any specific, or explicit, link to the risk management tools
and techniques to be employed at each phase of the project lifecvcle, and associated deliverables
in subsequent phases. Consequently the literature that includes references to project
management tends to treat lifecycle phases in relative isolation, although not exclusively [34, 136,
137].
Before a project is allowed to continue from one phase to the next, an independent team typically
makes a formal decision, normally based on various screening criteria relating to technical,
commercial, financial, and HSEperformance, whether the project remains viable to continue.
One description, based on the work by Urban Kjellen [138], illustrated in Figure 16, uses Decision
Gates set at strategic points in the development lifecycle
Figure 16 Development lifecyde with decision gates
) Abandonment
/ G3 \
BS EN ISO 20815:2008 [139] provides a further insight into project phases but has
recommendations on which processes should be performed as a function of the project. The
standard also provides recommendations on when the processes should be applied (in what life-
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cycle phase). However, this is relatively high level, and does not prescribe the specific safety
studies and deliverables that are needed during each phase. The categorisation of risk (in SSEN
ISO20815:2008) depends on factors relating to:
• The maturity of the technology;
• Whether operations are within or on the boundaries of the operating envelope; and
• The scaleand complexity of the project;
While the literature presents variation in definitions, lifecycle phase classifications and
descriptions, there are nevertheless several key common features of projects, such as [48]:
• "they are non-repetitive and tend to have significant unique features likely to be novel to
the management;
• they carry risk and uncertainty; and
• they are usually in the hands of a temporary team, and may be subject to change as the
work progresses".
Given the nature of projects, particularly large ones, organisations rarely recruit employees for
the entire team since they are typically of relatively short duration. Also, there may not be a
continuation of projects and different projects may require different skills sets. Consequently
projects are predominantly staffed by temporary or agency employees, Le. contractors, but often
with company personnel in key roles, such as the Project Manager. Once a project Is completed,
the team will often disband. While this offers certain advantages to an organisation, there are
also many disadvantages.
For example, project teams generally have no ownership of a project covering its entire lifecycle.
This can mean that:
• Riskscan be easily transferred, as the project team will no longer exist in subsequent
lifecycle phasesto take accountability for their design;
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• Temporary contracting staff may not have the experience and expertise in relation
to an Organisation's existing policies, procedures and practices to ensure adequate
application of relevant 'internal' standards, and suitable levels of consistency
between designs and operating systems;
• Project teams, given their temporary nature, and due to the relatively high costs of
many projects, normally have relatively rigid cost and schedule targets; and
• Project teams are often incentivised to meet cost and schedule targets.
Furthermore, project teams may have a tendency to be optimistic about project costs and
schedules to satisfy initial business screening criteria and therefore ensure project viability. If
overly optimistic project plans are proposed, then, during the initial project phases, the resources
required to deliver the project can be adversely squeezed. This has the potential to sacrifice
quality and safety, and to increase the level of risk transfer to subsequent phases to avoid
compromising Capital Expenditure (CAPEX)cost and schedule. The literature that examines this
effect is limited and further work is essential to understand, for example, how risk transfer
decisions are understood and made by project teams, and how these risks are accommodated in
subsequent lifecycle phases. It is argued that the way costs are allocated during the entire
development lifecyde may not encourage features of safety management, such as inherent safety
in design. For example, initial project cost, i.e. CAPEX, is typically ring-fenced to ensure project
viability and to meet project financial targets.
To reduce or maintain CAPEX,risks might be transferred to the operating or abandonment phases
where risk mitigation often has to be achieved through lower order controls to preserve
Operating Expenditure (OPEX),especially as the implications of higher OPEXis to put more strain
on budgets as oil and gas reservoirs decline and the unit costs of production rise. Safety
Improvement in the operational phase then becomes progressively more difficult, technically,
operationally and financially.
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2.5.2 Safety (Risk) Management - General Principles
The OH&S-MS applies to all project development phases; therefore risk assessment is an intrinsic
component of each phase. 'Risk management' is the term generally used to cover the whole
process of identifying and evaluating risks, and establishing whether the controls in place, or to be
put in place, provide 'acceptable' residual risks to people, the environment, assets or reputation.
Other terms used synonymously are hazard management [140) and risk assessment (the term
hazard and risk, together with other relevant terms, are also defined in the Glossary). While risk
management can be applied in numerous types of government and private sector organisations,
in this research it is related to the risks from technological systems, such as the physical processes
associated with oil and gas exploration and exploitation. There are two primary types of risk
assessment: qualitative or quantitative. The risk assessment process is illustrated in Figure 17 and
is based on a diagram in "Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis" [141).
Figure 17 Illustration of a risk assessment process used in the oil and gas industry
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As with many topics relating to occupational health and safety, there are variations in the
definitions of the terms used. For example:
• risk is the threat that an event or action will adversely affect an Organisation's ability
to maximise stakeholder value and achieve its business objectives and business
strategies;
• risk arises as much from missed opportunities as it does from possible threats [142];
• risk is a combination of uncertainty and damage [141]; and
• risk is a combination of the likelihood of the occurrence of a hazardous event or
exposure(s), and the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by the event
or exposure(s) [28].
In general, the predominant OH&S-MS, in the oil and gas industry, is based on ISO 18001,
although companies may use any OH&S-MS they choose. Prior to ISO 18001, the industry OH&S-
MS was initially proposed by the oil industry international Exploration and Production Forum (E&P
forum). E&P forum was the international association of oil companies and petroleum industry
organisations formed in 1974, however it has subsequently been renamed as the International
Association of Oil and Gas Producers, (OGP) [28,44] [29).
Within the various OH&S-Ms there are also differences in the definitions and treatment regarding
risk perception [143), and risk criteria (acceptability or tolerability and risk estimation) [144-147].
All of these factors can lead to variability in the risk assessment process. As part of the oil and gas
industries OH&S-MS, the current recognised standard for hazard identification and risk
management for offshore operations is SS EN ISO17776 - 2002 [148]. In the scope it states,
"This International Standard describes some of the principal tools and techniques that are
commonly used for the identification and assessment of hazards associated with offshore oil and
gas exploration and production activities, including seismic and topographical surveys, drilling and
well operations, field development, operations, decommissioning and disposal, together with the
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necessary logistical support of each of these activities. It provides guidance on how these tools and
techniques can be used to assist in the development of strategies, both to prevent hazardous
events and to control and mitigate any events that may arise".
However, a different, but more detailed, version of the process is published by the The Institute of
Risk Management (IRM), The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers (AIRMIC) and ALARM,
the National Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector [149]. In either case, the resource
required for risk assessment should be commensurate with the estimated magnitude of the risk.
The process they describe is shown in Figure 18 below.
Figure 18 Processes for risk management
STEP 1
Identify Hazard
j
J STEP 2 i,. Screening CriteriaEvaluate Risk
r
PART of STEP 3
Identify
Risk-reduction
Measuresr
PART of STEP J
Set Functional
Requirements
Modification
Source BS EN ISO 17776:2002
The organisation's
strategic objectives
I
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis
Risk Identification
Risk Description
Risk Estimation
Risk Evaluation
I
I
~
Formal Audit
.,., Risk Reporting
Threats and Opportunities r
+
Oecislon
.-! Risk Treatment
• Residual Risk Reporting r,
Monitoring __r
Source AIRMIC, ALARM, IRM: 2002
The literature covering risk management demonstrates relatively common features and is well
documented. However, there is concern about the reliability of risk assessments by project
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managers as research has shown that there is often a significant degree of optimism bias and an
illusion of control relating to risk perception. Further research is being carried out in this area by
the International Institute of Risk and Safety Management in collaboration with Manchester
Business School and BP [150]. The primary tools and techniques used in oil and gas risk
assessment are described below.
2.5.3 Hazard Identification
Hazard identification is the first, and most important, element in the risk assessment process,
simply because if hazards are not identified, then they cannot be risk-assessed.
Hazard is defined as the "source or situation with a potential for harm in terms of human injury or
ill health, damage to property, damage to the workplace environment, or a combination of these
[44]". The primary hazards, i.e. checklists, associated with oil and gas operations are listed in
Annex 0 of BSEN ISO17716:2002 [148].
There are various types and styles of generic checklists that are readily available for many types of
hazard identification, and these are reasonably well documented [151, 152, 154, 155], although
most checklists are Intended to act as prompts rather than an exhaustive list of guidewords.
Consequently, there Is an expectation that competent personnel will identify and modify a
checklist(s), as appropriate, to suit the specific assessment being undertaken. Given the relative
commonality of hazards within onshore and offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation
operations, the tools often used, within the safety discipline, either in isolation or in combination,
are:
• Hazard identification (HAZIO) checklists [148];
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), which are primarily used to carry out a
systematic critical review of process systems [156-160]
• Procedural HAZOP that can be applied to batch or continuous processes to ensure
that every step in a procedure is properly considered [137, 148];
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• What-If Analysis, commonly called a Structured what-if technique (SWIFT), which is
essentially a brainstorming exercise applying similar approaches to HAZIOor HAZOP
studies but starting with the phase 'what-if' to generate discussion; and
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Modes and Effects Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) which is a systematic review of a mechanical system, considering
each component in turn and assessing the effects and criticality of failure [161].
Other risk studies generally used in the industry that directly, or indirectly, support safety
performance are:
• Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) studies, which are conducted
throughout the oil and gas industry to provide a quantifiable assessment of the
effectiveness of an operating asset. [161];
• Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) studies. The assessment of a safety function's
Safety Integrity Level or SIL, (also known as Instrument Protective Function, IPF,
Classification) provides a measure of the consequences of its failure on the system or
equipment's safety [161, 162].
Offshore-specific studies, as specified in 'A guide to Quantitative RiskAssessment for Offshore
Installations' [163], include:
• Temporary refuge impairment studies, Including smoke ingress analysis;
• Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA);
• Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA).This is similar to ESSAbut assesses
the ability to escape, evacuate and be rescued, following a major accident event;
• Hydrocarbon blowout (an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well or
between formation layers after all of the predefined technical well barriers or the
activation of the same have failed). This is a major incident with a high potential for
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multiple fatalities, and loss of the drilling facility, e.g. due to blowouts, riser and
pipeline failures;
• Ship collision impact analysis;
• Structural failures; and
• Transport accidents, e.g. flying and marine.
The key to a successful assessment is to have sufficient, competent personnel representing the
relevant disciplines, e.g. structural, safety, process, production, etc., and with adequate time to
properly conduct the assessment to ensure that hazards are identified and their controls or
mitigations evaluated. The timing of the study is also critical: too early and the safety implications
of subsequent design changes may be missed, too late and It may not be possible to make safety-
related changes to improve safety performance.
2.5.4 Major Acddent Databases
One of the difficulties experienced during this research was access to non-fee based
authenticated databases. Further problems are described below:
• no single definition of a major accident or disaster exists;
• data input for the databases is extremely varied and potentially unreliable;
• construction of databases, due to their search criteria, can yield widely differing results;
• there are delays in data and published reports becoming available;
• some databases can contain duplicates where similar information is derived from a
variety of sources; and
• the quantity of the data varies from a single line of text to more than a page.
Access to non-fee paying major accident databases is extremely limited and some free databases
that are available have no authentication to validate the data. Descriptions of some available
accident databases are given below.
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Worldwide Accident Databank (WOAD)
The Den Norske Veritas (DnV) Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) is a collection of
offshore accident data with statistical material that has been accumulated since 1975 [164]. It is
continuously being updated with the latest information from authorities, official publications and
reports, newspapers, databases, rig owners, and operators globally. All WOAD data, reporting and
filtering functionality is delivered through a fee-based web application.
UK Health and Safety Executive
Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS)
The UK HSEsponsors the Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) which is operated by AEA
Technology (AEAT) on their behalf. This information is required by the UK HSEas a regulator. A
public access'data service based on the MHIDAS accident database was established in 1985. The
database contains coded information on reports of some 8000 major accidents which are in the
public domain. The database is updated quarterly and is available to users via various media,
including compact disc and the internet [165]. Public access is delivered via a fee-based service
from AEAT.
Injury and Incident Statistics
The UK HSEalso publishes annually the Offshore Injury and Incident Statistics [166]. The annual
reports are part of a series of Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) Statistics Reports covering
offshore injury and incident statistics, which continue from previous Offshore Technology Reports
from the UK HSE.Data is derived from submissions by oil and gas companies under the Reporting
of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR). This is a useful
database since it is a statutory requirement to report relevant events, and is therefore scrutinised
by the UK HSE.The information is free and publicly-available, and was used in this research.
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Hydrocarbon Releases Database
The UK HSEpublishes Offshore Injury and Incident Statistics Reports that contain information and
trends on offshore hydrocarbon releases. Offshore releases of hydrocarbons are currently
reported to the Offshore Safety Division (OSD) as dangerous occurrences under RIDDOR,which
became effective offshore on 1 April 1996. The Hydrocarbon Releases (HCR) System contains
detailed voluntary information on offshore hydrocarbon release incidents, which is
supplementary to that provided under RIDDOR (and previous offshore legislation prior to April
1996) and the database contains reports dating from 1 October 1992 [167]. This database is also
scrutinised by the UK HSE,and was used in this research.
Research Reports
Several projects were undertaken by Den Norske Verltas (DnV) and Oil and Gas UK on behalf of
the UK HSE, to obtain accident statistics for offshore fixed and floating units on the UK
Continental Shelf (UKCS).Four databases having such information about relevant incidents were
interrogated. These were:
• The Combined Online Information System (COINS) and ORION (acronym not published
but the former Sun Safety System,) held by the UK HSE;
• Offshore Blowout Database held by Stiftelsen for Industriel! og Teknisk Forskning, SINTEF,
Norway;
• Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD, DnV); and
• MAIB accident database (UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch)
As of a result of these projects the UK.HSEpublished the following reports which can be freely
accessed by the public, and which were used in this research:
• Accidents Statistics for Offshore Units on the UKCS1990 - 2007, April 2009;
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• Accidents Statistics for Offshore Units on the UKCS1990 - 2006, completed in March
2008;
• Accidents Statistics Fixed Offshore Units on the UKContinental Shelf 1980 - 2005; and
• Accidents Statistics Floating Offshore Units on the UKContinental Shelf 1980 - 2005.
Given that the UK is often used to benchmark global safety activities and the research reports are
free and available on the UK HSEwebsite, the data was used in this research.
Major Accident Reporting System (MARS)
The scope of the European Commission (EU) official online reporting system, eMARS, facilitates
the exchange of information on accidents and near-misses related to Seveso [96, 169]
establishments, Le. industries where dangerous substances are present in quantities exceeding
thresholds set by the EU, and promotes lessons learned among the EU Member States and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, as well as the
general public. The system contains data on chemical accidents and near-misses reported to the
Major Accident and Hazards Bureau (MAHB) by the competent National Authorities under the
current and prior Seveso Directives since 1982. The information related to the reported event is
entered into eMARS by the EU Member States and OECD Countries themselves. Reporting an
event into eMARS is compulsory for EU Member States when a Seveso establishment is involved
and the event satisfies one or more of the six criteria set out in the Seveso Directive. The eMARS
database has the narrowest scope since it contains only those incidents notified to the ECunder
the Seveso Directive (or the COMAH Regulations in the UK). The reporting is done on a voluntary
basis by those OECDCountries which are non-EU Members. Access is free if registered with the
MARSorganisation. This database was used in this research.
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The Institution of Chemical Engineers (lChemE)
The IChemE provides an Accident Database that has a much broader focus than MHIDAS or MARS.
It covers global accidents of all sizes as well as near-misses. The Accident Database is delivered via
a fee-based service from IChemE.
This database appears to only provide results up to the year 2000. It is currently (2011) not
maintained, although IChemE have plans to restore and update the database. Consequently, it
was not used in this research.
The International Association of 011and Gas Producers (OGP)
This Association has been collecting incident data from member companies since 1985. The
database is considered to be the largest database of safety performance in the exploration and
production industry. Its principle purpose is to provide the industry with trend analysis,
benchmarking, and the identification of areas and activities that should bring about the greatest
improvements in performance. Incident data is global and covers both onshore and offshore
operations, and member companies and their contractor employees. Access to the Annual Safety
Performance Reports is free via the OGPwebsite, and these were used in this research.
The International Association of Drllllni Contractors (IADC)
The IADC provides annual safety performance reports, the Incident Statistics Program (ISP), based
on compiled data volunteered by drilling contractors worldwide. During 2009, 125 contractors,
representing approximately 78% of the worldwide oil and gas drilling rig fleet, participated in
providing data. The annuallSP reports are freely available online and were used in this research.
Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA)
OREDA is a project organisation with eight oil and gas companies as members (2009). It collects
and collates reliability data and provides a databank. The data is derived globally but OREDA is
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also a forum for the exchange of reliability methods and experience within the oil and gas
industry. Its general objectives are stated as:
• 'To improve safety by providing experience and data on risks;
• To improve reliability and availability by the use of reliability data to select the most
reliable equipment and configurations, and to reveal design weaknesses;
• To improve maintenance effectiveness by using failure data to refine maintenance
strategies; and
• To enhance industry reputation by demonstrating a high degree of understanding of
equipment performance and characteristics".
ORDEAhas issued five handbooks (in the years 1984, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2009) that have been
sold in over 50 countries, and has developed an ISOStandard based on the OREDAconcept (ISO
14224) [162). The 2009 version has two volumes and costs (2011 prices) NOK 4250 per copy
(Volume 1 or Volume 2) and NOK6250 for both handbooks [171). Given the cost and its limited
applicability for this research, it was not used.
Stlftelsen for Industrlell og Teknlsk Forsknlng (SINTEF)
SINTEF collects, collates and analyses Offshore Blowout Data. Blowout and well release
frequencies are established and updated each year [172). The data is derived from the
geographical areas of the U.S.Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf, Canada East Continental
Shelf, and the North Sea. SINTEFreleased the Offshore Blowout Database as an Internet database
in 2009. The database includes information on 573 offshore blowouts/well releases that have
occurred world-wide since 1955.
The blowouts/well releases are categorised by several parameters, emphasising blowout causes.
The database and annual report are confidential and only accessible for the project sponsors.
Access to the database was made available to the author by one of the participating
organisations, and it was used in this research.
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Lees
A source of data is available in the three-volume set, 'Loss Prevention in the Process Industries -
Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control, edited by Frank P. Lees'. The first edition was
published In 1980, and the third, and current (2011) was published in January 2005. The second
edition, published in 1996 was consulted in this research but the data was too limited and thus
was not used [135].
011 Rig Disasters
This is a free online website, and although unauthenticated, is a useful source of information
[173]. The information corresponds reasonably well with authenticated data (e.g. from the data
sources described above), and provides information sources that can easily be validated.
Consequently it was used in this research. However, It is limited to drilling rig disasters only.
2.5.5 Quantitative Consequence Analysis (ORA)
The literature covering primary major hazards associated with offshore oil and gas exploration
and exploitation relates to:
• Hydrocarbon release through processing, blowout, riser and pipelines;
• Non-process fires;
• Structural failures;
• Transport/logistics failures and collisions, for marine and aviation operations; and
• Occupational events.
More specifically, in terms of hydrocarbon releases, there is ample literature covering
phenomenological and computational fluid dynamic (CFD)modelling [174,175]. However, the use
of models, especially those covering fire and explosion, presents problems, particularly in the
offshore sector. As the models become more sophisticated, and designs are re-modelled at later
dates using newer software, over or under design problems may be revealed. These issues may be
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difficult to reconcile, as offshore designs are generally optimised to produce minimum footprints
and structures to reduce initial construction and subsequent operational and maintenance costs.
Often, elements of contingency are not provided for in initial design specifications, primarily due
to the high capital costs.
There are various software models that support major hazard analysis and these are listed in
Table 4. Interrogation of the models in the publication, "The Guide to Quantitative Risk
Assessment for Offshore Installations" indicates that many have been updated to reflect
continuous improvements in their accuracy and reliability, and to accommodate newer computer
operating platforms [163).
Table 4 Software used in the oil and gas industry for risk assessment
Category Example of Software Supplier
General Offshore Risk Analysis Offshore Hazard and Risk Ana lysis (OHRAT) Den Norske Veritas Ltd
Toolkit, superseded by Neptune
Fire and Gas Explosion Modeling FRED Shell International
Explosion Modeling AutoReaGas (CFD) Century Dynamics Ltd
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis EVAC Saftec UK Ltd
Populations Databases North Sea Facts Database Oilfield Publications Ltd
Reliability Analysis CARA Den Norske Veritas Ltd
Event Tree Analysis LOGAN R M Consultants Ltd
The issue is not adequately covered in current literature, and requires further research to identify
the implications, especially when applying an inherently safe approach to design.
2.5.5.1 Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis involves estimating the likelihood of the failure case under assessment. There
are generally two basic forms in which the analysis can be expressed:
• Frequency: the expected number of occurrences of the event per unit time (usually
a year); and
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• Probability: the probability of an event occurring in a given time period or the
conditional probability given that a previous event has occurred. A probability is
dimensionless, and in the range 0 - 1.
The primary approaches to determining frequency are:
• Using historical frequency data;
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [177], that requires breaking down an event/failure into
component causes and estimating the frequency of each component event/failure,
using a combination of event/failure data and engineering judgement
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [178], which is similar to FTAbut starts at the event/failure
and develops this into an assessment of the potential outcomes.
The sources of information Include accident databases, published accident frequency analysis,
published risk assessments, reliability data, and accident data collections [179-181]. Given that
the technology changes, the types of analysis, e.g. FTA& ETA,can be subjective and the data may
be inaccurate for various reasons, in which case, as for consequence analysis, the results usually
have to be treated with caution.
2.5.5.2 Qualitative Consequence and Frequency Analysis
Another method involves working out a risk level by categorising the likelihood of the harm and
the potential severity of the harm, and then plotting these two risk-determining factors against
each other in a risk assessment matrix (RAM), Figure 19.
Qualitative risk assessment, e.g. using a RAM, is useful where the data needed for Quantitative
RiskAssessment (QRA) is unavailable, such as in new or novel designs, or where risks are not likely
to constitute a major accident hazard and the need for QRA is not justified. However, it is more
subjective and therefore a team of suitably-competent personnel covering all relevant disciplines
is generally required to obtain realistic results.
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Getting this wrong could result in applying unnecessary controls, or failing to take important ones
into consideration. The literature shows several variations of risk assessment matrix, but, in
general, these relate to the expansion and description of the categories of severity and frequency,
and therefore lead to wide variations in application. Figure 19 shows an example of a Risk
Assessment Matrix.
Figure 19 Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)
Potential Severity of Harm
Unlikely
Extremely Harmful
Moderate
Occurring
likely Moderate
Unlikely
Source: Health and Safety Executive, Risk Management, FAQs
2.5.6 Evaluation of risks and Screening Criteria
2.5.6.1 Introduction
Risk is primarily confined to the risk to people, although most risk assessment can include risks to
assets, the environment and reputation. In many respects, any major accident will affect all these
areas and therefore by protecting people there are indirect benefits in minimizing asset,
environmental and reputational impacts. This research is only concerned with situations where
people are exposed to risk.
Much of the literature is based on the principles established by the UK HSE in deciding how to
assess both the tolerability and level of risk inherent in oil and gas exploration and exploitation
[59].
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In the UK, the requirement for risks to be 'as low as is reasonably practicable' (ALARP) is
fundamental and applies to all activities within the scope of the UK Health and Safety at Work,
etc. Act 1974 [45]. The UK HSE considers that duties to ensure health and safety so far as is
reasonably practicable ('SFAIRP') and duties to reduce risks as low as is reasonably practicable
("ALARp") require the same set of tests to be applied. There is little legal guidance defining what
reducing risks as low as is reasonably practicable means since the [U.K.] Court of Appeal held that;
"... In every case, It Is the risk that has to be weighed against the measures necessary to eliminate
the risk. The greater the risk, no doubt, the less will be the weight to be given to the factor of cost"
and
"'Reasonably practicable' is a narrower term than 'physically possible' and seems to me to imply
that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one
scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money,
time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is 0 gross disproportion
between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge
the onus on them".
The HSEonly expect organisations to address those risks that are a reasonably foreseeable cause
of potential harm so as to avoid unnecessary attention on potentially abstract risks. In this context
the assessment of risk has to consider employees, the self-employed, and members of the public
that may be affected by an incident caused by an organisation's activities.
The ALARP principle is based on the 'reversed onus of proof that requires all identified risk
reduction measures to be implemented, unless it can be demonstrated that there is a gross
disproportion between costs and benefits. The determination of what is grossly disproportionate
is often carried out using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and various financial values are used to
represent the statistical loss of life, or Implied Cost of Averting Fatalities (ICAF) [92, 182] [183]
[163].
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The financial values used can vary according to whether the risk is to individuals, such as in the
transport sector or rail industry, or is much higher, and there is the potential for multiple
fatalities, as in the oil and gas industry [184] [185]. However, it is also argued that the financial
criteria used, such as net present value (NPV), do not adequately reflect the risks and
uncertainties [186, 187]. It is also argued that risk criteria should not be used, perhaps because
they are too prescriptive, and that judgments should instead be made using the concept of cost-
effectiveness [188]. However, the use of cost-effectiveness is likely to be as, if not more,
subjective and controversial.
The sacrifice discussed by the UK HSE,as part of ALARPdecision-making, relates to the measures
that an organisation could take to prevent or mitigate the potential harmful effects of a particular
risk. Measures, in this context, mean time, money and effort. However, the UKHSEargue that the
financial viability of a particular project is not a legitimate factor in the assessment of its safety
costs, Le. organisations should not take into account their sizeand financial position when making
judgments on whether risks have been reduced ALARP, and that the benefits gained by
organisations as a result of effective and efficient implementation of health and safety measures
should be offset against the costs they incur.
The general principle, applied by the UK authorities and UK courts when considering whether
ALARPhas been reached, is on the basisof proportionality, and therefore the greater the risk, the
less weight will be given to the factor of cost. However, the UK HSEhas not formulated an
algorithm which can be used to determine the proportion factor for a given level of risk. The
extent of the bias must be argued by organisations on a case-by-case basis. However, there is
some criticism that, for example, the current UK offshore safety case regime indirectly fails to
present an ALARPcase, as there is no explicit requirement in the regulations to provide a robust
case clearly demonstrating how an organisation's arrangements lead to a continued safe
operation [189].
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Societal concerns can arise when the realisation of a risk impacts on society as a whole. The public
and political impact may produce an adverse response (which has its origins in the public aversion
to certain characteristics of the hazards concerned, e.g. nuclear). The harm which results is a loss
of confidence by society in the provisions and arrangements in place for protecting people, and,
consequently, a loss of trust in the regulator. This was an outcome from the Piper Alpha Inquiry,
when the role of the regulator was transferred from the Department of Energy to the Health and
Safety Executive, and similarly, the transfer of regulatory duties following the Deepwater Horizon
investigation. This situation often arises when large numbers of people are killed at one time,
where potential victims are particularly vulnerable (such as children), or where the nature of the
risks inspires dread (such as long-term or irreversible effects).
It is often possible to transfer risks, e.g. from one phase of a development lifecycle to another.
However, this should be seen in the context of a holistic view of the overall development lifecycle.
Therefore transferring risk may not constitute ALARP when considered over the development
lifecycle. For example, transferring a risk from design may not be effective, and probably not cost-
effective, If the subsequent controls required rely on lower order controls. Furthermore, the costs
of making changes to a design during the operational phase are likely to be significantly higher
than during the design and construction phases. It should be noted that risks may also be
transferred both internally and externally. For example, it is argued that in the case of the
Flixborough disaster, (an explosion at a chemical plant close to the village of Flixborough, England,
on 1 June 1974, which killed 28 people and seriously injured 36) [36], the process was replaced by
one which was less hazardous, but which used a raw material manufactured elsewhere by an
equally hazardous process [190]. Assessments require that organisations identify the hazards in
their workplace, determine who might be harmed and how, evaluate the risk from the hazards,
and decide whether the existing control measures are suitable and sufficient, or whether more
should be done. There are various tools and techniques for the evaluation of risk which are
common to the industry, although it is suggested that this is not the case for determining inherent
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safety [191]. Similarly, most organisations, including global oil and gas companies, have similar
hazards and therefore similar risks, requiring broadly similar controls, although the focus may vary
between organisations. Consequently, there are a number of industry standards that have been
developed which provide good, if not best, practice. These standards are normally accepted by
the UK HSE,if properly implemented, as reducing the risks to ALARP [147]. Nevertheless, this still
has to be demonstrated by an organisation, to be the case.
During the design stage there may be a number of options available to meet specifications, and
therefore choices have to be made. Often, for large projects the project performance criteria
comprise a combination of factors such as cost, schedule, and health, safety and environment.
Therefore judgments have to be made about which combination of these options delivers an
overall ALARPcase, when assessed against lifecycle criteria. This issue can be more difficult with
brownfield, compared to greenfield, projects as there are generally implications associated with
retrofitting existing plant in order to interface with a new system. Given the above vagaries
associated with risk assessment and screening criteria, the literature is similarly vague in its
evaluation of risk tolerability, although there is guidance as discussed below.
2.5.6.2 Quantitative Risk Criteria
The basis for quantitative risk criteria is derived from the nuclear industry, and the Report
"Tolerability of Risk of Nuclear Power Stations" [145]. Some of the key issues identified in the
Report are:
• '70lerability'does not mean 'acceptability'. It refers to a willingness to live with a risk
so as to secure certain benefits, and in the confidence that it is being properly
controlled. To tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or
something we might ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review,
and reduce still further if and when we can. Fora risk to be 'acceptable' on the other
hand, means that for the purposes of life or work, we are prepared to take it pretty
well as it is.
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• Risk is the chance that something adverse will happen
• There is no such thing as 'nil risk'.
• We can distinguish the general levels of risk that individuals accept for a personal
benefit (such as pay at work) and we can also see the level of risk we usually ignore
or regard as negligible".
These levels are broadly described in terms of average figures. Table 5 illustrates typical
comparative risk levels for certain activities.
Table 5 Levels of Fatal Risk (average figures approximated)
Per annum Description
1 in 100 Risk of death from five hours of solo rock climbing every weekend
1 in 1000 Risk of death due to work in high risk groups within relatively risky
industries such as mining
1 in 10,0000 General risk of death in a traffic accident
1 in 100,000 Risk of death in an accident at work in the very safest parts of industry
1 in 1 million General risk of death in a fire or explosion from gas at home
1 in 10 million Risk of death by lightning
Source:Tolerability of Riskof Nuclear Power Stations
There are also variations in risk criteria used in other countries. These are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 International Risk Criteria
UK Hong Kong The Netherlands Austraiia (New South
Wales)
Individual risk de minimus 1 in 10,000 Not used Not used Not used
(Worker) (negligible)
Individual risk de minimus 1 in 1,000,000 Not used 1 in 100,000,000 Not used
(Public)
Individual risk de manifestus 1 in 1000 Not used Not used Not used
(Worker) (intolerable)
Individual risk de manifestus 1 in 10,000 1 in 10,000 1 in 1,000,000 1 in 1,000,000
(Public)
Source:Government tolerable risk cntena summary [146]
Deminimus meansa negligible risk
Demanifestus means an unacceptable risk
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The literature demonstrates significant variation in approach and ranges in risk tolerability
criteria.
2.5.7 A Decision Making Framework used in the Oil and Gas Industry
Guidelines have been produced by the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOAj, now called
Oil and Gas UK, that describes a framework to assist risk-related decision making, primarily where
the risks concerned are those associated with major accident hazards [192]. The framework takes
account of the various business, technical and social factors that influence decision-making and is
intended to be transparent and fully auditable. However, the guidelines are non-prescriptive and
can reflect the values of different companies. Its primary focus is to cover major safety-related
decisions during the design, operation and abandonment of offshore installations, although it has
wider applicability.
Since it is stated that the guidelines are industry good practice, then the application of the
guidelines should contribute to an ALARP case in the decision-making process (Figure 20).
Figure 20 A decision support framework for major accident hazard safety
SIGNIFICANCE TO DECISION MAKING PROCESS--- Decision context typeMeans of calibration
A
Nothing new or unusual
Well understood risk
Established practice
No major stakeholder implications
Codes and standards
Verification
jCodes and standards
Peer review
Benchmal1<ing
B
Lifecycle implications
Some risk tradeoffsltransfers
Some uncertainty or deviation from
standard or best practice
Significant economic implications
Inlemal slakeholder consullation
ISocietal I C
Very novel or challenging
Strong stakeholder views and perceptions
Significanl risk tradeoffs/transfers
Large uncertainties
Perceived lowering of safety standards
- --------------------------------------- --------------
External stakeholder consuttation
Source: A Framework for Risk Related Decision Support, Oil and Gas UK
In a speech to a Process Safety forum in London, the chairman of the UK HSE, Judith Hackitt,
stated there is an "unfortunate propensity among the process industries such as oil, and gas
production and chemicals manufacture to emphasize difference as a reason for not recognizing
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what they hove in common and working together". She continued, "Process safety management
and leadership Is on area where this makes absolutely no sense and where we need to maximize
the shoring of knowledge and learning". This speech was triggered in part by UK HSEanalysis
which showed that in the year 2010 - 2011 there had been 105 loss of containment incidents
categorised as dangerous occurrences under RIDDOR,more than half of which were considered to
be precursor events for potential major accidents [193]. The guidelines can also be used in
combination with other decision-making aids such as Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) [194,
195], Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [196] or decision trees [197]. Naturally these guidelines
need to be used by competent personnel, as with all HSEtools and techniques.
2.5.8 Assessing the risk for low frequency, hlah consequence events
How does the industry deal with rare and extreme occurrences if an event is calculated to occur
once every 1000 or 10,000 years, when typically oil and gas facilities have a design life of 20 - 40
years? We anticipate it happening but it could occur at any time during that period. In Black Swan
theory (see 2.5.9) any future event falls into one of three categories:
• Known known (known to have an effect and information is available to predict its
likelihood);
• Known unknown (known to have an effect but unable to predict its likelihood); and
• Unknown unknown (hazard not known and therefore its likelihood is not relevant).
This Is Illustrated by the following examples used by Nassim Nicholas Taleb as part of his Black
Swan theory [198]:
"When smoking gained popularity It was thought to be beneficial to health and therefore it was on
'unknown - unknown', but when 0 link to lung cancer was discovered it become 0 'known-
unknown'; in other words it was known to hove on effect but the likelihood was unknown. As the
link become more fully understood, it moved towards 0 'known-known'. In the case of
earthquakes, we know they occur but not when, i.e. 0 'known-unknown'. The nuclear industry has
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not been around for a million years and no anthropologic structure is designed to last that long so
expressing the reliability of a plant in terms of one event per million years demonstrates some
weaknesses in the validity of the assessment. It is argued that there is a tendency to
underestimate the probability of failure and that the edges of probability graphs are bigger than
equations predict (i.e. where the probability of an event occurring can range anywhere from just
above 0% to just below 100%. It cannot be exactly 100%, because then it would be a certainty, not
a risk, and it cannot be exoctly 0%, or it wouldn't be a risk). However, these are the areas in which
the most extreme events sit and may constitute some of the 'unknown-unknown'risks. Essentially,
an 'unknown-unknown' is one that has not been considered at all, until it happens, when it stops
being an unknown".
2.5.9 Black Swan Theory
Taleb's Black Swan Theory or Theory of Black Swan Events is a metaphor that encapsulates the
concept that an event is a surprise (to the observer) and has a major impact. After the fact, the
event is rationalised by hindsight.
The 'Black Swan Theory' refers only to unexpected events of large magnitude and consequence
and their dominant role in history. Such events, considered extreme outliers, collectively play
vastly larger roles than regular occurrences.
However, in accident causation theory it may be argued that major accidents are not hard to
predict if, for example, diverse warnings signs are consistently and comprehensively identified,
and not ignored. It is only when it might happen that is difficult to determine, therefore giving the
appearance of a random event. Furthermore, in oil and gas operations most major hazards are
well understood and the consequences of error or failure leading to a disaster can be qualitatively
or quantitatively determined, using, for example, computational fluid dynamic (CFD)models. Also,
the impact of recent disasters, e.g. Deepwater Horizon, is well documented and publicised in
various media, ensuring they are well developed and distributed in the public domain.
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2.6 Major Accidents
2.6.1Introductlon
The European Commission (EC) recognises that the scale and characteristics of recent offshore
accidents and near-misses demand action, and that they expose the disparity between the
increasing complexity of oil and gas operations and inadequacies in current risk management
practices. This includes wide variations in safety performance and attitudes, the challenges facing
the regulators to provide suitable support, lack of transparency, and data sharing. Consequently,
in October 2011, the EU proposed additional measures to reduce the risks of major accidents and
to limit their consequences [69].
While there are variations in the definitions of major accident, it is proposed to use two
definitions that are widely applied in the UK. The first is derived from the Control of Major
Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH) 1999 [96], which is applied to qualifying onshore
installations, but not to offshore installations, and the second from the Offshore Installations
(Safety case) Regulations 2005 [200].
2.6.2 Onshore and Offshore Major Hazards
COMAH and its predecessor (the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards, CIMAH [201]) were
initiated after the Seveso disaster. This was an industrial accident that occurred on July 10, 1976,
in a small chemical manufacturing plant north of Milan in Italy. It resulted in the highest known
exposure to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) in residential populations, which gave rise
to numerous scientific studies and standardised industrial safety regulations. This also led to
much harsher Industrial safety regulations, encompassed in the Seveso Directive, that were
passed in the European Community in 1982. The Seveso Directive was updated in 1999, and
amended again in 2005, and is currently referred to as the Seveso II Directive (or COMAH
Regulations, in the United Kingdom) [202].
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The SevesoDirective was also a response to previous serious onshore chemical or petrochemical
incidents such as the explosion of cyclohexane in the Nypro ltd. plant at Flixborough [36]. During
the next two years, three additional serious chemical accidents occurred within the European
Community: these were at Seek [203], Manfredonia [204], and finally Seveso. The Seveso
Directive requires that the workers and general public are made aware of the hazards that
threaten them, and how the industry responsible for the hazard(s) will manage the residual risks.
However, this 'need to know' principle is not the same as the 'right to know' principle that is
widely adopted in the U.S., i.e. the status of 'need' is determined by the authorities and is not a
right of citizens [205].
Similar to the motivation for the Seveso Directives, the offshore safety case regime evolved from
the Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. This requires that the operator of a hazardous offshore
installation demonstrates to the regulatory authority the safe design and operation of the
installation rather than compliance with the regulations. The offshore safety case is broadly
similar to that required for onshore installations but with key differences as described below.
Qualifying, in relation to the COMAHRegulations, means an establishment having any substance,
specified in Schedule 1 of the regulations, present at, or above, the qualifying quantity. There are
two thresholds, known as lower-tier and top-tier, and the application of either tier is dependent
on the quantities of dangerous substances at an establishment. lower-tier operators must take
'all measures necessary' to prevent major accidents and report any that do occur. An important
duty of lower-tier operators is the preparation of a Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP).This
duty reflects the vital role of management systems in accident prevention [65]. If any top-tier
threshold is equalled or exceeded, the operator must also comply with additional regulations and
prepare and submit a written safety report, analogous to an offshore safety case.
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The COMAH regulations define major accident as, "on occurrence (including in particular, 0 major
emission, fire or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the
operation of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health or the
environment, Immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or
more dangerous substances".
The qualifying criteria for offshore major accidents are set out in The Offshore Safety Case
Regulations [200] that define major accident as,
• "a fire, explosion or the release of 0 dangerous substance involving death or serious
personal injury to persons on the installation or engaged in on activity on or in
connection with it;
• on event involving major damage to the structure of the installation or plant affixed
thereto or any loss in the stability of the installation;
• the collision of a helicopter with the installation;
• the failure of life support systems for diving operations in connection with the
installation, the detachment of 0 diving bell used for such operations or the trapping
of 0 diver in 0 diving bell or other subsea chamber used for such operations; or
• any other event arising from 0 work activity involving death or serious personal
injury to five or more persons on the Installation or engaged in on activity in
connection with it".
Noteworthy are the key differences between the definitions. The COMAH definition considers the
danger to people, the environment and the public, while the offshore regulations definition does
not need to consider the public, but neither does it consider the environment. Furthermore, the
offshore regulations are also specifically required to consider the structure of the installation and
helicopter and diving operations.
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Similarly, there are also guidelines for the global development of safety cases for onshore and
offshore drilling units, produced by the International Association of Drilling Contractors [206-208].
However, in most cases, national laws take precedence over industry guidelines.
2.6.3 Offshore Independent Certification and Verification
2.6.3.1 Certification
Prior to 1988, offshore installations were subject to the requirements of obtaining a five-yearly
certificate of fitness (CoF). The role of assessing the fitness-for-purpose of offshore installations
for continuing operations rested with a certifying authority (CA), which was appointed by the
regulator. This role consisted of assessing inspection techniques and results, and overseeing
repairs and technical reassessment as needs arose, subject to technical guidance and survey
requirements laid down in statute, to qualify for a CoF [116]. The guidance was first published by
the Department of Energy in 1974, to support the Offshore Installations (Construction and Survey)
Regulations 1974 to provide a consistent basis for the certification of offshore installations by
Government-appointed certifying authorities [116]. The guidance was regularly updated to keep
up with evolving technical knowledge and the fourth and final edition was published in 1990. The
UK HSE withdrew the guidance from publication in June 1998 at the end of the certification
regime.
In 1998, the certification regime was replaced by a risk-based regulatory regime, i.e. Verification.
This entails the inspection and assessment requirements being subject to the duty holders own
technical planning with an element of independent verification by a third party. The results of
such arrangements are not required to be automatically reported to the regulator.
2.6.3.2 Verification
The duty holder (i.e. the operator for a fixed installation and the owner of a mobile Installation),
for the life of an Installation, from design through the various lifecycle phases to decommissioning
and dismantlement, has to ensure that there is a suitable written scheme, called a verification
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scheme, which makes certain that safety critical elements are suitable and remain in good repair
and condition, Figure 21. In this context, duty holders have a statutory duty to control the risks of
a major accident as defined in the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SCROs)
[200]. Verification must ensure that safety critical elements and the Offshore Installations
(Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 (PFEER)specified
plant are initially suitable and remain suitable for the life of the installation [126]. Duty holders
also have a further duty under SCROs to put in place and keep under continual review a
verification scheme, by means of which assurance is obtained from an independent competent
body or person (ICB/ICP). This is to ensure that safety critical elements and PFEERspecified plant
are suitable and remain suitable for the life of the installation.
Figure 21 Typical Verification Scheme
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The ICP can work for the organisation but have to be sufficiently impartial and objective in their
judgment and have independence from pressures, especially of a financial nature. They should
not verify their own work, and their management lines should be separate from those whose
work they are checking e.g. the independent person's management chain should not include the
management responsible for either the work being verified or for meeting production targets.
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2.6.3.3 Safety Critical Elements (SCEs)
Safety Critical Elements (SeEs) are defined through the following:- "Any structure, plant,
equipment, system (Including computer software) or component part whose failure could cause or
contribute substantially to a major accident is safety-critical, as is any which is intended to prevent
or limit the effect of a major accident. The term 'contribute substantially to a major accident' is
intended to include within the category of 'safety-critical element' those parts whose failure would
not directly cause a major accident but would make a significant contribution to a chain of events
which could result in a major accident". In order to be regarded as a suitable written scheme, the
Verification scheme must give assurance that the safety critical elements:
a) are (or, where they remain to be provided, will be) suitable; and
b) where they have been provided, remain in good repair and condition.
2.6.3.4 Performance Standards
Performance standards, in the context of SeEs, ensure that the SeEs provide functionality,
availability, reliability and survivability, and contain detailed acceptance criteria and contingency
actions when the performance criteria are not met.
2.6.4 Disaster reduction
While not specific to technological disasters, the United Nations (UN) has assessed the current
risks associated with natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and droughts [209].
They state that their causes and impacts are increasingly better understood but governments
have yet to find a way of reducing and managing the risks they pose.
In some respects this is analogous to the rare but high-consequence technological disasters
encountered in the petrochemical business, in that many of the immediate and underlying causes
are understood but they continue to occur. The following observations are made:
Page 84
• Countries with weak governance are likely to find it difficult to address underlying risk
drivers. This is similar to the disasters at Texas City (2005) and Deepwater Horizon where
regulator failures were identified as contributory factors;
• Extreme hazards and events are not seen as synonymous with extreme risks, as countries
with similar hazards manage the resultant risks differently. In oil and gas operations, the
hydrocarbon hazard is managed differently between countries, organisations, and in
some cases, within the same company;
• The main opportunities for reducing risk lie in reducing vulnerability. The United Nations
believes this can be achieved by addressing the underlying causes through strengthened
governance. In oil and gas, improvements in audits and reviews are also seen as crucial to
improving safety performance;
• Both individuals and governments seem to discount low-probability future losses and are
therefore reluctant to invest in disaster management. Accounting for potential disaster
losses does not guarantee greater investment but it may enable a more transparent
assessment of liabilities. Equally, in the oil and gas industry the economic effects of
disasters such as Deepwater Horizon, may need to be more weighted when making policy
decisions about resource allocation;
• Historical evidence shows that societies have always accepted a degree of risk into their
technological systems, urban infrastructure and cosmology. However, the funds for
disaster reduction management (DRM) often compete with other priorities for limited
resources, whereas the UN propose that DRM must be seen as an integral part of local
government, but there needs to be political commitment and suitable financial provision
to deliver resilience. Similarly, safety management has identical issues.
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2.7 Historical Safety Performance of the oil and gas industry
2.7.1 Measuring performance
Oil and gas companies, and other organisations, such as the Oil and Gas Producers (OGP)
Association [210] and the UK HSE [211], use various indicators to measure performance [212,
213]; a role shared with OH&S-MSs, so that judgments can be made about the implementation
and effectiveness of the arrangements (strategies, processes and activities) for controlling risk,
Table 7 [28, 32, 44].
Table 7 Injury-based Safety Performance Indicators used by OGP, IADCand HSE
Key Performance OGP IADC HSE
Indicator (KPI)
No. of Fatalities "Fatal Accident Rate " " The number of fatalities per 10 million exposure hours(FAR)
Fatal Incident Rate " The number of fatal incidents per 10 million exposure hours(FIR)
Fatal Injury Rate " The number of fatal incidents per 100, 000 exposure hoursMajor Injury· Rate " The number of major injuries per 100,000 exposure hoursFatal Injury Rate " Seeaboveplus Major Injury
Rate
Over 3 Day Injury " Lost Time Injury resulting in at least three days off workRate
Lost Time Injury " " Lost Time Injury (LTI) is an injury resulting in at least one day off work andFrequency (LTIF) the frequency is the number of fatalities plus the number of LTis per one
million exposure hours
Total Recordable " Total Recordable Incident Rate is the number of fatalities plus LTls plusIncident (case) Rate RWDCsplus Medical Treatment Case (MTCs - see below) per one million
exposure hours
Restricted Workday " Restricted Workday Cases are injuries and occupational incidents that areCase (RWCor severe enough to prevent a person from performing normal duties, but not
RWDC) plus LTiF so severe that lighter duties cannot be performed. The rate is RWCs plus
LTisper one million exposure hours.
Medical Treatment " Any work- related injury or illness requiring medical care or treatmentIncident Rate (MTC) beyond first aid (regardless of the provider of such treatment) that does
not result in a Restricted Work Case (RWC) or Lost Time Incident (LTI). The
rate is based on the number of MTCs per 200, 000 exposure hours
Restricted Work " Number of RWCsper 200, 000 exposure hoursIncidence Rate
Lost Time Incidence " Number of fatalities plus LTis per 200, 000 exposure hoursRate
DARTIncidence " DARTIncident Rate is the number of Fatalities plus LTls plus RWCsper 200,Rate 000 exposure hours
(Days Away from
work or Restricted
Time/work)
Recordable " Recordable Incident Rate is the number of fatalities plus LTls plus RWCsIncidence Rate plus MTCs per 200, 000 exposure hours
DARTFrequency " DART Frequency Rate is the number of Fatalities plus LTls plus RWCs perRate one million exposure hours
Recordable " Recordable Frequency Rate is the number of fatalities plus LTls plus RWCsFrequency Rate plus MTCs per one million exposure hours, ,.Major Injury ISdefined In the guide to the Reporting of tnjuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 [214]
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Measuring performance is an essential requirement of an OH&S-MS to help achieve one of its
principle aims: that of continuous and sustainable improvement in safety. The Safety Policy
should include a commitment to the prevention of injury and ill health and continual
improvement in OH&S management and OH&S performance.
The OH&S-MS should ensure that reports on the performance of the OH&S management system
are presented to top management for review and used as a basis for improvement of the OH&S
management system; it should establish, implement and maintain a procedure(s) to monitor and
measure OH&S performance on a regular basis. Table 8 is used by the UK HSEand lists the non-
injury-based KPls. KPls should not be confused with Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that are,
literally, the factors that are critical to success but are not necessarily measures of performance
[215].
Table 8 Non-Injury-based Safety Performance Indicators used by HSE
Key Performance Description
Indicator (KPI)
Number of Major "Potential to quickly impact outwith the local area, e.g. affects the Temporary Refuge
Hydrocarbon Releases (TR),escape routes, and escalates to other areas of the installation, causing serious injury
or fatalities." A major leak, if ignited, would be likely to cause a "major accident", i.e. it
would be of a size capable of causing multiple casualties or rapid escalation affecting TR,
escape routes, etc.
Number of Significant "Potential to cause serious injury or fatality to personnel within the local area and to
Hydrocarbon Releases escalate within that local area, e.g. by causing structural damage, secondary leaks or
damage to safety systems." A significant leak, if ignited, might have the potential to cause
an event severe enough to be viewed as a "major accident" or be of a size leading to
significant escalation within the immediate area or module.
Number of Minor "Potential to cause serious injury to personnel in the immediate vicinity, but no potential
Hydrocarbon Releases to escalate or cause multiple fatalities." A minor leak, even if ignited, would not be
expected to result in a multiple fatality event or significant escalation, but could cause
serious injuries or a fatality local to the leak site or within that module only.
The KPls demonstrate, on a global or national level, that the KPls used are reactive (i.e. lagging or
post-incident) as opposed to proactive (Le. leading or pre-incident, preventative measures) forms
of KPI.
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The UK HSEguide to key performance indicators [216] suggests that by setting focused leading
and lagging indicators, the information obtained will provide an early warning when the systems
paid for and implemented, and relied upon for the integrity of business, start to go wrong.
However, this is potentially misleading, since, by definition, reactive indicators mean that
something has already gone wrong and this could result in business failure, depending on the
severity of the event, before an organisation has time to react. Although it assumes a relationship
between leading, Table 9, and lagging indicators that may not be recognised, the literature
presents cases for using both forms of measurement, but they are generally dominated by KPls
only relevant during the operational phase of a development.
Table 9 Process Safety leading Indicators
leading Options Means of Measurement
Indicator 1
Mechanical A (Number of inspections of safety critical items of plant and equipment due during the
Integrity measurement period and completed on time /Total number of inspections of safety
critical items of plant and equipment due during the measurement period) x 100 %.
B (Length of time plant is in production with items of safety critical plant or equipment in a
failed state, as identified by inspection or as a result of breakdown/Length of time plant
is in production) x 100%.
Action Items (Number of past due and/or having approved extension of process safety action
Follow-up items/Total number of active or open action items) x 100 %.
Management A Percentage of audited MOCs that satisfied all aspects of the site's MOC procedure
of Change
(MOC)
B Percentage of audited changes that used the site's MOC procedure prior to making the
change
C Percentage of start-ups following plant changes where no safety problems related to the
changes were encountered during re-commissioning or start-up
Process Safety A Number of Individuals Who Completed a Planned Process Safety Metrics (PSM) Training
Training and Session On-time)/(Total Number of Individual PSMTraining Sessions Planned) x 100%.
Competency
B Number of Individuals Who Successfully Completed a Planned PSM Training Session on
the First Try)/(Total Number of Individual PSM Training Sessions with Completion
Assessment Planned for that time period) x 100%
C Number of safety critical tasks observed where all steps of the relevant safe working
procedure were not followed)/(Total number of safety critical tasks observed) x 100 %
Note 1 An orgarusatron can select one or more options for each leading indicator If available
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Therefore, there is a significant gap that needs to consider KPls during all phases of a
development's lifecycle, including the design phase, and this should identify design aspects that
will shape the ability of a development to meet safety performance requirements in all
subsequent phases, e.g. KPls for meeting inherent safety in design. This is particularly important
since the work done during the design phase helps establish the effectiveness of safety
performance in subsequent lifecycle phases. There are other forms of measurement of safety
performance. The Centre for Chemical Process Safety, established in 1985 by the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers for the express purpose of assisting industry in avoiding or
mitigating catastrophic chemical accidents, focuses on process-related incidents [217]. The KPls
for lagging indicators are similar to those described in Table 7 used by OGP, IADC and HSE. For
leading safety performance indicators, the Centre for Chemical Process Safety uses the criteria set
out in Table 9
In the context of lagging Indicators, it attempts to distinguish between process and other
Incidents. For example, a fall resulting in a lost workday injury is not reportable simply because it
occurred at a process unit. However, if the fall resulted from a chemical release, then the incident
is reportable.
Step Change for Safety [218] defines a Leading Performance Indicator as, "something that
provides information that he/ps the user respond to changing circumstances, and take actions to
achieve desired outcomes or avoid unwonted outcomes". It warns that leading performance
indicators can be ineffective if the wrong areas are targeted, the actions proposed are not
sufficiently demanding. they are used superficially to get good scores, and the subjectivity of the
assessment produces [Inappropriate] self-deception of performance.
The association between the type of indicators that an organisation finds effective was made by
Dr. Alan Sefton when he was head of the Offshore Safety Division of the HSE [219]. During his
keynote address at an IADC conference on Leading Performance Indicators, he observed that,
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"...the design standards and safety factors a company adopt is a leading indicator of company
values, and the quality and sophistication of indicators goes hand in hand with safety
management systems and cultural developments". Step Change for Safety proposes three levels
of leading performance indicator:
• "Levell - Compliance: The leading performance indicators populating this level will
be associated with compliance, in other words 'is the organisation implementing its
management systems and complying with its requirements as stated in legislation?'
• Level 2 - Improvement: The leading performance indicators at this level will be
associated with monitoring the effectiveness of the company's management
systems.
• Level3 - Learning:At this level, continuous learning and improvement is the norm for
·011parts of the organisation".
It recommends that the characteristics of good indicators (which also apply to lagging indicators)
are:
a) "Objective and easy to measure and collect,
b) Relevant to the organisation or workgroup whose performance is being measured,
c) Immediate and reliable indications of the level of performance,
d) Cost efficient in terms of the equipment, personnel and additional technology required to
gather the information, and
e) Understood and owned by the workgroup whose performance is being measured".
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Step Change for Safety suggests that the following leading indicators listed in Table 10, satisfy the
above criteria.
Table 10 Examples of leading Performance Indicators
level Description leading Indicators
1 Compliance % of applicable legislation addressed by Company procedures
% statutory training completed
% of Safety Management System that is compliant with current guidance (e.g. HS(G)6S; SS
8800; OHSAS18001).
Number of management safety visits completed against number planned
2 Improvement Perceptions of management commitment to safety
The extent to which plans and objectives have been set and achieved
Number of suggestions for safety improvements
Number of safety audits planned and completed
3 learning % of jobs with defined National Vocational Qualification 1 (NVQ) requirements
% of identified competency gaps addressed
% of planned equipment tests meeting performance criteria, e.g. % of Emergency Shut Down
(ESD) valves that close in required time
% of jobs for which risk assessments are carried out
1 NVQ IS a competence-based qualification achieved by learning practical, work-related tasks designed to help develop the skills and
knowledge to do a job effectively. NVQs are based on national standards for various occupations. The standards say what a competent
person in a job could be expected to do. As someone progresses through the course, their skills and knowledge are compared with
these standards.
The literature does not explore, in detail, the implied and necessary link between lagging and
leading performance indicators, or any mix between them. OH&S-MSs require a feedback
mechanism such that, following an incident (e.g. lagging indicator) or non-compliance from an
audit (e.g. leading indicator), the OH&S-MS is adjusted to prevent recurrence. For example, if
leading indicators are effective, then the factors that could result in incidents should be
systematically eliminated prior to an undesired event, and there should be a continuous and
sustainable improvement in safety performance. Equally, incident investigation should identify
both the immediate and root causes, and these should be fed into the process for developing
leading indicators, achieving similar results. If this association is broken, then the potential
synergy that one can offer the other no longer exists.
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2.7.2 Association between major and minor accidents and incidents
There are many major hazards in the E&P industry. In the case of offshore operations the fatality
rate from each area has been predicted by Mansfield, Poulter and Kletz [101], (Table 11), and this
is dominated by hazards relating to hydrocarbon releases.
Table 11 Predicted Major Hazards Fatality Rate for Offshore Activities
% Predicted Fatality Rate by Major Hazards - by Hazard Source
Process 38.8
Blowout 2.0
Riser/Pipeline 1.6
Structural Mobile 23.0
Structural- Fixed Installation 1.7
Collision 11.2
Helicopters 21.8
Adding the hydrocarbon hazard sources associated with the first three items in Table 11, gives a
percentage fatality rate due to hydrocarbon events of 42.4%, which is almost double that from
any other single major hazard source.
This is not surprising given the inherent hazards relating to process safety in the oil and gas
industry, such as pressure, temperature, and composition, in combination with relatively large
inventories and the number of potential leak paths (e.g. valves, flanges, pumps, compressors,
etc.) [220). Process characteristics also change over time as reservoirs deplete, although ongoing
development programmes, such as drilling new wells can increase original hazards. Hence,
Process Safety is a particularly important indicator of safety performance for preventing major
accidents when considered in relation to operational practices and preventative maintenance
regimes, designed to ensure asset integrity. In terms of hydrocarbon releases there is a self-
evident link between apparently minor incidents and those leading to explosions and fires such as
at Piper Alpha [10) and Texas City [18). It can also be argued that the theoretical and
proportionate association between minor incidents and major accidents should provide an
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organisation with the means to predict the potential for a major accident as there are likely to be
considerably more minor incidents than major accidents. Equally importantly, recognition of such
an association would give managers the information required to take a proactive approach, and
therefore prevent injury and ill health, or further mitigate the consequences of failure. One of
the more widely-established theories about the nature of workplace accidents relates to Total
LossControl (TLe) and the 'accident triangle', illustrated in Figure 22 [221] [222] [223,224].
Figure 22 Bird and Germain's Accident Triangle
Fatalities
Major injuries
Over 3·day injuries
Lost time injunes
Restricted workday cases
10 Minor injuries Medical treatment cases
30 Property damage
Blowout (no ratallties)
- Major hydrocarbon release
Significant hydrocarbon release
Minor hydrocarbon release
600_rmi_
Note the descriptions outside the triangle, in Figure 22, are based on a personal interpretation of oil and gas industry incident
classification
Early work in the development of accident triangle theory is described in ' Industrial Accident
Prevention by Herbert William Heinrich' [225]. One empirical finding from the first edition of his
book (in 1931) became known as Heinrich's Law: that in a workplace, for every accident that
causes a major injury, there are 29 accidents that cause minor injuries and 330 accidents that
cause no injuries. Because many accidents share common root causes, addressing more
commonplace accidents that cause no injuries can prevent accidents that cause injuries.
Heinrich's classic work has been revised into the more recent book, 'Industrial accident
prevention: a safety management approach' [226]. The ratios between different types of incident
are a fundamental principle in loss control but the numbers on which the original study ratios
were based, were limited. Later studies carried out by Bird and Germain [227] involving some 1.75
million accidents from 297 co-operating organisations, resulted in a ratio of 1:10:30:600. The
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analysis suggests that, preceding every major injury, there are likely to have been 10 minor
injuries, which were preceded by 30 instances of property damage (including plant and
equipment damage), and which were preceded by 600 near misses (often quoted as 'near hits' _
typically an incident that did not result in injury or damage but had the potential to cause either
or both) as shown in Figure 22. In another study, 'The Costs of Accidents at Work' [4]
investigations were carried out at a creamery, a construction site, a transport company, a hospital
and an oil platform. The results are described as: over 3-day injury/minor injury/non-injury
accident, with an associated ratio of 1:4:126.
The allocation of industry incidents is illustrated in Figure 22 to show how they might interface
with Bird and Germain's triangle. It is important to note that, for example, blowouts (uncontrolled
release of formation fluid from a well) are likely to cause significant asset damage, while
hvdrocarbon releases may not. Both blowouts and hydrocarbon releases have the potential for
escalation as is evident from the incidents involving the GSFAdriatic IV Jack-Up (the rig was
drilling a natural gaswell when a gas blowout occurred during drilling operations. More than 150
workers on the jack-up and platform were evacuated with no casualties [228]), Piper Alpha [10],
Texas City [18], Buncefield [21], and the Transocean blowout and sinking of the Deepwater
Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) [20]. However, if no injuries occur then they will not form
part of OGPand IADCsafety performance statistics (KPls),since these are injury-based, yet the
consequencesare potentially huge in terms of:
• lossof revenue and recovery and liability costs;
• environmental impacts, particularly when onshore and where the public are
affected;
• reputational impacts and the loss of confidence from stakeholders, including
governments;
• economic impacts, both in the short-term and long-term, affecting the company(ies)
involved and their viability; and
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• individual impacts (both employees and the public) causing financial, physiological
and psychological harm.
As discussed, the literature describes variations associated with these ratios. For example, in
a study on quarries [229], a ratio of 1 major injury or illness to 7 minor injuries or illnesses
and 189 non-injury accidents or illnesses was reported, but the principle remains the same:
reducing the number of injury-free near-misses (near-hits) at the bottom of the triangle
through proactive improvement in safety performance reduces the number of incidents in
the upper sections of the triangle where people are hurt. This theory is supported by the
practical experience from Norsk Hydro, where it was stated that they:
"focused on near-miss reporting offshore in the late 1980s where it was evident to see an
Inverse proportionality between the number of reported near-misses and the number of
accidents. When line managers managed to get an increased focus on the importance of
near-misses, and thus increased reporting and learning from them, the number of accidents
fell. When the organisation relaxed on near-misses, the number of accidents increased". [230]
It is evident from the published literature that there is consensus about the principles that
underpin accident theory, although the ratios themselves vary according to the type and
scale of study undertaken. However, it appears that the both OGP and IADC annual incident
reporting statistics, for example, lack near-miss data (although OGP publishes accident
triangles). The impact this has on the value of the statistical presentation and subsequent
analysis is unclear in the Annual Reports.
In this context the UK HSEhydrocarbon release data [231] and SINTEFBlowout data [232]
provide more reliable sources of information since, in the main, their reporting is based on
statutory requirements, e.g. UK RIDDOR [214], whereas OGP and IADC data are entirely
voluntary and from member organisations.
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In terms of accident theory, failure to report instances of property damage and near-misses
constitutes a significant omission as it effectively eliminates the opportunity to address their
causes before the failures that contributed to these events collude with other factors
resulting in a more serious outcome. For example, if the Bird and Germain accident ratios are
applied to the OGPSafety performance indicators 2006 data [233], comprising 115 fatalities,
theoretically there would have been 1150 minor injuries, 3450 classlflcattcns of Property
Damage, and 69,000 near-misses. Consequently, the absence of over 70 000 events from the
data is obviously a potentially serious loss of valuable information.
Another important feature of the hydrocarbon release database, in relation to accident
causation theory, is that, assuming there was no injury following a release or property/asset
damage, the event would be classified as a near-miss. Therefore, it may be treated less
seriously than a minor lost time injury, although the near-miss might have a much higher
potential for a major accident event (e.g. hydrocarbon release).
According to accident prevention theory, OGP, IADC and HSE, in isolation, do not provide
comprehensive performance data. This may be due to the voluntary requirement for
reporting, the use of reactive KPls, and the absence of major accident data, at one end of the
accident triangle, and property damage and near-misses at the other. Furthermore, given the
lack of global agreement in major accident definition and the difficulty and uncertainty when
using available accident databases, this problem is likely to be amplified for global property
damage and near-miss reporting. However, as part of the effective implementation of an
OH&S-MS, property damage and near-miss investigation, reporting and recording, should be
happening at the organisational level. This information could then be fed into the process for
global analysis. Since it does not appear in the global safety performance data, then perhaps
it is not being [adequately] reported and recorded at the organisational level.
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Irrespective of the challenges in collecting and collating large amounts of data for learning
adequate lessons from the past, it follows that if industry performance is based on limited
data then there is a greater chance that the underlying (root causes) factors that result in
accidents, and in particular major accidents, will remain unknown (latent failures [234, 235])
and then major disasters will appear to occur 'randomly' as the conditions that would have
preceded these events would not have been fully recognised, and therefore the industry
would not have reacted in advance to prevent their occurrence.
Similarly, the extensive use of reactive (injurious) KPls, are likely to preclude any significant
warning of a more serious event. This was also one of the conclusions of the investigation
into the causes of the three incidents that occurred at the BP Grangemouth Complex
between zs" May 2000 and io" June 2000 [236], involving a power distribution failure (29th
May), medium pressure (MP) steam main rupture (7th June) and Fluidised Catalytic Cracker
Unit (FCCU) fire (10th June), where each had the potential to cause fatal injury and
environmental impact, although no serious injury occurred. The conclusion stated,
"Inadequate performance measurement and audit systems, poor root couse analysis of
incidents, and incorrect assumptions about performance based on lost time occident
frequencies (DAFWCF - days away from work case frequencies) and 0 lock of key
performance indicators for loss of containment incidents meant that the company did not
adequately measure the major accident hazard potential. Since the incidents, BP has worked
in conjunction with the wider chemical industry and with the HSE to develop new Key
Performance Indicators for process safety".
The majority of industry data collected by OGP and IADC, and some of the HSE data are
reported on a voluntary basis, and since there is no statutory or mandatory obligation to
report incident data, particularly in the case of non-members of OGPand IADC, it is less likely
to be a comprehensive and accurate record of the industry's actual safety performance. This
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limitation can only add to the vulnerability of the industry to incur incidents of all severities.
This lack of published comparative data for all incident types, and therefore associated
analysis, fails to produce an accurate indication of previous problems, which in turn creates a
confusing picture of what improvements are needed, and is not conducive to cost-effective
decision-making. However, it is possible that this may be happening within companies,
although there is evidence from the UK's Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents
(RoSPA)that there are obstacles to reporting at this level [237]. For example, RoSPAbelieves
that, in general, the reporting of incidents is not encouraged for the following reasons:
• "employee fear of consequences;
• no investigation tokes place (coupled with massive under-reporting to enforcing
authorities);
• no clear procedures established for investigation (and/or no managerial
involvement);
• no workforce involvement occurs (trades union safety representatives hove 0 legal
right to investigate accidents}".
2.8 Summary
It is evident that there are a number of factors, listed above, that can influence decision-making
by management, and which have an impact on the ability to deliver OH&S objectives. The
application and implementation of an OH&S-MS, and the weighting, partly driven by the safety
culture, that an organisation applies is not prescribed. Furthermore, the ability of an organisation
to achieve continuous and sustainable improvement in safety performance may be impeded, but
not necessarily prevented, by the competing demands for resources, from a finite base, all of
which can change over time. However, despite these potential constraints, many organisations, as
demonstrated by the research that led to HSG 65, prove that some organisations, particularly
during their operational phase, can achieve a successful safety performance. Consequently, there
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is no firm evidence to suggest that an OH&S-MS does not provide the basic framework for an
organisation to meet safety objectives, and achieve its safety-related goals.
In a largely non-prescriptive goal-setting regime, management have considerable flexibility in
deciding risk tolerability and risk levels, but this should be supported by an independent,
competent, and adequately-resourced regulator, to ensure that risk is not adversely compromised
by, for example, financial and commercial pressures influencing decision-making.
The tools and techniques used in project and risk management are generally well-tried and
tested. However, variability in the access to reliable and accurate data and the application of
judgment can result in potentially large variations in the quality of assessments. The components
of an OH&S-MS lack detail, and emphasis (e.g. the use of inherent safety in design), in the
implementation of suitable and sufficient risk assessments during each of the project phases.
This is particularly important when highlighting the need to eliminate or minimise risks in design,
the stage which offers the most cost-effective lifecycle solution.
The way in which, at a global level, the Industry collects, collates, analyses and presents safety
performance data, is unlikely to achieve either the rate of improvement, and a continuous and
sustainable improvement, particularly in the context of major accident hazards, and this is
generally confirmed by the case study accident investigation reports. Many of the accident
databases are fee-based, and random interrogation would generally be uneconomical for smaller
enterprises or researchers. Interrogation of available databases is difficult given the variety of
definitions (e.g. major accidents or disasters?) and construction of search criteria within the
databases, resulting in inconsistency of findings, and uncertainty in the validity and accuracy of
the data. This problem would be amplified for less serious events due to the added volume of
data.
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3. CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL OH&S-MSs
3.1 Introduction
This section examines relatively recent theories and concepts that are intended to further explain
and support continuous and sustainable improvements in safety. They are:
• Inherent safety;
• Normal accident theory;
• Resilient Engineering;
• High Reliability Organisations; and
• Human Factors
They are generally treated as mutually exclusive and there is no literature that considers the
effective integration of all five, although this may have benefits or synergies that provide a
greater chance that safety performance goals can be achieved, or that that they can be achieved
more cost-effectively.
3.2 Inherent Safety
3.2.1 Introduction
Inherent safety (In this respect the term Inherent safety includes the concept of inherently safer
design) is not a modern phenomenon and, historically, there have been various initiatives to
safeguard personnel by reducing the risk from industrial processes, e.g. in 1867 Alfred Nobel
invented dynamite by absorbing nitroglycerine on a carrier, greatly enhancing its stability [238,
239]. Dr. Trevor Kletz has been a more recent advocate of inherent safety when he Initially
presented the concept at the 1977 Annual Jubilee lecture to the Society of Chemical Industry in
Widnes, England. This was published in 1978, and in 1985 he published a paper 'Inherently Safer
Plants' [240] [241]. Inherently Safer Design (ISO)achieved greater prominence following disasters
such as Mexico City 1984 (where there was a major fire and a series of catastrophic explosions at
the government owned and operated PEMEX lPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City.
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As a consequence of these events some 500 individuals were killed and the terminal destroyed)
and Bhopal 1984 [242, 243]. Consequently, various bodies, such as government and regulatory
authorities, Industry working groups which developed the INSIDE (INherent SHEEvaluation Tool
designed to encourage greater application of the principles of inherent safety) project, and non-
government organisations, took an interest in ISO [244-246] [247,248] [249]. Tools are available
to compare the relative safety of chemical plant, e.g. the Dow Fire & Explosion Index and the Dow
Chemical Exposure Index [250], to apply the concept in accident investigation [251], while
research into inherent safety and ISO has been reviewed in publications including; 'Inherently
Safer Chemical Processes: A Lifecycle Approach', 'Inherently safer design: Present and future',
'Inherently safer design-Its scope and future' and 'How to make inherent safety practice a reality'
[252-255].
OGP suggests that an OH&S-MS may not be able to identify the hazards or risks relating to a
major accident given the complexity of some failure scenarios. However, it could equally be
argued that the failure is in designing a plant that is too complex and tightly-coupled (described in
more detail in Normal Accident Theory later), and that those designs based on the principles of
inherent safety would instead provide a greater opportunity to achieve a desired level of safety
performance [256, 257]. The UK HSEsupports this approach and states,
"adoption of the principles of inherently safer design is particularly important where the
consequences of plant or system failure are high".
This is more important in those industries that experience disasters, i.e. rare but high severity
events. The UK HSEtherefore advocates ISO features, where these are possible, to reduce the
reliance on engineered safety systems or operational procedures (lower order controls), to
manage risks which are more susceptible to failure, and may require unnecessary exposure, and
associated risks, to maintain safety systems. There is evidence that many of the failures that arise
during the lifecycle of a project stem from poor design [258-264]. For example, it is quoted for the
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accidents and incidents in the aircraft and nuclear industries, 51% and 46%, respectively, that
these have a root cause in design. For the railway industry, quantitative analysis was not possible
but poor design was a significant contributor to recent major rail accidents [260]. In the chemical
and nuclear industries it is reported that about 20% to 50% of studied incidents and accidents
have at least one root cause attributed to erroneous design. Although the number of design
errors actually occurring during the design process is much higher, 80-95% of them are removed
by thorough design reviews [261]. This naturally assumes that thorough design reviews are
carried out effectively and at the right time, when sufficient information is available to make valid
judgments, and to allow changes to be made without significant impact on cost schedule.
In this context the UK HSE also applies the concept of 'defence in depth', i.e. redundancy,
diversity and segregation, the provision of multiple barriers and other good practices [101]. These
are set out in the UK HSE'ssafety assessment principles for nuclear facilities [265] which are seen
to be fundamental to ensuring safety. The general principles of inherent safety are;
• "first, to avoid the hazard and maintain safe conditions through inherent and, where
appropriate, passive design features; and,
• secondly, to minimise the sensitivity of the plant to potential faults, as far as can be
reasonably achieved, by ensuring the plant response to a fault is as near the top of a
hierarchy, i.e. 0) produces no operational response or a move to a safer condition; (ii)
passive or engineered safeguards, continuously available, make the plant safe; (iii) active
engineered safeguards, brought into service in response to the fault, render the plant
safe".
Consequently, the concept of inherently safer design refers to an approach to design in which
hazards are 'designed out' or mitigated at source. Typically, the primary means of prevention are
the use of appropriate standards for design and operation, the optimisation of the layout for
safety, and the quality standards applied to design, construction and operation. The greatest
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opportunities to reduce risks are during the initial hazard identification stage at the conceptual
design phase, since once into detailed design there may be limited scope to apply hazard
avoidance (as opposed to prevention) methods. Facilities designed on this basis can be described
as intrinsically or inherently safer [266]. This suggests that the setting of appropriate OH&S
objectives, and design-based KPls, as a part of the OH&S-MS at the start of any development, l.e.
the concept phase, or equivalent, must consider all lifecycle phases if the safety objectives for its
lifetime have any genuine prospect of being achieved. Currently the inherent safety approach
tends to mainly focus on the major hazard issues.
While this focus is about eliminating or mitigating the severity of incidents due to escalation and
the domino effect and is a critical and essential element of OH&S, it does not adequately address
the huge number of Incidents and accidents that relate to single fatalities, the huge volume of lost
time Injuries, restricted work cases, medical treatment cases, first aid cases and the significant
asset losses Incurred regularly by the industry [267]. Therefore the application of inherent safety
needs to have a much broader perspective, in particular, during the design phase, in that:
• it is cost-effective at this stage, when assessed over the development lifecycle;
• it eliminates the need to make design modifications during subsequent lifecycle
phases, particularly during the operational phase when it potentially increases the
. risk to personnel and can Incur significant costs due to loss of production and
revenue; and
• it avoids the need to overcome design error through the application of appropriate
competencies and experience and design review.
However, major obstacles to effective application of ISOmight be:
• Design engineers in all disciplines are less familiar with ISO and therefore lack the
necessary competencies to apply the concept effectively; and
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• Unless there is a top-down drive and commitment to apply ISO then Project Managers
may be reluctant to prioritise its use, especially if it could compromise traditional project
KPlsof cost and schedule
3.2.2 Concept of Inherent safety
The term 'inherent' is defined as "existing in something as a permanent, essential, or
charocteristic attribute" but this does not in itself make the process safe [268]. For example, in oil
and gas exploration and exploitation the hazards associated with hydrocarbons under pressure
cannot be eliminated, but the consequences and likelihood of something going wrong can be
mitigated by risk control measures, such as inherent safety. This can also provide a more robust
case for the demonstration of AlARP if risks and costs are assessed over the lifecycle of a
development. It is stated that, "Changes in the chemistry of a process that reduce the hazard of
the chemicais used or produced can be considered First order Inherent Safety. Changes in process
variables can be considered Second order Inherent Safety" [239]. However, to achieve a risk(s)
that is both tolerable and ALARP over the lifecycle of a development, a range of risk control
strategies may need to be assessed. This includes concepts such as inherent safety but may be
complemented by additional tools and techniques such as Layers of Protection Analysis (lOPA)
[269]. LOPA is one of a number of complementary techniques developed in response to a
requirement within the process industry to be able to assess the adequacy of the layers of
protection provided for an activity [269], analogous to the UK HSEconcept of 'defences in depth'.
Initially this was driven by industry codes of practice or guidance and latterly by the development
of international standards such as IEC61508 [270) and IEC61511 [271]. In a typical chemical
process, various protection layers are in place to lower the frequency of undesired consequences.
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This includes: the process design (including inherently safer concepts); the basic process control
system; safety instrumented systems; passive devices (such as blast wails); active devices (such as
relief valves); human intervention; etc. as illustrated in Figure 23.
Figure 23 Risk Reduction Hierarchy
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Layers of Protection
However, a perennial discussion among decision makers is:
• how safe is safe enough?
• how many (and what type) of protection layers are needed? and
• what should each layer contribute in the overall risk reduction strategy? (particularly as
some layers may be regarded as more robust than others).
LOPA is therefore designed to provide rational risk-based answers to these questions but often
lacks valid and accurate source data, and therefore is, at best, semi-quantitative.
3.2.3 The Role of Inherently Safer Concepts in Process Risk Management
It is argued that inherent safety provides greater risk reduction at lower comparable costs than
risks that are controlled by, for example, active protection or procedures, since these demand
greater ongoing costs in terms of training personnel and maintenance [239].
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Furthermore, the later the introduction of inherently safer systems during the lifecycle of a
development, the more it is likely to cost, although inherent safety can be applied at any stage of
the lifecycle [272-274J. Therefore the most cost-effective strategy would be to apply inherent
safety during the early stagesof a development. However, to fully comply with ALARP,previously
managed risks and their risk control strategies would need to be continuously reviewed, as
inherently safe techniques and technologies are superseded when new and novel concepts are
developed in pursuit of more cost-effective operations. Moreover, techniques and technologies
that were uneconomical may become attractive as screening criteria change towards inherent
safety. Approaches to the design of inherently safer processesand plants have been grouped into
four major strategies by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), IPSG[275J and Kletz
[276,277J:
• "Minimise. Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances (also called
Intensification).
• Substitute. Replace a material with a less hazardous substance.
• Moderate. Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material, or
facilities that minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy (also
called Attenuation and Limitation of Effects).
• Simplify. Design facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity and make
operating errors less likely, and which are forgiving of errors that are made (also
called Error Tolerance)".
3.2.4 Inherently Safer Strategies
In the oil and gas industry there are inherent hazards, e.g. hydrocarbons under pressure. In terms
of hazard management there are various classifications of ISD:
• "First-order inherent safety involves eliminating hazards from the process altogether;
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• Second-order inherent safety attempts to reduce the magnitude of a hazard, or make it
extremely unlikely, perhaps nearly impossible, for an accident to occur; and
• Layers of protection" [278].
First Order inherent safety, i.e. the elimination of the hazard, is not applicable in the main
hydrocarbon processes in the oil and gas industry, although it may also be argued that if people
are removed from this hazard, then while the hazard exists, the risk to people has been
eliminated, and therefore it is inherently safe. However, this discussion might then extend beyond
the safety domain to the environmental arena, where any risk of loss of containment may not
directly affect people but could have increased risk for the environment, if there is no one
available to quickly control the source of leakage.
• "Limitation of effects (consequence management/mitigation)
• Limiting escalation of knock-an effects
• Avoiding incorrect assembly
• Making status clear
• Instilling inherent robustness (e.g. resilient engineering)".
The four major strategies of Minimise, Substitute, Moderate and Simplify apply in that it may be
possible to have smaller inventories, use less hazardous substances for process management,
develop unmanned installations (onshore and offshore) and simplify designs to make them less
prone to, or to mitigate, failure or error. The literature also describes other safety strategies that
are typically associated with hazard management and not always associated with inherent safety
[279-281]. They are:
The INSIDE (INherent SHE In DEsign) project [247J was a European government/industry project
established by the Commission of the European Community in August 1994. The goal of the
INSIDEProject was to develop practical ways to encourage the use of inherent safety in process
development and plant design. The result of this work has been a collection of tools and methods
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known as the INSETToolkit that was specifically designed for this purpose [282]. The toolkit is
specific to inherent safety and is relevant for all phases of a project, including modifications, but it
is not intended to be a substitute for the various safety engineering studies normally carried out
in projects. However, there is recognition that, in the early phases of a project, it is beneficial to
qualitatively estimate totallifecycle costs and risks for competing options, since the level of detail
required for a quantitative assessment would generally be unavailable, in order to select the
option for further development that provides ALARP.Cost benefit analysis (CBA) may be a useful
tool to aid decision making in this context) [146].
3.2.5 Implementing Inherently Safer Design
In the UK the Health and Safety Executive publish criteria for assessing compliance with the law in
individual cases, and the use of good practice, (within the UK HSE,good practice is the generic
term for those standards for controlling risk which have been judged and recognised by the UK
HSEas satisfying the law when applied to a particular case in an appropriate manner [283]). In this
context reviews of design projects were carried out by three teams of UK HSEOffshore Safety
Division (050) inspectors from a spread of topic backgrounds [284]. A cross-section of project and
Operator Company staff were interviewed, ranging from a UK managing director to contractor
discipline engineers. The findings were assessed against the key components of HSG(65) [32]. The
Review stated that, "In inspecting design and construction projects, the key indicator for effective
corporate management is: Corporate commitment to continuous safety improvement and
inherently safer design".
There are references to inherent safety in the 1999 Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)
Regulations [96]. This requires the consideration and documentation of inherently safer design
alternatives during the initial design stage. Principles of hazard control, section 15 states that,
"Major accident hazards should be avoided or reduced at source through the application of the
principles of inherent safety", while section 16 states, "Operators are required to take 'all
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measures necessary' to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences (COMAH Reg. 4).
Operators should therefore demonstrate that they have looked at ways of avoiding the hazards or
reducing them at source through the application of the principles of inherent safety. The preferred
approach to further risk reduction, after the application of inherent safety principles, is through
the application of a hierarchy of measures comprised of prevention and control of hazards,
followed by mitigation of events".
3.2.6 Inherent Safety Review Objectives
The application of inherent safety is similar to other forms of risk management. For example, it is
important to identify how it is incorporated into the existing OH&S-MS, when it will be applied
and updated as the project progresses through the lifecycle, who will participate to ensure that
the right type of competencies and experience are involved and, what is expected in terms of the
deliverables for the project. Many safety engineering studies use guidewords and it is therefore
relatively easy to ensure that the ranking of preferred risk reduction methods, including inherent
safety, is intrinsic in the set of guidewords.
3.2.7Inherently Safer Deslln Conflicts
The transfer of risk might result in conflict. For example, reducing plant inventories to mitigate
loss of containment incidents might require increased frequencies of road tanker movement to
transport product to and from the sites. In this case the onsite risk reduction is achieved by an
offsite risk increase [280, 285]. Consequently, setting the boundaries for studies to demonstrate
ALARP is crucial to ensure that all relevant risks are captured, although it is possible that the
protocols in reporting safety studies may not make study boundaries transparent, and this could
be significant for risk transfer.
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3.2.8 Economics
Where inherent safety can effectively be applied, the resultant process may, for example, be
simpler, and smaller. This has the advantage of reducing capital expenditure and often operating
costs, since there is less to maintain. It also has the potential to reduce error and therefore
downtime caused by system disruptions. Conversely, traditional designs tend to rely more on
lower order layers of protection that require significant intervention to meet production
efficiencies, and this in turn increases the number of personnel needed to satisfy maintenance
and operational demands. This also increases their exposure to the hazards present in the process
and therefore the collective risks relevant to the site, e.g. individual risk per annum (IRPA), Le. in
the fatality estimation the consequences of each scenario are represented by the probability of
death for an individual. The IRPA is the sum of the probability of death from all the scenarios.
Commensurate with increased personnel are increases in welfare arrangements, training and
other competency requirements [286]. If inherent safety is not implemented, it does not mean
that those sites cannot achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance,
but it is likely to be at a greater cost (when viewed over the lifecycle of a project) than a process
that incorporates inherent safety during design [287]. This is especially true of a process where
the operational phase can last for decades and be subject to significant changes, such as
organisational and, in some cases, ownership, e.g. Texas City 2005 [18].
When comparing ISOsolutions to other solutions, designers should include the total lifecycle cost
of each alternative before reaching a decision. For example, Noronha, describes the use of
deflagration pressure containment design in preference to using deflagration suppression or
other means of explosion prevention, based on lifecycle cost and reliability considerations [286].
In many cases, formal tools for decision making can be useful, particularly if the hazards vary
greatly in type of consequence or impact. Many of these tools may introduce additional rigour,
consistency, and logic into the decision process, but are not technically oriented. For example,
weighted scoring methods, such as Kepner-Tregoe Decision Analysis, use a structured
methodology for gathering information and prioritising and evaluating it. The idea is not to find a
perfect solution but rather the best possible choice.
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The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a structured technique for dealing with complex
decisions. Rather than prescribing a 'correct' decision, the AHP helps decision makers find one
that best suits their goal and their understanding of the problem. Based on mathematics and
psychology, it provides a comprehensive and rational framework for structuring a decision
problem, for representing and quantifying its elements, for relating those elements to overall
goals, and for evaluating alternative solutions [196].
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is often used in the oil and gas industry. It is an analysis of the cost
effectiveness of different alternatives in order to see whether the benefits outweigh the costs,
and therefore can be extremely useful when making an ALARP case. The standard approach to
CBA in risk assessment involves converting risks to life into equivalent costs, I.e. to place a value
Net benefit = reduction in risk factored accident costs - cost of measure.
on a fatality [188]. The approach is typically calculated as:
An alternative approach is to use Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality (lCAF).This is expressed as:
leAF = Reducti i I f I·tton n annua ata tty rate
Net annual cost of measure
If the net benefit is positive, the measure is regarded as cost-effective. The calculation is usually
expressed using net present values (NPVs).
3.2.9 Inherent Safety International Standards
A key internationally-recognised standard, ISO 17776 [148] requires that inherent safety is
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addressed as part of the risk control hierarchy. Section 3 of the standard states that, "Risk-
reduction measures should include those to prevent incidents (i.e. reduce the probability of
occurrence), to control incidents (i.e. limit the extent and duration of a hazardous event) and to
mitigate the effects (i.e. reduce the consequences). Preventive measures, such as using inherently
safer designs, and ensuring asset integrity, should be emphosized wherever practicable".
The standard describes the selection of measures to reduce the risk, which should consider:
• "the technical feasibility of the risk-reducing measure;
• the contribution of the risk-reducing measure;
• the costs and risks associated with implementing the measure; and
• the degree of uncertainty associated with the risk, or the risk-reduction technique,
including human factors".
The standard, in effect, applies the 'as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP)'concept that
requires a progressive reduction in risk until such time that the cost outweighs the benefits.
However, the general suitability and application of standards in the oil and gas industry may be
extremely variable. For example, OGPhas produced a "Catalogue of International Standards used
in the Oil and Gas Industry" [288]. The objective of the catalogue is to make users aware of the
International Standards available, thereby enabling procurement costs of materials and
equipment to be more efficient. This catalogue does not include regional or national standards
developed by a recognised Standards Development Organisation (500), such as the British
Standards Institute or the American Petroleum Institute, although it recognisesthat they may also
be applied globally. Consequently, the catalogue is simply a limited listing of joint ISO/IEC
Standards and standalone ISOand IECstandards. However, OGP, in their publication, "Value of
Standards", state that, "Standards are the tools we use to organise our technical world. They
underpin expectations that the platforms, systems and equipment will be safe, reliable and fit-for-
purpose". However, the catalogue itself offers no value as a means of identifying and
benchmarking good, or best practice, and therefore has limited use.
3.3 Normal Accidents
3.3.1 Introduction
Current accident theories relating to resilient engineering and high reliability organisations, both
discussed later, make reference to the work carried out by CharlesPerrow [289].
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The work was inspired by the increase in high risk technologies and the commensurate need to
manage them safely. The hypothesis is that no matter how effective conventional safety devices
are, there is a form of incident that is inevitable. For major accident hazard operations the
consequences of this analysis, if valid, have huge safety implications, i.e. the acceptance that
there is nothing that can be done to prevent a major accident. The hypothesis revolves around
the complexity of plants, which makes it virtually impossible to predict all the possible
interactions in a way that ensures no single, or combination, of undesired events can cause
immediate, or through escalation, major accidents. It argues that systems are often 'tightly-
coupled' (asopposed to loosely-coupled) in that once a reaction has started it may happen so fast
that no form of intervention will stop it. The author states, "If interactive (linear and complex -
discussed below) complexity and tight coupling - system characteristics, Table 12 - inevitably will
produce an accident, I believe we are justified in calling it a normal accident, or a system accident.
The odd term normal accident is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple
and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. This is an expression of an integral
characteristic of the system, not a statement of frequency. II
• Tightly-coupled systems have more time-dependent processes; they cannot wait,
or be on standby until attended to. In loosely-coupled systems, delays are
possible, processes can remain in standby mode and designs can allow
substitution, etc.;
• The sequences, including design, in tightly-coupled systems are constant, such as
in nuclear or chemical plants, whereas in other industries assembly of products or
processesmay be taken out of sequence; and
• Tightly-coupled systems have little slack, and quantities must be precise, while
loosely-coupled systems can accommodate waste without great cost to the
system.
The main characteristics of tight and loose coupling can be illustrated as follows:
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Table 12 Key features of the interactivity of linear and complex systems
Complex Systems LInear Systems
Tight spacing of equipment Equipment spread out
Proximate production steps Segregated production steps
Many common-mode connections of components not in Common mode connections limited to power supply and
production sequence environment
Isolation of failed components Easy isolation of failed components
Personnel specialisation limits awareness of Lesspersonnel specialization
interdependencies
Limited substitution of supplies and materials Extensive substitution of supplies and materials
Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops Few unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops
Many control parameters with potential interactions Few control parameters, direct and segregated
Indirect or inferential information sources Direct, online information sources
Limited understanding of some processes Extensive understanding of all processes
Perrow discusses the systems' prone to system accidents and develops the concepts of linear and
complex interactions. Linear interactions are considered relatively simple and comprehensible
although they may have limited complex interactions. These are dominant in most systems,
whereas complex interactions are those where system components can interact with one or more
other components outside the normal production sequence, either by design or by accident.
Paradoxically, Perrow argues that complexity is best since it is more efficient than linear systems,
e.g. smaller footprint for offshore installations, therefore less cost for the same process, but,
potentially, at the expense of safety performance. The purpose of defining systems in this way is
to help understand their failure potential and therefore the controls, through design and/or
operation, needed to adequately manage the associated risks. However, Perrow's analysis
assumes that people are exposed to risk. Therefore, if people are removed from the hazard(s)
then the effect of failure only relates to asset (financial) losses, and environmental and
reputational effects.
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There are further various ramifications connected with this theory. For example, it is assumed
that about 60 - 80% of all incidents can be attributed to human error. It is argued that system
behaviour cannot be fully understood by operators and therefore the human response to many
events can be regarded as reasonable, even if subsequent investigation indicates that it may have
been flawed. Furthermore, minor incidents can lead to major accidents but given the system
complexity and tight coupling the Significance of these events may not be transparent. The role of
the organisation is also recognised as an important factor in incident causation and prevention,
where there is often a conflict between centralisation and decentralisation, since both
approaches can produce positive as well as negative results. However, a crucial failure of many
organisations is in their inability to identify, and correctly react to, warning Signals. Consequently,
there is an operational naivety about the level of risk within the organisation. Potential fixes for
normal accidents are therefore focused on organisations.
3.3.2 Three Mile Island
Perrow evaluated the accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear plant near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, on 28 March 1979 that resulted in the release of moderate amounts of radioactive
gases and radioactive iodine Into the environment. This was the most serious in U.S. commercial
nuclear power plant operating history, even though it led to no deaths or injuries to plant workers
or members ofthe nearby community. Furthermore the USNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
determined that public health and environmental assessments had been subsequently carried out
by several respected organisations that showed the actual release had negligible effects [290].
However, it brought about major changes involving emergency response planning, reactor
operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of
nuclear power plant operations. It also caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. A similar contributory factor of regulatory oversight
was identified by the Deepwater Horizon investigation, some 31 years post-Three Mile Island, at
the Piper Alpha Inquiry some 9 years post-Three Mile Island, and Texas City, 26 years post-Three
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Mile Island. Resultant changes in the nuclear power industry and at the NRChad the effect of
enhancing safety. Perrow argues that while the nuclear industry suggests it has 500 'reactor' years
of operating experience; this does not in itself justify whether this is adequate or whether this
experience is valid, given the various generations of nuclear plant design and operation. Plants are
also getting bigger but scaling up plant size does not necessarily produce comparable and
consistent risks and risk profiles. Consequently, he proposes that we have not had more serious
nuclear accidents because plants have not had the time to reveal their full potential for danger. In
other words, unidentified or incorrectly identified risks may not be corrected and may remain
dormant (latent) for years until circumstances coalesce to result in an incident. A NRCreview of
operating plants in 1980, as a result of berating criticism from the Kemeny Commission, revealed
that little had changed [presumably since Three Mile Island] and identified below-average
facilities [2911. In fact, the wide-ranging failures identified by Kemeny are broadly similar to those
described in the BPTexasCity (2005) investigation. It is also noteworthy that most of the failures
relate to lower order control systems. Therefore, it reinforces the need to consider higher order
controls to reduce the likelihood of these types of incidents happening.
3.3.3 Petrochemical plants
Perrow identifies petrochemical plants as processes that provide some good examples of system
accidents since they are regarded as being tightly-coupled together with complex (interactive)
systems. They have relatively mature technologies, and established management systems but
continue to incur accidents, which suggests there is an intrinsic problem with the processes
employed. Perrow's report was written well before Deepwater Horizon. European incidents were
analysed since they are seen to be more open than comparable U.S. investigations. Generally,
low incident rates do not necessarily indicate safe operations. Perrow suggests that this is
because, in the main, worker exposure to the worksite is relatively low and often in [protected)
control buildings.
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Various accidents were reviewed by Perrow In support of his hypothesis. For example, the Texas
City disaster in 1947 started in a ship carrying fertiliser [292] where an initial explosion on the ship
escalated to nearby facilities and the end result was that about one third of the city was burnt
down, 561 people were killed and over 3000 injured. The cost of the damage was over $100
million. One feature of this accident was that there had been extensive experience with the
process, although following the accident changes were made to the design, firefighting and
recovery systems to prevent recurrence, and limit their impact. At Flixborough (UK) on 1st June
1974 human error was identified as a significant contributory factor; Perrow believes that
incompetence and negligence should be assumed in this type of operation as well as
organisational ineptitude, as this is the 'normal' state of organisations. There were many warning
signals that were ignored and since the process was tightly-coupled with complex systems, there
were various latent failures that could only be addressed by the proper and timely resolution of
warning signals. Perrow suggests that petrochemical plant fires and explosions are increasing in
number, although this may be due to an increase in the number of plants rather than frequency.
However, Perrow believes these are less safe because of factors such as arbitrage and downsizing.
Based on information obtained from Swiss Re, a reinsurance firm spectalislng in petrochemical
industries, risk is increasingly being transferred into the public domain, minimising the
consequences to those that take the risks to increase profits.
Perrow states, '7he shift Isfrom expending resources on inspection of the huge properties the firm
reinsures (by forming a syndicate of insurers), to increasing the resources expended upon money
management, or arbitrage. The number of inspectors has declined substantially, while the finance
staff has increased substantially. Because the profit from arbitraging the spread between the
currency of dozens of countries where they reinsure and collect premiums, is so great in total, it
pays to insure more properties to obtain the premiums. Marginally safe properties become
profitable, even though they will have more losses than the insurer must cover. The fewer the
inspectors, the more marginally safe properties that will be insured".
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This spreads the costs of fires and explosions while the profits to the insurers increase. Production
pressures play another important part in normal accidents, particularly in combination with
downsizing, and it is estimated that the increased profits from reductions in labour and safety
costs may be more than enough to offset any wider costs associated with downsizing the
workforce.
3.3.4 Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory
It is suggested that the difference between Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability
Theory (HRT) is that HRT assumes that if we try harder, we can achieve our [safety] goals,
irrespective of system complexity and tight coupling. However, NAT states that no matter how
hard organisations try to achieve safety goals, there are intrinsic [latent] failures in systems
because they are complex and tightly-coupled and therefore failures (incidents or accidents,
minor or major) will occur at some point in time. In fact, all that can be done is either abandon
them, or design them in such a way as to reduce the impact of a failure when it occurs.
Perrow examines the question, 'what is to be done'? He proposes three categories to resolve the
problem of industries with tightly-coupled and complex systems:
• "Systems that are 'hopeless' should be abandoned when the risks outweigh the
benefits, e.g. nuclear weapons and nuclear power;
• Systems that we are either unlikely to be able to do without, but which could be
made less risky with considerable effort, or where the expected benefits are so
substantial that some risks should be run, but nat as many as we are now running,
should be kept; and
• Systems which, while hardly self-correcting in all respects, are self-correcting to
some degree and could be further improved with quite modest efforts, should be
kept".
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Perrow recognises that his analysis of the above categories could be wrong:
• "If the science of risk assessment currently practiced is incorrect, i.e. the risk
perception underpinning this theory is incorrect;
• If they are contrary to public opinion and values; and
• If there is a way to run these industries safely".
This results in four tasks:
• '70 examine the concept and application of risk assessment, since it allows risks
that are both unacceptable and incorrectly evaluated;
• To examine the field of decision-making, since it argues that the public is poorly
equipped to playa role in decisions on risk;
• To examine organisational dilemmas in high risk systems; and
• To show how the analysis of the first three, together with the analysis of tightly-
coupled and complex system Industries produces suitable risk reductions [to
tolerable] levels".
3.4 Reallience engineering (RE)
3.4.1Introductlon
Resilience engineering is a paradigm for safety management that focuses on how people deal
with complexity, under pressure, to achieve performance requirements. It accepts safety as a
core value and therefore requires organisations to provide a level of investment that ensures they
remain within a suitable range of stability by predicting departures from safe limits of operation.
This also ensures that the organisation, as a minimum, prevents any adverse deterioration of
safety performance and also provides the resources for continuous, and sustainable,
improvements in performance. However, there is no universal agreement on the prlnclples that
underpin RE,nor is there any consistent use of REterminology.
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In RE, the challenge is to address complex and unstable systems (e.g. organisations) in order to
develop strategies that are robust enough to accommodate variation. REhas been mostly studied
in the context of complex systems of high risk, such as in the aviation, petrochemical and nuclear
power industries [294].
Erik Hollnage, a specialist in the field of resilience engineering, states that, "Safety is the sum of
accidents that did not occur. Whilst accident research has focused on accidents that occurred and
tried to understand why, safety research should focus on the accidents that did not occur and try
to understand why (294]".
In this context it is argued that a system is safe if it is impervious to adverse upsets from a stable
state, and if the mechanisms for failure and therefore the ability to effectively apply timely and
suitable risk management techniques, an essential ingredient for success, are understood.
However, REsuggests that given the complexity and dynamic nature of many organisations and
their processes, and external influences on their activities, linear accident models, e.g. Swiss
Cheese/Domino model [234,235,295], cannot explain fully the many variables that contribute to
an accident. REargues that in normal conditions many accidents are prevented by people who
are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate change, despite deficiencies in the
management systems, which that might, for example, lag behind operational transformations.
However, reliance on human interventions is also a cause of failures, e.g. a view that sees human
fallibility as the consequence of wayward psychological processes such as forgetfulness,
inattention, poor motivation and the like [296]. Since resilience assumes that failures will occur
and that there is a need to be able to withstand harmful conditions and situations, the concept
applies a more systemic approach. This is to ensure that an organisation can react with a level of
expediency so that a state of dynamic instability, irrespective of the speed at which this occurs, is
constrained and returned to a state of dynamic stability before any serious adverse outcomes
occur.
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To achieve this, REmonitors the application of the model that drives safety performance, e.g. the
OH&S-MS, and measures performance against demands and continually adjusts the model to
meet changing conditions. This includes monitoring decision-making in order to determine if the
risks proposed or being taken are within prescribed safety boundaries, although defining these
boundaries is difficult, especially if the boundaries are changing. This requires an understanding
of how the system adapts and, equally, what changes are likely, such as:
• Buffering capacity: changes that can be absorbed without any significant change
in the system;
• Flexibility versus stiffness: the system's ability to change in response to
perturbations;
• Margin: how close the system is operating to performance boundaries, e.g. risk
tolerability criteria;
• Tolerance: how a system reacts when close to a boundary
• Cross-organisational relationships: for example, Downward Resilience considers
how to manage goal conflicts whereas Upward Resilience assesses how
individuals/groups respond to safety strategies, such as their level of compliance
or non-compliance.
While this is generally consistent with OH&S-MSs, it does not fully explain what criteria could be
applied and how performance could be measured to ensure that the response needed to prevent
incidents, when moving towards an unstable condition, could be fast and timely enough to revert
to a state of stability before any adverse outcome occurs.
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For example, the National Aeronautics· and Space Administration (NASA) applied a policy of
'faster, cheaper, better' (FCB) that led to a number of accidents and an investigation report
concluded that while NASA had a history of successfully carrying out some of the most complex
and challenging engineering tasks, it was being asked to sustain this level of success whilst
continually cutting costs, personnel, and development time, and that these demands stressed the
system to the limit due to:
• "insufficient time to reflect on unintended consequences of day-to-day decisions,
• insufficient time and workforce available to provide the level of checks and balances,
• breakdowns in inter-group communications, and
• too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction [297]".
The Report diagnosed the situation as being too 'brittle' and eroding of resilience. The findings of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Report, (a disaster that occurred on February 1, 2003, when,
shortly before it was scheduled to conclude its 28th mission, STS-107,the SpaceShuttle Columbia
disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana during re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, resulting in
the death of all seven crew members [298]) suggested that a 'silver bullet' strategy, the
advancement of multiple goals that do not conflict with each other, is a mirage. Instead, the
report recommended that new mechanisms were needed to balance the inherent tensions
between the various goalswithin a project. Similarly, in ResilienceEngineering, it is proposed that
these tensions often cause increased complexity especially in conjunction with the pace of change
and coupled with other influences, which inevitably lead to failure unless reconciled.
Systems need to be resilient against various threats [299). These are categorised as regular
threats that normally only require a standard response; the irregular threat that is considered
extremely unlikely to occur but may have major consequences,and finally the unexampled event
which is not considered foreseeable and therefore with no paradigm or prepared response.
Resilience is the way in which the management system copes with both predictable and
unpredictable undesirable events.
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This gives rise to themes that embody the concept of resilience [3OOJ,as illustrated below:
• Being better at predicting the next accident, by being more sensitive to the
pressures of normal work by normal people in normal organisations, although
defining 'normal' is contentious unless perhaps, 'normal' relates to a dynamic
environment undergoing constant change;
• Identifying drifts into failure modes, before failures occur, particularly where
there are tensions within the system due, for example, to Incompatible goals.
However, detecting drift and taking the right action at the right time with the
right people at the right place, etc. is also fraught with difficulty ;
• Charting the difference between what is actually being practised (what is actually
happening) and theory (what senior managers would like to be happening) to
ensure that risks and their controls can be calibrated as necessary; and
• Maintaining the safety profile even if risks appear to be well-controlled, in a
relative stable environment.
3.4.2 Assessln, resilience
Typical factors that contribute to a lack of resilience in organisations [301J include:
• [Safety] Defences erode under production pressure. This can include structural
integrity, process containment, ignition control, protection systems (e.g. fire),
detection systems (e.g. fire and gas), shutdown systems, and emergency response
and lifesaving systems;
• The fact that past good performance is taken as a reason for future confidence
about risk control;
• The fact that fragmented problem-solving clouds the big picture - mindfulness,
discussed in the section on High Reliability Organisations, is not based on a
shared risk picture;
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• The failure to revise risk assessments appropriately as circumstances change or
new relevant evidence becomes available;
• Breakdown at boundaries (e.g. breakdown at the internal or external boundary
impedes communication and coordination);
• The organisation's lack of ability to respond flexibly and rapidly to changing
demands;
• A lack of commitment to safety, in relation to competing goals; and
• The fact that safety is not inherent in the system.
There are also many potential conflicts, or tensions, within organisations, which are extremely
difficult to reconcile [302). For example:
• Formal procedures that, over time, capture lessons learnt that are often
voluminous and difficult to apply in comparison with slim procedures that are
easy to apply but may lack relevant content, e.g., corporate memory;
• Centralisation to achieve consistency and continuity, especially in multinational
organisations where personnel often transfer, 'v' decentralisation and local
autonomy; and
• Maintaining the status quo for stability 'v' the need to change to meet future
challenges;
• Using tried and tested techniques and technologies 'v' developing new innovative
systems and processes.
These factors are recurring themes in terms of adaptation and change but for an organisation to
be resilient it has to be able to absorb, adapt and adjust to survive, although there is a lack of
empirical evidence that unambiguously identifies exactly how this can be achieved.
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3.4.3 Resilience and KPls
REprescribes a proactive approach to the use of KPls [303], [102]. It considers that OH&S-MSs can
deteriorate over time or become obsolete as a consequence of changes, and that continuous
performance measurement is essential for successful OH&S Management. A particular type of
measurement, which is considered important in RE, is auditing, since it is proactive identifying
gaps between current and desired performance, and therefore helping to define corrective action
before an incident occurs. REalso attempts to learn from normal working conditions, rather than
from incidents, and subsequent incident investigations. However, in many respects these may
already be covered by current OH&S-MS models in that tools such as Job Safety/Hazard Analysis
[304] or Task Risk Assessment [305] are used in a proactive way, and auditing and review has
been an essential component of an OH&S-MS since its inception [32]. The primary difference
between them is that traditional OH&S-MSs tend to emphasise the reactive approach whereas RE
focuses on proactive methods. While OH&S-MSs already prescribe the use of both reactive and
proactive KPls it is a matter for the Industry to decide where and how to apply KPls to achieve
performance requirements.
3.4.4 Safety Resilience In UK offshore 011 and Gas Operations
Asset Integrity
Between 2000 and 2004 the UK HSEran an initiative, Key Programme 1 (KP1) (not to be confused
with Key Performance Indicator (KPI)) aimed at reducing hydrocarbon releases.
While this subsequently reduced the number of major and significant releases, it did not help to
improve the number of minor releases, and minor releases can quickly escalate to major releases.
Therefore, the HSEbecame concerned about the general decline in asset integrity and introduced
Key Programme 3 (KP3) [306] to improve asset integrity. This was scheduled to run between 2004
and 2007. Key Programme 2 [KP2] started in 2003, and focused on unacceptable accident
statistics from deck and drilling operations offshore, while KP 4 covers HSE's concerns about
ageing and life extension inspection programmes (2010 - 2013).
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The findings demonstrated a significant lack of resilience (given that many of the systems were
originally in better shape than those found during the inspections).
3.4.5 KeyThemes in RE
The seven characteristics present in highly resilient organisations are:
• Top-level [safety] commitment;
• A 'Just Culture' that encourages the reporting of issues and allows for human
error but does not accept negligent behaviours;
• A learning culture where there is no denial of adverse events but where these are
seen aspositive lessonsthat have the potential to produce improvement;
• Awareness, in that personnel know what is actually happening (as opposed to
what they are they led to believe is happening) and therefore they are aware of
the current state of defences;
• Preparedness, not just in terms of the planning process but being ahead of
problems so that corrective actions are taken before a problem emerges;
• Flexibility to adapt effectively, and in a timely manner, to changing conditions,
irrespective of their complexity; and
• Opacity, so that the organisation understands the boundaries within which it
needs to operate, can accurately and reliably measure moves towards these
boundaries, and make corrections to avoid degrading defences such that it
operates outside these limits [611.
3.5 High Reliability Organisations
One way of preventing accidents is to study organisations that do not have significant, or major,
accidents. These are called High Reliability Organisations (HROs),Table 13. However, Hopkins
[307] argues that the term HRO is not well defined and that this impairs the ability to identify
whether an organisation can be labelled as an HRO[314]. In general, incident performance is not
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a good indicator since there are many variables that can influence performance, such as under-
reporting. However, this is overcome by identifying those organisations that exhibit a collective
state of 'mindfulness'. "The processes of mindfulness is intended to suppress tendencies toward
inertia , i.e. mindfulness is as much about the quality of attention as it is about the conservation of
attention. It is as much about what people do with what they notice as it is about the activity of noticing
itself' [308].
Table 13 Key Concepts of HROs
Key Concept Sub Heading Description
Respectful interaction Trust Respect others and be willing to base beliefs and actions on them
Honesty Report honestly so that others may develop valid beliefs
Self-respect Respect our own perceptions and beliefs without devaluing them
An informed culture Just Culture Encourage free exchange of information and allow for human
error but not negligent behavior
Reporting Culture Remove fear from reporting, Have we learnt lessons and
communicated them?
Learning Culture Learning is continuous
Flexible Culture Rules cannot be so complete that they cover every eventuality.
• "Reporting is audited;
Hopkins suggests that HROs have very successful reporting regimes, driven by a reporting culture,
given that:
• Personnel are told, in considerable detail, about what needs reporting;
• Incidents may be reported by 3,d Parties;
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• Disciplinary action may be taken if personnel fail to report; and
• There is no 'dabbing on a mate' (e.g. informing on someone, or volunteering
someone for an unwelcome task) particularly when there are no personal
connections [309]".
HROsare typically major accident hazard organisations, e.g. nuclear, aviation and petrochemical
and therefore they do not have the luxury to learn by trial and error. Consequently another
feature is that they are often subject to independent scrutiny from external regulatory bodies
[310]. As with many other organisations there is often a potential conflict between safety and
cost.
Air ServicesAustralia, a government-owned entity, is considered to be an HRO[311]. To achieve
this status a functional group was established that provided support across the whole
organisation, leaving the business to focus on core activities, e.g. making a profit. Hopkins notes
that many large organisations that are structured with independent profit centres, with little
central control, have been implicated in numerous major accidents [312]
It is suggested that today's organisations are characterised by 'raplex' - rapidly evolving and
complex, and that for organisations to survive they have to be capable of managing raplex [313]
similar to NASA'sexperience of 'faster, cheaper, better', [314). From an efficiency perspective an
organisation needs to be tightly-coupled or integrated in a way that ensures it acts as one rather
than the fragmented behaviours of many. In theory, this minimises costs since there is lesswaste.
However, HRO theory suggests that most organisations operate at a suboptimal level because
they are loosely-coupled.
High Reliability Organisations have a history of very safe operations, although many act in high-
risk industries (e.g. aircraft carriers [315) and the nuclear industry [316)) and demonstrate a high
combination of reliability, flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency [317).
Processesin HROsfocus on failure rather than success,and while HROsare not error-free, errors
that occur are not disabling [318) and reliability is the primary objective for HROs [316, 319).
Consequently, there are similarities with the concepts underpinning RE.
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HROsare reliable because they have a state of 'mindfulness' which is less about decision-making
and accident prevention and more about empowerment. HROspossess five qualities (Appendix A)
enabling them to reach their state of mindfulness and achieve a balance between tight and loose-
coupling, thereby maximising efficiency and reliability by continuously maintaining sensitivity to
operations.
3.6 Human Factors
As some of the oil and gas Industry has tried to improve asset integrity through the introduction
of hardware solutions such as safety critical elements, performance standards and verification, it
has also attempted to address human factors. The UK HSEpublished a document, 'Reducing error
and influencing behaviour', to help understand their approach to human factors [320]. It gives a
simple introduction to generic industry guidance on human factors, in which it states:
"Human factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual
characteristics, which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety"
This definition includes interrelated aspects that must be considered: the job, the individual and
the organisation. The publication states, "human factors are concerned with what people are
being asked to do (the task and its characteristics), who is doing it (the individual and their
competence) and where they are working (the environment and the organisation and its
attributes), all of which are influenced by the wider societal concern, both local and national.
Human factor interventions will not be effective if they consider these aspects in isolation".
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It is argued that human failures are not random but that there are patterns, and therefore
understanding these patterns can help prevent error. Furthermore, different failure types have
different causes and require different remedies.
The UK HSEpublication, 'Reducing error and influencing behaviour' indicates there are different
types of human failure (unsafe acts) that could result in a major accident. They are:
• Unintentional errors such as; errors (slips/lapses) and mistakes; and
• Intentional errors, i.e. violations. Violations can be further categorised as routine,
exceptional, situational and acts of sabotage
The probability of human failure is determined by 'performing-influencing' factors, including
distraction, time pressure, workload, morale, noise levels and communication systems. Therefore
it is argued that human error and rule-breaking is predictable and can be managed. However,
common pitfalls in managing people and their performance include:
• '7reating operators as if they are superhuman, able to intervene heroically in emergencies
• Providing precise probabilities of human failure (usually indicating very low chance of
failure) without documenting assumptions/data sources;
• Assuming that an operator will always be present, detect a problem and immediately take
appropriate action;
• Assuming that people will always follow procedures;
• Stating that operators are well-trained, when it is not clear how the training provided
relates to major accident hazard prevention or control, and without understanding that
training will not affect the occurrence of slips/lapses or violations, only mistakes;
• Stating that operators are highly motivated and thus not prone to unintentional failures or
deliberate violations;
• Ignoring the human component completely, failing to discuss human performance at all in
risk assessments, leading to the impression that the site is unmanned;
• Inappropriate application of techniques, such as detailing every task on site and therefore
losing sight of targeting resources where they will be most effective; and
• Producing grand motherhood statements that human error is completely managed
(without stating exactly how)".
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A Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) has been developed to help improve the investigation
and contribution of human factors in the causes of accidents [321J. The tool collects four types of
human factors information:
• the action errors occurring immediately prior to the incident,
• error recovery mechanisms, in the case of near-misses,
• the thought processes which led to the action error; and
• the underlying causes.
Various explanations for human error have been published in recent years comprising lapses,
mistakes and violations, and these can occur at any time during the lifecycle, e.g. design,
construction, fabrication, and operation and maintenance [295, 322J. The OH&S-MS is intended
to provide the framework that helps prevent or mitigate the potential impacts from human
intervention, e.g. providing personnel with suitable competencies. While the OH&S-MS
framework, arguably, contains the necessary components to secure sustainable improvements in
safety performance, including the provision of adequate supervision and Inspection, the relatively
constant changes within oil and gas organisations may cause a differential between the ability to
apply the OH&S-MS effectively and the need for continuity of operations. Furthermore, as
experienced personnel leave, or transfer within an organisation, there may be a loss of 'corporate
memory' that accompanies these personnel. Unless, for example, the procedures adequately
capture this experience, and are written and managed to ensure effective implementation, then
the historical experience acquired by personnel, l.e. lessons learnt, will be lost to the organisation.
Obviously, the risk is that errors will be repeated. These phenomena may be more relevant to
project teams given their temporary and transient structure, with often the lack of corporate
experience.
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It is suggested that it is necessary to integrate human factors into design, particularly for high
hazard industries, in order to bridge the gap between designers and end-users. Without this
integration a facility may have operability problems and, consequently adverse impacts on safety
performance [323].
Inherently safer techniques and technologies are often designed to tolerate human error,
especially as in various sourcesof the literature people are considered to be primarily responsible
for accidents.
In the context of human factors the 'process' includes more than the equipment and the
chemistry. It includes the systems of training, supervision, and the provision of tools to the people
who operate and maintain the plant, including the design of operating and maintenance
procedures and other management systems.
Unfortunately many designs fail to adequately address and implement inherent safety, and
therefore rely on lower order safety systems, such as procedural controls. For projects, often the
easy and most cost-effective option, in the short-term, is to design a process that targets lower
CAPEX.This may translate, for example, to reduced investment in higher reliability plant and
equipment, which congruently requires greater maintenance and process interventions during the
operational phase. This has the effect of increased personnel exposure to potentially hazardous
conditions and a greater potential for human error. Factors that can contribute to procedural
error include:
• obsolescence,
• inaccuracy,and
• unavailability
Proper design of procedures requires consideration of the following [324]:
• Completeness and accuracy: Does the procedure have enough information for the
user to perform the task safely and correctly?
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• Appropriate level of detail: Has the level of detail considered the experience and
capabilities of the users, their training and their responsibilities?
• Conciseness: Conciseness demands eliminating detail and language that does not
contribute to work performance, safety, or quality. Conciseness also means
including only 'need-to-know' and omitting 'nice-to-know' information.
• Consistent presentation: This element ensures that the procedure is readily
comprehensible.
Given the dynamics of people movements, particularly within large organisations, maintaining
these aspects for all relevant people, at all times, presents a significant challenge, and is probably
unrealistic.
The Energy Institute, in the UK, in collaboration with Det Norsk Veritas (DnV, a classification
society in Norway with the objective of safeguarding life, property and the environment) has
published guidance to help non-specialists manage human factor analysis of safety critical tasks.
Safety critical tasks relate to human failures that could result in a major accident.
The intent of this publication along with similar guidance is to achieve better integration of
human failures prevention in safety studies [325].
3.7 The Role of the Safety Department and Safety Personnel
The primary role of safety personnel is to advise senior managers on all safety, health and welfare
matters to ensure an organisation complies with its statutory obligations. Generally a Safety
Manager (various titles may exist for this post), and subordinates, are designated responsibility by
the Director accountable for health and safety to, for example:
and keep up to date with any changes [45];
• Understand the application of safety-related legislation relevant to a Company's business
• Maintain sufficient competencies, e.g. skills and knowledge, to enable accurate
interpretation of legislation to enable implementation within the organisation;
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• Ensure effective implementation of a recognised OH&S-MS;
• Ensure that risk assessment is appropriate for the hazards created by an organisation;
• To audit and review company safety performance and make recommendations to ensure
that the approach to safety is adjusted, where necessary, to meet company safety goals;
• Immediately contact the Director responsible for health and safety if situations are found,
that in the opinion of the Safety Manager, require immediate rectification or the stopping
of any operation;.
• To support investigations into all accidents, and near-miss incidents, and to record the
findings to ensure that the OH&S-MS is modified, where necessary to prevent recurrence;
• To identify good/best safety practices and advice the organisation where appropriate as
part of the process of continuous and sustainable improvements in safety; and
• To highlight areas where training/certification is required to meet the standards imposed
by Legislation, Approved Codes of Practice, or H.S.E.guidance.
Consequently the role of safety personnel can be highly influential in shaping and achieving an
organisation's safety goals since they provide the expertise to inform safety-related decision-
making. The UK law also requires that the organisation appoints someone competent to perform
health and safety duties [129]. To support this selection there is an Occupational Safety and
Health Consultants Register (OSHCR)[326]. This provides an up-to-date list of general health and
safety advisors who have a qualification recognised by the professional bodies participating in the
scheme. A minimum standard is set for consultants to join the register. This minimum standard
has been set at a degree level qualification, at least two years' experience, and active engagement
in a continuing professional development scheme. All consultants who join the register are bound
by their professional body's code of conduct, and are committed to providing sensible and
proportionate advice. More recently, as lessons have been learnt from major accidents, there has
been a new discipline of safety engineers, who have focused on major accident hazards and
process safety [338].
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This role has evolved to include:
• Fire safety engineering;
• Process engineering and hazard analysis;
• Hazard modelling and quantitative risk assessment,
• Process safety management; and
• Safety culture.
However, there is not a statutory requirement in the UK for an organisation to employ someone
from the OSHeR. While other countries may have similar schemes, it is likely that, similar to all
disciplines, there will be a wide variety in the competencies, experience and capabilities of safety
professionals. Furthermore, the ability of the safety professional to help achieve safety goals is
likely to be dependent on factors such as the safety culture within an organisation, the legal
framework in which they operate, and the influence of the regulator.
3.8 Summary
Inherent safety
An inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by
reducing the amount of hazardous material and the number of hazardous operations in the plant.
The potential benefits of an inherently safer design include:
• Less reliance on lower order process controls and active protection system;
• Lessmaintenance as systems are more passive;
• Lessexposure to risk due to reduced maintenance;
• Lower aPEX due to reduced manpower and fewer active systems to replace;
• Improved process productivity as shut downs are less frequent; and
• Higher revenues due to increased productivity.
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In the oil and gas industry the introduction of inherent safety should be relatively simple
compared to complex chemical plants since the product is dominated by hydrocarbons. There is
considerable literature in this field and the principles are well-defined and established. The
challenges for its introduction are not technically onerous. Somework has been carried out by the
UKHSEon the extent of implementation in design of inherent safety in the UKoffshore oil and gas
industry. It has concluded that generally the industry has been poor in adopting this approach.
Currently it is not clear why the industry has not fully embraced inherent safety. However, this
research suggests that, first; it may be due to the way that projects in the design phase are
financed and the expectation that applying inherent safety may increase capital expenditure
(CAPEX).This might compromise project viability and/or the traditional project KPls of cost and
schedule. Second, to implement inherent safety (assuming it involves higher CAPEX)would
require the ability to determine lifecycle development costs. This might then justify higher CAPEX
but lower operating expenditure (OPEX)so that the overall expenditure is lower compared to a
non-inherently safer design. Third, safety engineers may not have the expertise to apply inherent
safety, although it has been established for some time. This research has not been able to identify
if this is the casebut it is clear that there are no project KPlsthat relate to the implementation of
inherent safety during design. Fourth, this is potentially a step change from decadesof traditional
practice and therefore might require a culture shift in the way that the industry makes decisions.
The principles of inherent safety are more specific to process and hardware systems. However,
there is no literature that considers the elements of an OH&S-MS that would contribute to
inherent safety. The reasons why the industry failed to fully implement inherent safety are party
speculative and more research is needed to understand its reluctance, especially when the
potential benefits, technically and financially, are extremely attractive. The scope of inherent
safety needs to be extended to consider the wider aspects of OH&S-MSs.
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Normal Accident Theory (NAT)
'Normal accidents' can be translated as accidents that are inevitable. This is because complexity
and tight-coupling of plant design and layout make it impossible to understand all the possible
failure permutations and therefore controls cannot be applied to failures that cannot be
predicted. The benefit of this theory is to support decision-making for plant design to ensure that
complex, tightly-coupled plants with low societal value may not be constructed. If there is value in
a particular plant then providing that the assessment of risk is correct, and risk tolerability and
ALARP can be demonstrated, in combination with public support for the development through
informed consultation, then the resultant risk can be justified. Nuclear and petrochemical plants
are used to illustrate NAT. Ironically NAT states that complex, tightly-coupled plants are more
efficient that alternatives. The literature does not explore this is much detail. For example, if NAT
was an accepted theory that steered design then it would present a dichotomy for designers, e.g.
should it be an efficient design, but accept inevitable accidents, or an inefficient design that
minimises accidents? Given the weighting typically exhibited by oil and gas companies, in this
context, it is likely to be the former. However, NAT fails to address more basic principles, in that if
NAT was accepted theory then it might, for example, highlight the need for designers to remove
people from the hazard and therefore rely more on remotely controlled facilities although this
aspect of NAT is not fully explored. Furthermore, NAT fails to recognise the contribution of
inherent safety which indirectly accepts that accidents might happen. Inherent safety ensures
that both the likelihood and consequences (immediate and escalation), i.e. the risk, are
accommodated in the design so that the effects of any failure, whether predicted in the design or
not, are mitigated to ensure risk tolerability and ALARP. NAT also assumes that since operators
cannot be expected to make decisions, e.g. in an emergency, to manage events that have not
been predicted, and therefore for which they have no experience, then they cannot be liable for
any errors they make.
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This is also ready acknowledged by most companies in the industry through concepts such as 'just
culture' and in the UK legal system through criminal and civil proceedings. Whereas inherent
safety provides an engineer with tangible and practical design solutions, NAT is largely
conceptual. The meaning of complex and tightly-coupled has no definition to which an engineer
can justify a particular plant design. Also, the features of a complex, tightly-coupled chemical
plant, e.g. layout, may vary considerably from a petrochemical plant with a similar footprint.
Equally an onshore petrochemical plant with an identical design to an offshore facility may have
different footprints but the onshore may be regarded as non-complex, loosely-coupled whereas
the offshore facility could be complex and tightly-coupled. NAT offers a conceptual explanation
for major accidents but lacks technical evaluation and the ability to translate the concept to
inform plant design decision-making.
Resilient Engineering (RE)
In RE traditional approaches to safety management are considered to be incremental so that
when a failure occurs, a change in introduced to prevent recurrence, and so on. REbelieves this
approach has limited value in that the change may only be just sufficient for each problem rather
than a more holistic evaluation and remedy. REattempts a step change by introducing a new way
of thinking about safety management. In RE, organisations with a good or poor safety
performance are expected to invest in anticipating the changing potential for failure because
knowledge gaps are imperfect and the environment is constantly changing. Therefore REis about
the ability to predict the changes in risk, before failure and harm occurs. The benefit of REis that
the approach is analogous to a process system that has inputs, a process for converting them into
desired outputs, and a feedback loop that continually adjusts the inputs to correct errors or
deviations from required outputs. This model is tried and tested in many process-related
applications and conceptually works well for managing safety performance.
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In theory it ensures that systems behaviour, e.g. process, organisational, assets, is maintained
within a stable range and any change towards a less stable condition is identified, in a timely way,
and corrected, thereby retaining a stable state. This requires monitoring and measuring system
performance to provide the accuracy, validity and speed to make modifications before harm or
adverse failure occurs. In this context the theory is relatively simple. REdoes emphasise, or re-
emphasise some important characteristics that can contribute towards improving safety
performance, e.g. that safety performance can be eroded under pressure, past good safety
performance is taken as a confident predictor of future performance, etc. This approach is also
found in OH&S-MSs but is not articulated in the same way, l.e. it is less obvious. The literature,
similar to NAT, does not fully describe how RE translates into practice. For example, for RE to
work it advocates the need to have buffering capacity to absorb deviations from a stable
condition before they become unstable, l.e. produce undesired outcomes. It also requires that
there is a need to manage goal conflicts to avoid relationships that can erode resilience. In both
cases it is not clear how they are reconciled and RE itself does not appear to offer solutions that
are any different to those currently employed by the industry, e.g. organisational structure,
communications, competence, etc. RE requires that systems need to be flexible rather than stiff,
i.e. to respond to change in a timely and resolute way. Similarly it is necessary to understand
when a system is operating close to performance boundaries, and how the system responds when
it is close to those boundaries. However, these systems, e.g. organisational, hardware, people, are
never fully defined so that it is unclear what might constitute performance boundaries, how a
stable condition is defined, how deviations are monitored and measured, and what would be
regarded as a deviation towards a less stable state, etc. REin this research seems no more than a
concept requiring greater attention for effective implementation of an OH&S-MS. While the
vocabulary might have changed and some elements of the OH&S-MS emphasised, e.g. measuring
performance, its added value as a means of improving safety performance is limited at best, and
at worst can cause a distraction from getting effective application of an OH&S-MS.
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High Reliability Organisations (HROs)
These are organisations that are able to manage and sustain almost error-free performance
despite operating in hazardous conditions (where the consequences of errors could be
catastrophic) with a positive safety culture. In some respects they present similar characteristics
to those of RE,and parts of NAT, in that they exhibit the need to contain unexpected events, e.g.
redundancy, training, etc., require problem anticipation, e.g. sensitivity to operations that might
drift to an unstable state, and are particularly relevant to complex, tightly-coupled systems.
Where HROsdiffer from REand NATis the need to have a 'just' and learning culture, e.g. to report
events without fear of blame and continuous training, and 'mindful' leadership, e.g. management
by exception and proactive audits. In addition to the benefits of REfor which there are many
parallels, HROsplace additional emphasis on organisations so that they are more open to allow
empowerment of decision-making to individuals. This allows systems to be readily adapted to
changing conditions (similar to REwhere flexibility is preferred to stiffness). As with RE,HROs
invest heavily in safety management to provide an organisation with the resources it needs to
meet safety objectives. Similar to RE,HROsdo not have a specific framework on which to pin
strategies to improvement safety performance. The concepts are not inconsistent with REor
traditional OH&S-MSs.HROsemphasis the need to invest in safety management and therefore to
provide the resources necessary to satisfy safety objectives, but similar to REand OH&S-MSsit
does not describe how these resources can be funded, other than it needs a positive safety
culture to happen. In some areas translating the characteristics of an HRO into practice is as
difficult as those described in RE.For example, the concept that to contain unexpected events
requires deference to expertise is a reasonable principle but it is doubtful if this adds value to
existing practice. Similarly to have procedures to accommodate unexpected events is no different
to having emergency or contingency procedures that are relatively standard in most hazardous
operations. The learning culture is simply about acquiring people with the necessary skills and
knowledge, e.g. competency, and experience to execute the work they are employed to do. A key
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characteristic of an HRO is their apparent level of investment in safety management but there is
no indication, in the literature, of how much of an organisation's budget should be committed to
resourcing safety management, and whether this differs from that in any other organisation.
Consequently, it could simply be that these organisations are just more effective at implementing
an OH&S-MS than other comparable organisations. However, if safety management does get a
greater slice of the budget, in comparable terms with other organisations, then it could create a
benchmark for other organisations to follow if they desire similar levels of safety performance. It
would also be interesting to understand how the safety-related resources are distributed in an
HRO to help target improvement strategies, e.g. measuring performance and human factors also
appear to make significant contributions to HRO performance but there is no indicator of the
weighting given to either component.
Human Factors
In this research human factors refer to environmental (working), organisational and job factors,
and human and individual characteristics, which influence behaviour at work in a way which can
affect health and safety. This relates to what people are being asked to do (task and
environment), who is doing it (competence) and where they are working (organisation). These are
influenced by external factors, political, economic, technical, etc. Human factors therefore relate
to all oil and gas activities, from design through to abandonment of facilities. Managing human
failures is essential to prevent major accidents, occupational accidents and ill health, all of which
can cost businesses money, reputation and potentially the continued viability of an organisation.
Human factors pervade all aspects of oil and gas operations, and the implementation of OH&S-
MSs. People carry out risk assessments, conduct incident investigations, apply company
procedures, maintain safety critical equipment, and design facilities, and so on. However, it is
recognised that people are considered to be the largest contributor to accidents and there are
many causes, such as fatigue and shift work, behaviours, errors, lack of competence, workload,
etc.
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Therefore the literature examines some of these issuesby taking a relatively generic approach. In
some respects, given the extent of potential failure due to human factors, there is support for
NAT since it is generally impossible to predict, at work, whether an individual will perform an
intentional or unintentional error at anyone time or situation. Therefore, in this context, failures
might be considered inevitable. However, the literature on human factors does not link well with
the principles of inherent safety, especially as inherent safety is the one concept, in this research,
that has tangible measures to deal with failure. The concept assumesthat human failures are not
random but that there are patterns, and therefore understanding these patterns can help prevent
error. While there are well understood causes of human failure and many of these can be
remedied through training, supervision, ensuring compliance with procedures and motivational
and incentive schemes, etc., it is not clear what the relationship is between human factors, in the
context of decision-making and safety culture, as safety culture is considered an important factor
in establishing, and delivering, safety goals.
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
The hypotheses and literature review formed the basis for subsequent research using deductive
and inductive methodologies. In general, deductive research is considered to be theory-testing,
while inductive research is theory-generating. This research uses a combination of both. The
deductive element is mainly quantitative to determine global oil and gas safety performance. The
inductive element is qualitative to assess the effectiveness of Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems, their key components, and regulator influence. Consequently, the
research is set out as follows:
• Casestudies;
• Database analysis;
• Questionnaire; and
• Interviews.
4.2 Ca•• Stud I••
Four case studies were used in this research. A key, and relatively unique, feature of using them is
that they provide a comparative assessment of major accident causation over a period of 22
years. The case studies include the Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in 1988, with 167 fatalities
(Figure 4 and Figure 5). The second disaster in 2005 at Texas City cost 15 lives, the third at
Buncefield had no fatalities but wide ranging economic impacts, and the fourth, Deepwater
Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, in 2010 had 11 fatalities (Figure 8).
4.3 Databa •• Analy.l.
A number of organisations publish oil and gas industry performance data. Primary data was
extracted to identify historical safety performance. While there are issues about the validity and
accuracy of the data, it has nevertheless been collected, collated, analysed and presented in
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similar formats for many years and therefore provides a useful form of reference and comparison
of performance. However, most of the data is provided on a voluntary basis, it conforms to a
prescribed [limited] format, and not all oil and gas companies submit data. Therefore this is not a
comprehensive set of safety performance data.
4.4 Questionnaire
The aim of the questionnaire used in this research was to assesswhether a selected population of
experienced, suitably qualified and competent oil and gas personnel:
• agreed with the general conclusions identified in the Literature Review;
• could provide explanations for their views; and
• could offer alternative views or explanations.
The survey population was restricted to people with suitable experience and competencies in the
oil and gas industry, and who were particularly in safety roles. Given the characteristics of the
research and the specialist disciplines, it was necessary to adopt a non-probability, non-random,
sampling regime and therefore identify specific responders that would have similar competencies,
e.g. skills, qualifications and experience in safety. Consequently, judgment (purposive) sampling
was used [339]. This method relies on the judgment of the person carrying out the survey to
select a sample that reflects the general characteristics of the target population. The advantage of
this method is that it is a relatively simple, but effective, means to calibrate the findings from the
research previously undertaken in this thesis. It is recognised, however, that the disadvantage of
this method is the reliance on the objectivity of the person carrying out the survey and
introduction of bias from any preconceived views that exist.
The sample size can be chosen in different ways but in this case the size was based on an
expedient approach although it is appreciated that it lacks statistical confidence. The selection of
judgment sampling relates to the choice of responders who are most advantageously placed or in
the best position to provide the information required.
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They could reasonably be expected to have expert knowledge by virtue of having gone through the
experience and similar processes themselves and be able to provide good data or information for
this research. Thus this approach is justified when a limited number or category of people have the
information that is sought. In such cases any type of probability sampling across a cross-section of
the entire population is purposeless and not useful.
Judgment sampling may have limitations given the restricted availability of experts. However, it is
the only viable sampling method for obtaining the type of information that is required from very
specific pockets of people who are very knowledgeable.
For this reason, these findings cannot be generalised to the broader community based on this
study alone. It is recognised that a small sample size can have profound effects on the outcome
and value of a study. On the other hand, by carefully considering what sort of hypothesis to
evaluate, it was possible to find strong enough signals in the results to test conclusions relatively
rigorously. Therefore, given that technical safety engineering is a relatively new discipline, it was
more relevant to this research to focus on a representative set of individuals with suitable
technical safety qualifications and experience, who are distinguishable from the broader range of
safety professionals in the oil and gas industry, to intellectually test the research hypotheses.
Naturally, future research may extend this sample size. Sample size was also restricted by access
to people due to their geographical mobility and, in some cases, corporate sensitivities that
inhibited participation in external surveys.
Consequently, this approach overcame the potential problem of using a large range of safety
personnel with limited experience and competencies that might skew the results. It is recognised
that this introduces a potential bias in the research, but this is compensated for by the
combination of case studies, deductive research, options for open responses in the
questionnaires, and follow-up and interviews that included people who did not take part in the
questionnaire. People who had not previously taken part in the questionnaire provided views
that were not biased by completing the questionnaire thereby providing a further calibration of
the results.
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The survey was distributed to 60 individuals and 46 responses were completed giving a response
rate of ca 77%.
The questionnaire was based on the findings from the Literature Review. Given that the
questionnaire attempted to address a wide range of safety issues, at best this could only be
regarded as a screening exercise. Consequently, the questions were, in some cases, relatively
complex, but a compromise was necessary between question complexity and the number of
questions asked, Le. some questions could have been divided to provide more specific and
detailed analysis. However, this was largely compensated for by targeting respondents.
Respondents were from different oil and gas companies and included Operators, and suppliers of
accommodation vessels, drilling support services and onshore plants. Geographically they
covered Europe, the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand. Some respondents had experience
of working in the u.S. The survey population also included both oil and gas staff, and contractors
and consultants. Given the sampling criteria, it was crucial that the survey population was
representative of the oil and gas industry for the purposes of this research. The questionnaire
was distributed using a propriety software application, SurveyMonkey [340]. This application
allowed multiple-choice question types and the results could be downloaded into a spreadsheet
for detailed analysis.
A pilot questionnaire was run to spot any flaws which could then be corrected before publishing
and distributing the main survey. It was delivered to a small sample of the intended respondents.
Pie charts were then produced to show the results graphically. Question 1 asked for details of
each respondent and has not been included, in this thesis, to protect confidentiality.
Question 100 was an open question not requiring statistical analysis
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The following options were available in response to each of the questions:
• Agree
• Disagree
• Neither agree or disagree, e.g. assumes respondent understands the question and has
sufficient knowledge and experience of its relevance.
• Don't know, e.g. respondent may not understand the question or has no, or insufficient,
knowledge or experience to formulate a response
• See comments, e.g. provides the option to explain or clarify a response given above, or
where there is no response in the above categories, to offer an explanation.
4.5 Seml-structured Interviews
A structured interview has a formalised, limited set of questions; a semi-structured interview is
flexible, allowing new questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the
interviewee says. In this research semi structured-interviews provided greater opportunity to
explore research topics in more detail. The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to:
• Obtain specific qualitative information from a sample of the respondents;
• Obtain general information relevant to this research, (i.e. to probe for what is not known);
and
• Gain a range of insights on specific issues
The major benefits of the semi-structured interviews were that they:
• Encouraged two-way communication. Those being interviewed could ask questions of the
interviewer. In this way it also functioned as an extension tool.
• Confirmed what was already known but also provided the opportunity for learning. Often
the information obtained from semi-structured interviews provided not just answers, but
the reasons for the answers.
• Allowed individuals to easily discuss sensitive issues.
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The surveys were based on an online questionnaire that included options for both closed and
open questions. The advantages of a questionnaire are:
• The data gathered is in a given format and therefore, easy to analyse;
• Data can be gathered quickly from a large number of respondents, especially given the
geographical diversity and associated time zone differences of potential respondents in
the global oil and gas industry;
• Respondents can answer anonymously which may produce more honest answers; and
• The results can be readily processed.
The main disadvantages are:
• Responses may be inaccurate, especially through mis-interpretation of questions in self-
completing questionnaires (although the opportunity for this was minimised by the use of
a pilot questionnaire);
• A reasonable sample size is needed before the responses can be used to represent the
population as a whole; and
• Response rates can be poor, if people lack the motivation to complete or return the
questionnaire.
The semi-structured interviews, and possible topics for discussion, were based on some of the
key findings from this research, including:
a. OH&S-MSs
b. Inherent safety
c. Normal accidents
d. Resilient engineering
e. High reliability organisations
f. Human factors
g. Deductive research; and
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h. The Questionnaire.
Telephone and face-to-face interviews were carried out. A pilot was undertaken to attain
familiarity with the questions, and get feedback on two-way communication skills. Where
possible, the interview was recorded. If this was not possible, brief notes were made during the
interview and elaborated on soon after completion. Analysis of the information was carried out at
the end of each day of interviewing, or as soon as possible after that. A lot of extra information
surfaced during the interviews, and it was necessary to assure the person being interviewed that
the information was both confidential and anonymous. All semi-structured interviews were
carried out on a one-to-one basis, rather than in a group to avoid people interrupting one another
or 'helping each other out', or not taking turns.
Analysis of the interviews was carried out using an abridged version of 'Content Analysis'. Content
Analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or statements within
texts or sets of texts. This can be used to make inferences about the messages within the texts-
To conduct a content analysis on any such text, the text is coded, or broken down, into
manageable categories on a variety of levels such as word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme, and
then examined using one of content analysis' basic methods: conceptual analysis or relational
analysis. However, in this case, given the commonality of themes, and by using semi-structured
interview techniques, the coding was intrinsic during the interview sessions, and therefore
conceptual or relational analysis was readily identified [341].
4.6 Summary
The research was designed to satisfy the research objectives of:
• Reviewing case studies of selected disasters which have occurred over a suitable period,
that, perhaps with the exception of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, should have allowed
lessons learnt to be embedded in industry hazard management systems, and prevent
future disasters (CaseStudies);
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• Examining the industry's historical safety performance to assess whether it can
demonstrate a continuous and sustainable safety performance (DatabaseAnalysis);
• Assessingthose management factors that might have an impact on the ability to deliver
OH&Sobjectives (Questionnaire and Interviews);
• Evaluating the effectiveness and role of safety legislation and the safety regulator
(Questionnaire and Interviews);
• Considering typical hazards and how the industry currently approaches safety [risk]
management, during the lifecycle of a typical development (Questionnaire and
Interviews); and
• Reviewing relatively new concepts of inherent safety, high reliability organisations,
resilient engineering and human factors, to assess their potential value in meeting
industry safety objectives, and how well they have been implemented by the industry
(Questionnaire and Interviews).
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5. CASE STUDIES
5.1 Introduction
The relevance of the four disaster casestudies selected was that:
• They were subject to comprehensive investigation by authoritative and independent
nationally-recognised bodies [6, 10, 18, 21];
• The reports were readily available in the public domain;
• Analysis of the four disaster reports provided an insight into the effectiveness of the
application of OH&S-MSs, since HSG65was first published by the UK Health and Safety
Executive in 1991, approximately 3 years post-Piper Alpha, and preceding Texas City and
Buncefield by about 14 years, and Deepwater Horizon by 22 years;
• The companies accountable for the disasters were all mature major petrochemical
organisations with global offshore and onshore interests and therefore representative of the
industry (e.g. accidental was the owner of Piper Alpha, BP the owner of the Texas City
refinery and Macondo well which was drilled by Transocean, owner of the drilling rig
Deepwater Horizon, while Total UK Ltd, Chevron Ltd, BPOil UK Ltd and Shell Oil UK were
partners owning Buncefield);
• There were ample learning opportunities in the periods between the disasters, with the
exception of Deepwater Horizon, to have learnt the lessons from the investigations, that, if
effective IVimplemented, might have prevented subsequent disasters;
• All four disaster locations were subject to independent regulatory safety inspections; and
• The case studies provided a representative spread of oil and gas companies and contractors,
onshore and offshore operations, and drilling and production.
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The intention was not a comprehensive analysis of the four disasters, but simply a review of the
respective investigation reports for elements of commonality and contrast in relation to
immediate and root causes, i.e. the identification of the factors that could help prevent future
major accidents. Piper Alpha was selected as the first case study, since it preceded the
introduction of HSG 65 by three years and was, arguably, the first major accident where the
facility was subject to a reasonably comprehensive prescriptive regulatory regime. It also provided
the global industry with one of the most detailed public inquiries carried out to date at that time,
therefore giving the industry significant learnings to help prevent future major accidents.
5.2 Accident Investigations
Before embarking on a review of the four disaster investigation reports it is worth examining
whether all investigations provide the level of analysis that yields results to enable the industry,
and others, to identify all causes, in sufficient depth, to prevent recurrence. While many accident
investigations appear thorough, some would argue that most investigation techniques are based
on a linear approach, such as the Swiss Cheese Model, Figure 24 below, involving a chain of
events that often ignores the complex relationships that exist in large organisations.
Figure 24 Example of the Swiss Cheese Model
Source BG Group
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This aspect should be considered in the accounts given below of the major accident
investigations, since often their technical and linear bias may not explain some of the
organisational and external decisions that ultimately created the conditions for a major accident
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to occur. Furthermore, many accidents are believed to be caused by human error, and between
1999 and 2006, 96% of investigated U.S. aviation accidents were mainly attributed to the flight
crew, and in 81%, people were the sole reported cause [342]. However, it is argued that these
single factor judgmental explanations, which are dependent on a linear or 'chain of events'
accident causation philosophy, cannot fully explain accident causation, since failure is embedded
in complex systems and emerges as a result of a network of complex causal interactions [343].
The 'defences in depth' approach commonly used to both prevent accidents and identify potential
failures (e.g. Swiss cheese model, Layers of protection Analysis (LOPA), etc), provides symmetry
between cause and effect and therefore implies that events can be predicted. If events can be
predicted, then measures can be taken to ensure that adequate controls are in place to prevent
failures. In this context the vast majority of failures should be foreseeable and therefore people
must be negligent when failures occur, hence the large percentage of accidents attributed to
people. The implications are that, in linear analysis, the relationship between component
behaviour and system behaviour is analytically non-problematic, and that:
• Causes for effects can always be found;
• More effort is likely to produce more foreseeable outcomes, i.e. failures just mean people
have not tried hard enough;
• An event sequence follows a logically engineered path; and
• One official account can fully explain cause and effects.
However, complex systems cannot fulfill this linear model of cause and effect, given the dynamic
network of relationships in a nominally regulated environment including cultural, educational,
language and hierarchical diversity. Everyday decisions are embedded in masses of similar
decisions and people cannot be held accountable based on the benefit of hindsight as outcomes
are complex, non-linear and probably impossible to foresee (foreseeable in this context is where a
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reasonable person would be able to predict or expect the ultimately harmful result of their
actions [344], e.g. a foreseeable event or time is one that can easily be imagined or known about
before it happens. Complexity argues that potential failures are suspended in the messy interior
of the organisation, and are hard to trace as they do not follow documented organisational
protocol but depend on unwritten routines, implicit expectations, professional judgments and
subtle oral influences. Consequently, it is impossible to find all of the causesof failure or the true
causes. It is also noteworthy that investigations tend to address both the immediate and root
causes of accidents. The immediate cause, paraphrased from a legal definition [345], may be
defined as the final act(s) in a series of events leading to a particular result or event, directly
producing such result without further intervention, e.g. process failures that directly cause loss of
containment following by ignition. Immediate causes generally relate to people, processes and
practices while root causes tend to be embedded in failures of an OH&S-MS, e.g. failure to
provide adequate resources to manage the risk, such as provision of competent personnel.
Consequently the failures that are particularly visible, such as the disasters discussed below, all
have relatively unique immediate causes and therefore are considered on a case-by-case basis
(although lessons can still be learnt by the industry). However, more importantly, there is a
relatively common approach in OH&S-MSsapplied by the industry that is intended to prevent
such disasters and it is here that opportunities exist to take a proactive approach to stop major
accidents.
5.3 Piper Alpha 1988
The Piper Alpha oil platform was owned by a consortium consisting of Occidental Petroleum
(Caledonian) Ltd, who had a 36.5% interest, Texaco Britain Ltd with 23.5%, International Thomson
PLCwith 20% and Texas Petroleum Ltd with 20%. Oil was discovered in the Piper field in Block
15/17 in January 1973.
Page 154
The oil field was exploited by the Piper Alpha platform. The platform was located 120 miles north-
east of Aberdeen. The platform provided the facilities to drill and produce wells. The composition
of produced fluids from the reservoir included a mixture of oil, gas and water. Gas and water were
separated from the oil in separators, and gas condensate liquid was separated from the gas. The
design flowrate was 250,OOObbl/d oil. Production started in late 1976. Initially only the oil was
exported to shore, by a pipeline to the onshore oil terminal at Flotta. The gas was flared until
1978 when gas surplus to platform requirements was purified and pumped to the MCP-01 gas
compression platform, mingled with Frigg gas and then pumped to the British Gas collection plant
at St Fergus.
Piper Alpha was connected to other platforms and to shore by 4 pipelines, 1 oil and 3 gas (Figure
25). The risers of the Main Oil Line (MOL) and gas pipelines from Tartan and to Claymore came up
the north face; that of the gas pipeline to MCP-Ol up the east face.
Figure 25 Piper Alpha Oil and Gas Pipelines
Source: The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster
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There were various aspects of the platform in early July 1988 which were unusual, and prior to
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the disaster there were hydrocarbon releases involving temporary evacuation and precautionary
shutdowns. The initial explosion of the disaster occurred on the production deck at about
22:00hrs on 6 July 1988. This was followed immediately by a fire at the west end of Module Band
a fireball which erupted from its west face. The fire spread rapidly in Module B and extended to
Module C and down to the 68ft level (Figure 26). From the outset dense black smoke from the fire
engulfed the upper parts of the northern end of the platform, due to an oil pool fire in Module B.
The initial explosion was followed by a series of smaller explosions. Most of the emergency
systems of the platform, including the fire water system, failed to operate.
Figure 26 layout of Piper Alpha
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At the time of the initial explosion 226 persons were onboard, of which 62 were on the night shift.
The great majority of the remainder were in the accommodation module. Between 22:04 and
22:08 hrs, 3 maydays were sent from the Radio Room. The 3rd announced that the room was
being abandoned due to fire, but owing to the flames and dense smoke outside the
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accommodation module it was impossible for evacuation to be carried out by helicopters or
lifeboats. The remaining survivors, who were on duty, made their way to the accommodation
module, perhaps fully aware of the dire situation there. The normal lighting in the
accommodation module failed shortly after the initial explosion, and it was followed by
emergency lighting that lasted 10-15 minutes. At about 22:20 hrs there was a massive explosion
which was due to the rupture of the Tartan gas riser. This caused a massive and prolonged high
pressure gas fire which generated intense heat. Shortly before 22:45 hrs the cascade from the fire
monitors of the Tharos, a large semi-submersible flrefighting, rescue and accommodation vessel,
which had been approaching the platform, began to reach it. The gangway of the Tharos was not
landed on Piper. A number of men, including 28 survivors, made their escape from the
accommodation module at various levels. By 22:50 about 39 survivors had left the platform. At
that point a further massive explosion occurred. This is likely to have been caused by the rupture
of the MCP-Ol gas riser. It added to the intensity of the high pressure gas fire. The explosion
destroyed the fast rescue craft (FRC)of the Sandhaven, a standby vessel, and killed most of its
occupants. Debris from the explosion was projected some 800m, and vibration was felt up to a
mile away. Structural collapse at the 68ft level below Module B started. The structural collapse
was hastened by a series of major explosions, one of which occurred at about 23:20 hrs, and was
due to the rupture of the Claymore gas riser. Between 22:30 and 00:45 the centre of the platform
collapsed. The risers from the gas pipelines and the MOL were torn apart.
A total of 62 survivors from Piper (one of whom died later in hospital) and one survivor from the
Sandhaven's FRChad by then reached a variety of vessels. The bodies of 30 personnel from Piper
remain missing.
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The Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, at that time, was probably one of the most
comprehensive investigations ever undertaken into a disaster in the oil and gas industry. Its report
comprised two volumes, each over 250 pages long.
The Report made 106 recommendations to improve safety performance in the UK offshore
industry, summarised in Table 14.
Table 14 Piper Alpha Summary of Recommendations
Subject Number of Comments
Recommendations
Safety Case 13 Has to demonstrate that the SMS is adequate for design and
operation. Major accidents hazards are properly identified, assessed
and controlled. Adequate provision to protect people in relation to
emergencies. Standards to be set to ALARP.Adequate provision for
escape, evacuation and rescue. Safety case to be managed.
Auditing of the 2 Operator and regulatory body to satisfy themselves that SMS is
operator's management working
of safety
Independent assessment 1 Regulator to consider how much of the previous independent
and surveys of certification scheme is to be retained
installations
Legislation - General 6 Move from prescriptive to goal-setting regulatory regime.
Revocation of some existing regulations and introduction of some
new ones based on goal-setting principles
The regulatory body 4 Provision of single regulatory body to UK HSE
Safety committees and 5 The need to involve the workforce in safety, and protection of safety
safety representatives representatives against victimisation
Permits to work (PtW) 7 PtW should be part of SMS. Sets out need for competent PtW users.
Preference to harmonise PtWs across the industry. Requirement for
mechanical isolations and procedures. Display of PtW
Incident reporting 1 Regulator to maintain a hydrocarbon leak database
Control of the process 3 Key processes to be monitored from a Control Room, with trained
operators
Hydrocarbon inventory, 4 Provision for riser isolation valves with full emergency shutdown
risers and pipelines capability. Also; Subsea Isolation valves (SSIVs)where appropriate.
Fire and gas detection 2 The provision of emergency shutdown valves and SSIVs, if fitted,
and emergency should be part of the safety case and take account of emergency
shutdown scenarios
Fire and explosion 6 The requirement to undertake a fire and explosion risk assessment
protection and to confirm the suitability of controls and mitigations
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Number of
Recommendations
Comments
To protect people in the TSR taking into account emergency
scenarios, e.g. fire and explosion and smoke and gas ingress into the
TSR
The provision of facilities in the TSR to monitor and control
emergencies, including communications. To standardise (across the
industry) alarm systems. To determine the vulnerability of
emergency systems and standards for its availability
Subject
Accommodation, 7
Temporary Safe Refuge
(TSR),escape routes and
embarkation points
Emergency centres and 9
systems
Pipelines emergency 2
procedures
Evacuation, escape and 4
rescue - General
Helicopters 1
Totally Enclosed Motor 4
Propelled Survival Craft
(TEMPSC)
Means of escape to the 3
sea
Personal survival and 3
escape equipment
Standby vessels 9
Command
emergencies
in 3
Drills, exercises and 5
precautionary musters
and evacuations
Training for emergencies 2
Total 106
Page 159
Operators to regularly review pipeline emergency procedures and
manuals and shutdown procedures
To carry out an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis and identify
a number of features of this analysis that should be included, e.g.
command structure
Provision for short-term availabiiity and capacity of helicopters in
the event of an emergency
Providing sufficient TEMPSCto have lS0% of the persons on board
(POB) the installation. To orient the TEMPSC away from the
structure
To have 100% capacity of life rafts and ropes and a variety of means
of descent to the sea
To provide people with adequate Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) including survival suit, life jacket, smoke hood, torch and
fireproof gloves
Introduction of new standards including criteria for improving
rescue and recovery, crew fitness and training. In particular special
training for coxswain and fast rescue craft crews.
The formal emergency command structure and criteria for DIM
selection should be part of the SMS. There should be a system of
emergency exercises
Emergency drills and exercises should be part of the SMS. All staff
should attend one muster per tour of duty. The need to report all
precautionary musters and evacuations. Need to maintain a POBlist
Establishes the minimum requirements for offshore emergency
safety training, the need to keep a register of trained personnel and
that the system for emergency training and its enforcement is part
of the SMS
However, since many of the oil and gas companies operate internationally these findings and
recommendations could be cascadedand implemented globally, although there is no evidence to
suggest this was done.
Relevant regulators across the globe had access to these findings to support their legislative
regimes. In general, the Report was well received by the industry and it led to significant changes
in the way safety was managed, particularly in respect of major hazards. However, some of the
fundamental causes of the disaster were not fully explored during the Inquiry, and this is still
having an impact on the way in which the industry manages safety. For example, it was
documented in the Inquiry Report that, following the initial explosion that must have consumed
most of the hazardous inventory on Piper Alpha, any subsequent explosions must have been fed
from the pipelines connected to Piper Alpha, and these pipelines were able to be shutdown at
their sources:
The Report identified that there was a considerable delay in closing these pipelines, resulting in
escalation of the initial event, and therefore criticised the Offshore Installation Managers (DIMs)
who were responsible for managing those offshore installations that had control of the pipelines
leading to Piper Alpha.
The Inquiry failed to understand why the OIMs were so reluctant to shut down their pipelines
despite the fact they had received Maydays from the Piper Alpha and had been informed of the
situation on the Piper Alpha by the Tharos.
If decision making by the OIMs is seen in the context that, at that time, huge investment (in
excessof $1 billion) had been made by Occidental, and that to achieve suitable margins, costs had
to be driven down and revenue maximised by oil and gas production, then the pressure to
maintain production is likely to have been immense.
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However, the Inquiry tended to focus on the technical aspects and heavily biased the
recommendations as illustrated in Table 14. Noticeable is the absence of any recommendations
associated with safety culture, or drivers that influence safety-related decisions and behaviours.
There is nothing about safety performance and how this might have either contributed to the
failures that eventually led to the disaster or provided the signs that could have prevented the
disaster. However, many of the recommendations were associated with risk management and the
use of ALARP in the risk analysis.
5.4 BP Texas City 2005
On March 23, 2005, at 1:20 p.m., the BP Texas City Refinery suffered one of the worst industrial
disasters in recent U.S. history (18). Explosions and fires killed 15 people and injured another 180,
alarmed the community, and resulted in financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion. At the time of the
accident it was BP's largest refinery and produced 10 million gallons of gasoline per day,
approximately 2.5% of the gasoline sold in the U.s. It also produced jet and diesel fuels and
chemical feed stocks, and comprised 29 oil-refining units and 4 chemical units spread over its
1200-acre site. It employed approximately 1800 employees and at the time of the accident
approximately 800 contractors were on site. The Texas City facility is one of five U.S. refineries
owned by BP; its others are in Whiting, Indiana; Carson, California; Cherry POint, Washington; and
Toledo, Ohio.
The incident occurred within the refinery's Isomerization (lSOM) unit when it was being restarted
after maintenance, which had lasted for one month. The ISOM started production in 1985 to
produce higher octane fuel for blending with unleaded petrol. The plant comprised:
• An Ultrafiner desulfuriser;
• A Penex reactor;
• A vapour recovery/liquid recycle unit; and
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• A raffinate splitter that took stock from the Aromatics Recovery Unit (ARU) and separated
light and heavy components.
The refinery and its equipment were designed and operated in accordance with Amoco and U.S.
industry engineering codes and process safety standards. Following the BP-Amoco merger, former
Amoco sites continued using these standards.
Between 1993 and 2002 various safety improvement projects were proposed for the site but all
were rejected due to costs and regulatory uncertainty. In early 2005, two plants adjacent to the
ISOM unit were shut down for maintenance and repair (turnarounds). These were the
Ultracracker unit (ULC) and Aromatics Recovery Units (ARC).Trailers were provided for employees
supporting the ULC, and both activities increased the number of BP personnel and contractors in
the area. The raffinate splitter was shut down on 21 February 2005, and drained, purged and
steam-cleaned to remove hydrocarbons. At the time of the incident the majority of planned tasks
had been completed on the raffinate splitter section, but the Penex reactor, separated from the
splitter, was waiting for a gasket to be fitted. When BP started up the raffinate splitter section,
three contractor crews were still working on the ISOM unit: one was waiting to install the gasket
on the Penex unit, another was removing some asbestos, and the third was painting the inside of
the unit. The incident occurred during the startup of the raffinate splitter section of the ISOM
unit, when the raffinate splitter tower was overfilled. Flammable liquid was released, which
vapourised, and ignited, resulting in an explosion and fire.
Prior to the introduction of hydrocarbons, a Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)should have been
carried out, but it was not done. On instruction from BP, startup of the 150M unit raffinate section
was initiated during the night shift on 22 March 2005. However, after startup had begun, it was
stopped and then had to be re-started during the next shift. This was unusual and was not
covered in the startup procedures. Furthermore, while the night shift supervisor started filling the
raffinate section he did not use the startup procedure or record what had been done and
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therefore there was no description of the actual plant status for the next shift. The raffinate
splitter tower was filled past the two alarms to a level reading of 99% on the transmitter in the
early morning on 23 March 2005, but only one alarm was activated. For the morning of 23 March
2005, the investigation report identified various communication failures.
The flammable liquid discharged into the collection header for about 46 seconds and then into
the blowdown drum, at a rate estimated to have been 509,500 gallons per hour. As this drum
filled, some of the liquid fiowed into the ISOM process sewer system at a rate estimated to have
been 223,400 gallons per hour, and into the other safety relief valve discharge pipe headers. It
was estimated that 7,600 gallons were discharged. In response, the Board Operator and Lead
Operator shut the flow of fuel to the furnace, while outside operators re-directed traffic away
from the blowdown drum. The ISOM operators were unable to sound the emergency alarm
before the explosion. Hundreds of alarms registered in the Control Room at 13:20 hrs. The
resultant vapour covered an area of approximately 200,000 square feet. However, in order for an
explosion to occur, an ignition source of sufficient energy was needed to Ignite the flammable
gas/air mixture, and the most likely source was an idling diesel pick-up truck that was parked
about 25 feet from the blowdown drum. The overpressure generated by the explosion produced
heavy structural damage in all directions. The flame-front also ignited flammable liquid that had
accumulated near the blow down stack, causing a pool fire. The most severe blast damage
occurred within the ISOM unit and the surrounding area. Many of the approximately 70 vehicles
near the ISOM unit were damaged or destroyed, and similarly, more than 40 trailers were
damaged while 13 were destroyed. Buildings in the area suffered blast damage and 50 storage
tanks incurred varying levels of structural damage. Blast damage also occurred in offsite premises
located north of the refinery, up to a " of a mile away from the ISOM unit. As a result of the
incident, 15 contract employees working in the area were killed, 3 in a Quality Assurance/Quality
Control (QA/QC) trailer and 12 out of 20 in a doublewide trailer; the others were seriously injured.
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None of the contract workers in the area needed to have been there at the time of the incident. A
total of 180 employees were injured.
The investigation stated that, "Many of the safety problems that led to the March 23, 2005,
disaster were recurring problems that had been previously identified in audits and investigations".
Between 1975 and 2005, The Texas City site had 23 fatalities. For example, in 2004 there were
three major accidents that resulted in three fatalities. Shortly after the incident in March 2005,
there were a further two incidents as a result of mechanical integrity failures, and in 2006 there
was a further fatality. BPwas aware of the serious safety problems at the refinery, but the focus
was primarily on personal safety rather than process safety. Consequently, as personal safety
statistics improved, BP Group executives assumed that performance was heading in the right
direction. However, process safety, training and safety leadership performance continued to
deteriorate at Texas City, primarily due to the lack of funding.
Following the 1999 BP and Amoco merger, there were a number of organisational changes that
involved, for example, dismantling and decentralising safety groups. These produced cost savings,
but the process safety function no longer reported directly to senior refinery executive leadership,
and therefore their ability to influence decisions was adversely impacted.
BP Group's 'Getting Health, Safety, and the Environment Right' (GHSER)policy, established in
1997, was intended to provide a business-wide HSEmanagement system. However, the GHSER
policy for performance reporting was not followed, and thus serious safety failures were not
identified in the reports.
BP Group issued a 'Process Safety/Integrity Management' standard in May 2001 covering design,
construction, operation and maintenance, and management of major accident hazards. However,
following a review of the application of the standard it was determined that the existing process
safety management system covered the requirements of the standard and no change was
needed. While the process safety group developed and tracked process safety performance,
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unlike the conventional safety metrics relating to incident reported, the process safety metrics did
not drive site performance. Consequently, plant performance contracts, personal performance
contracts or bonus programmes were all excluded from the process safety management regime.
The BPGroup incentive programme, which was in place several years before the ISOM incident,
did not include process safety management but 'cost leadership' accounted for 50% and safety
metrics 10%. For 2003 - 2004 the single safety metric for the bonus was the Recordable Injury
Rate.
Behavioural safety was an important feature of the BPTexasCity safety management system and
had been in place since 1997. Workers were required to observe and report unsafe acts and
conditions. In 2001, BP Texas City managers stated that the site required a significant
improvement in performance or a worker would be killed in the next three or four years. They
said that unsafe acts contributed to 90% of the injuries at the refinery. In 2004, the budget and
programme were further expanded for a new behaviour initiative, and this resulted in 48,000
reported safety observations, although it typically excluded safety systems, management
activities, or any process safety-related activities.
BP Group and Texas City managers' priorities were greatly influenced by the industry
benchmarking of Solomon Associates, a firm that provides performance analysis and
benchmarking services. Solomon Associates' performance measures included operating cost,
refinery utilisation, mechanical availability, energy effiCiency, personnel staffing, and specifiC
process unit categories, but did not include any process safety-related metrics.
Before 1989, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)had conducted a Special
EmphasiSProgramme (SEP)using a safety system approach, to prevent accidents in the chemical
manufacturing industry. This involved 40 inspections of different plants in 1985 and 1986, and
identified the need for a different inspection regime to address the potential for catastrophic
situations. In 1989 an explosion occurred at the Phillips 66 plant in Pasadena, Texas, killing 23
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people. It was not until 1992 that OSHA introduced the OSHA Process Safety Metrics (PSM)
standard. Following an investigation by OSHAinto the major accident on 23 March 2005, at Texas
City, OSHAidentified over 300 wilful violations of OSHAstandards, many of which related to PSM
non-compliance. In the previous 20 years OSHA records show there were a minimum of 10
incidents at the site resulting in 10 fatalities, and during this period OSHA issued citations for
three willful and 82 serious violations, resulting in proposed penalties of $270,255 of which
$77,860 was collected.
Before the major accident at TexasCity on 23 March 2005, they had a Total Reportable Incident
Rate (TRIR)that was a third of the industry average, although multiple fatalities had occurred in
2004. While OSHAwere required to target five inspection sites, the selection criteria included
incident history. However, in its report on the Phillips 66 explosion, OSHAconcluded that the
petrochemical industry had a lower accident frequency than the rest of manufacturing, when
measured in traditional ways, using the Total Reportable Incident Rate (TRIR)and the Lost Time
Injury Rate (LTIR).The Phillips 66 and BP Texas City explosions are examples of low-frequency,
high-consequence catastrophic accidents. TRIRand LTIRdo not effectively predict a facility's risk
for a catastrophic event; therefore, inspection targeting should not rely on traditional injury data.
While OSHA'scompliance directive assumed that a comprehensive inspection would need to take
several weeks or months to provide value, five out of the nine planned federal OSHAProgramme
Quality Verification (PQV) inspections lasted less than one month. This may have been due to
resource constraints, given the estimated 15,000 facilities that needed to be covered. The
National Transport Safety Board (NTSB)concluded that OSHAdid not provide effective oversight
of such hazardous facilities.
The TexasCity investigation identified a number of root causes;
• BPGroup Board did not provide effective oversight of the company's safety culture and
major accident prevention programmes.
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Senior executives:
• inadequately addressed controlling major hazard risks. Personal safety was measured,
rewarded, and was the primary focus, but the same emphasis was not put on improving
process safety performance;
• did not provide effective safety culture leadership and oversight to prevent catastrophic
accidents;
• ineffectively ensured that the safety implications of major organisational, personnel, and
policy changes were evaluated;
• did not provide adequate resources to prevent major accidents; budget cuts impaired
process safety performance at the Texas City refinery.
BPTexas City Managers did not:
• create an effective reporting and learning culture; reporting bad news was not
encouraged. Incidents were often ineffectively investigated and appropriate corrective
actions not taken; and
• ensure that supervisors and management modelled and enforced the use of up-to-date
plant policies and procedures, and did not incorporate good practice in the operation of
the 150M unit.
In terms of contributory causes, BPTexas City managers:
• lacked an effective mechanical integrity programme to maintain instruments and process
equipment. For example, malfunctioning instruments and equipment were not repaired
prior to startup;
• did not have an effective vehicle traffic policy to control vehicle traffic into hazardous
process areas or to establish safe distances from process unit boundaries;
• ineffectively implemented their PSSRpolicy; non-essential personnel were not removed
from areas in and around process units during the hazardous unit startup; and
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• lacked a policy for siting trailers that was sufficiently protective of trailer occupants.
5.5 The Buncefleld 011 Storage Depot 2005
Following the initial formal Investigation Report, a subsequent Report, 'Buncefield: Why did it
happen? [346], was issued. This Report was issued several years after the original investigation
report [21] because it was not possible to disclose some of the underlying causation due to
ongoing legal proceedings at that time.
Located in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, England, close to Junction 8 of the M1 motorway
Buncefield is an oil storage and transfer depot. There were three operating sites at the depot:
• Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd (HOSL), a joint venture between Total UK Ltd and Chevron
Ltd, and under the day-to-day management of Total UK Ltd. HOSL (the site) was divided
into East and West sites;
• British Pipeline Agency ltd (BPA), a joint venture between BP Oil and Shell Oil UK,
although the assets were owned by UKOil Pipelines Ltd (UKOP). This tank farm was also in
two parts, the north section, and the main section which was located between HOSLEast
and West; and
• BPOil UK ltd, at the southern end of the depot.
All three sites were 'top-tier' sites, under the UK Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations
1999 (COMAH), and had planning consent to store 194,000 tonnes of hydrocarbon fuels. Fuel was
transported to these sites through three pipelines:
• the Fina line between lindsey Oil Refinery, Humberside and the HOSLWest site;
• the UKOPNorth line between Stanlow Oil Refinery, Merseyside and BPA; and
• the UKOPSouth line between Coryton Oil Refinery, Essexand BPA.
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Various grades of fuel were separated into dedicated tanks according to the fuel type, and the
majority of fuel was then taken from the depot by road tankers. The report states that,
"unleaded petrol was being delivered through the UKOPSouth line into HOSL's Tank 912 from
1850 hrs on Saturday 10 December 2005. The tank, which had a capacity of 6million litres, was
fitted with an automatic tank gauging system (ATG) which measured the rising level of fuel and
displayed this on a screen in the control room. At 0305 hrs on Sunday 11 December the ATG
display 1Iatlined', that is, it stopped registering the rising level of fuel in the tank although the
tank continued to fill. Consequently the three ATG alarms, the 'user level', the 'high level' and
the 'high-high level', could not operate as the tank reading was always below these alarm
levels. Due to the practice of working to alarms in the control room, the control room
supervisor was not alerted to the fact that the tank was at risk of overfilling. The level of petrol
in the tank continued to rise unchecked. The tank was also fitted with an independent high-
level switch (tHLS) set at a higher level than the ATG alarms. This was intended to stop the
filling process by automatically closIng valves on any pipelines importing product, as well as
sounding an audible alarm should the petrol in the tank reach an unintended high level. The
IHLS also failed to register the rising level of petrol, so the 1inal alarm' did not sound and the
automatic shutdown was not activated. By 0537 hrs on 11 December, the level within the tank
exceeded its ultimate capacity and petrol started to spill out of vents in the tank roof'.
Vapour was noticed by members of the public and by tanker drivers who alerted site
employees, and the alarm was activated, as was the site fire pump. A vapour cloud explosion
then occurred and the devastation far exceeded expectations. Although there were no
fatalities, 40 people were injured and the subsequent fire, believed to be the largest seen in
peacetime in the UK, engulfed over 20 tanks and burnt for several days.
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The immediate cause of this major incident was the failure of both the ATG and the IHLSto
control levels in tank 912. The following contributory factors were identified:
• Tank 912 was fitted with a new independent high-level switch on 1 July 2004 but the
design, installation and maintenance of the switch was not fully understood by operators
and it was left inoperable. The design was not subjected to rigorous review and therefore
potential failure modes were no identified. Neither was it identified as safety critical.
Supply chain failures also occurred in the alignment of specifications, communication of
product data, identification of equipment vulnerabilities, and testing procedures;
• The ATG failure had flatlined 14 times between 31 August 2005 and 11 December 2005
before this incident but the actual cause of the problem was never resolved;
• The control room monitor could only view one tank at a time and therefore the operators
relied heavily on the effectiveness of the tank level control system. The Red Stop
emergency shutdown button on the mimic screen was supposed to close all tank side
valves but, unknown to the supervisors, it had never been fitted. Although there were
later versions of the ATG system with improved alarm capability, the system was never
modified.
There was inadequate fault logging that should have demonstrated a history and failure trends to
alert personnel to a more serious problem.
Management failures
The overall control system for the distribution of fuel on the site was fragmented and this
undermined the ability of supervisors to control the management of fuel. This was exacerbated by
the different priorities over the lines associated with financial penalties if the wrong flow was
stopped, especially in the context that since the late 1960s there had been a four-fold increase in
throughput of product on the site. This increase also meant more tankers, greater focus on ullage
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management and more pressure on staff. Staff then worked overtime to meet demand, and the
company recruited an additional supervisor, but another resigned so that the net effect was zero.
On the night of the incident, deficiencies in shift handover procedures led to some confusion in
the control room about which pipeline was filling which tank. The control room operators did not
receive any risk assessment training, and written work procedures relating to the filling process
were short on detail. Consequently, there was no robust safe system of work at the site. The
contractual agreements relating to the supply of safety critical equipment neglected suitable
specifications relating to functionality and maintenance requirements, and replacements were
not subject to a rigorous management of change procedure that might have properly assessed
the safety-related implications of the change.
Loss of secondary containment
The design of the bunding around the tanks was flawed, and large volumes of fuel, firefighting
foam and water spilled out of the bunds during the incident and emergency response, due to
joints and penetrations through the bund.
Tertiary containment
There was essentially no tertiary containment outside the bunding other than drainage for
rainwater and minor spills. Any spillage from the tanks was not directed to the drains but kept
within the bunding.
Emersency arransements
COMAH requires that adequate emergency arrangements are in place but the following
provisions were either not made or were inadequate:
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• Lack of risk assessment reflecting worst-case scenarios that allows emergency procedures
to be informed about the best course of action;
• No up-to-date drainage plans to determine flows and associated risks for emergency
response;
• No spill response contract to obtain support in the event of a major incident.
Safety management systems, managerial oversight and leadership
The site was considered, under COMAH, as top tier, and therefore required a safety report.
However, what was written and submitted to the UK HSE, did not reflect what was actually
practised. The management system was inadequate due to factors such as the following:
• Risk assessments only considered a single tank fire or bund failure;
• Poor management of contractors to ensure that bunding design and construction were in
accordance with good practice;
• Poor application of management of change procedures;
• No review of standards to assesswhether later revisions could be introduced to improve
site safety;
• Bund failures were not considered as 'near-misses' and therefore opportunities were lost
to improve their design, construction and maintenance.
Management of the site
The operation was managed by Total using Total employees. However, the overall responsibility
for the site remained with Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd (HOSL)as the operator under the COMAH
regulations. Total had considerable influence over site operations and were supposed to provide
HOSLwith engineering support and other expertise, but support was poor. This was attributed to
the Operations Manager and Terminal Co-coordinator being overworked, and also their lack of
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competency in some areas. Furthermore, their Loss Control Manual was not effectively
implemented, which if it had been, could have prevented the incident. There was too much focus
on occupational safety and too little on process safety.
The COMAH Safety Report was produced by contractors but never scrutinised by HOSL, and
therefore they were oblivious to many of the provisions required for the control of major accident
hazards, and had an unjustified over-confidence about site performance.
Conclusions
Based on the above findings, the investigation report concluded the following:
• "The failed level control system was the immediate cause of the incident but the
underlying, or root causes were equally important and are likely to have wider
implications across all major hazard industries.
• The process safety controls on safety critical operations were not maintained to the
highest standard;
• Senior managers did not apply effective control;
• Effective auditing systems were not in place. Auditing and monitoring arrangements
focused on whether a system was in place; the audits did not test the quality of the
systems and, most importantly, did not check whether they were being used or were
effective.
• The deSigners, manufacturers, installers and those involved in maintenance did not have
an adequate knowledge of the environment in which the equipment was to be used, and
the deSign, installation and maintenance of safety critical equipment was just as
important as the operational process controls.
• Operators of safety critical equipment were unable to make the right decisions about the
standards they needed to apply to their work.
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• HOSLdid not act as an 'intelligent customer' and could not be assured of the service they
were obtaining from their contractors.
• A safety report is not a chore to satisfy the regulator and HOSL missed an ideal
opportunity to look critically at its own systems and managerial arrangements intended to
'prevent major accidents and limit their consequences to persons and the environment".
All major hazard sites are unique, but there are many common threads to the management of
them. Many of the important factors are discussed in this thesis. They warrant careful
consideration by the whole of the major hazard sector. The types of managerial failings revealed
during the Buncefield investigation were often found at other major incidents. The report on the
gas explosion at Longford, Australia in 1998 (a catastrophic explosion which occurred at the Esso
natural gas plant at Longford in the Australian state of Victoria's Gippsland region, on 25
September, killing two workers and injuring eight) [312], identified factors associated with the
incident which were later found at Buncefield. For example:
• "poor communications at shift handover;
• lack of engineering expertise on site; and
• failure to implement management of change processes".
Equally, some of the failings identified at Buncefield were also identified by Baker (the BP Texas
City Investigation Report was chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, III) in his
report. In both cases management failed to address safety critical process controls. The Baker
report emphasised that process safety protection systems should not rely on operator responses
to alarms and that overfill protection should be independent of normal operational monitoring.
Both reports also identified that leadership and top-level engagement in dealing with significant
risks to people and the environment, in this industrial sector, was lacking.
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The Buncefield explosion was therefore further evidence that, for at least some major hazard
organisations, vital lessons from previous disasters had not been adequately captured.
5.6 Transocean Deepwater Horizon 2010
Backlround
The explosion, following a blowout of the Macondo well, on the Transocean drilling rig,
Deepwater Horizon, occurred in April 2010, in the relatively deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico
(GoM). This resulted in 11 crew fatalities, 16 injured crewmen, and a subsequent economic and
environmental disaster. The full impact of the disaster is still unknown. Other than the effects on
the families of the people who died, it is estimated that more than four million barrels of oil were
released into the GoM, threatening various ecological systems and the livelihood of industries
reliant on exploiting those natural resources. On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama
announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling: an independent, nonpartisan entity, responsible for investigating the disaster.
Their remit was to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country's ability to
respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer [347].
The BP Macondo well
In March 2008, BP paid a little over $34 million to the then Minerals Management Service (MMS)
for an exclusive lease to drill in Mississippi Canyon Block 252, a nine-square-mile plot in the Gulf
of Mexico. BP had contracted the drilling rig, Deepwater Horizon, owned by Transocean, to drill
the Macondo well and, according to government reports, had budgeted $96.2 million and 51 days
of work to drill the well. They discovered a large reservoir of oil and gas, but drilling had been
challenging. On 20 April 2010, they were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58
million over budget. In addition, the Deepwater Horizon, built for $350 million, was being leased
for as much as $1 million per day [348].
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Financial Pressures and the impact on safety
The investigation revealed that technological challenges and the necessity to complete work as
quickly as possible compromised safety. It painted a picture of the oil and gas industry in the u.S.
where:
• Project profitability depended on how soon production could be brought online (perhaps
a similar pressure was on the OIMs who failed to quickly shutdown the pipelines leading
to Piper Alpha);
• Production processes were highly interdependent: delay in one place could cause delays
elsewhere. Therefore there were relentless demands to drill the wells, install the
platforms, and get the oil and gas flowing; and
• Drilling vessels were contracted on day-rates, increasing time pressures.
The report quoted one offshore worker as saying, "When I first started working, they didn't care
whether they killed you or not. In other words, we are going to get it done, regardless. There was
no suing like people are suing now. Back then, if you got hurt, they just pushed you to the side and
put somebody else in".
Oil and gas companies had not recovered from the 1980s bust when oil prices dipped again in the
late 1990s, driven in large part by the drop in global demand, precipitated by the Asian financial
crisis. Consequently, there was increased shareholder pressure on oil companies to improve
short-term financial results and longer-term profitability. This led to various mergers, e.g. in
1998, BP acquired Amoco. The following year, Exxon merged with Mobil in an $80 billion deal to
create the world's largest company. BP-Amoco then countered by acquiring ARCO; Total merged
with Fina and Elf (renamed Total in 2003); Chevron combined with Texaco; and, finally, Conoco
and Phillips joined to create the sixth 'super major' (along with Royal Dutch Sheil). The purpose of
the mergers was to reduce costs by, for example, sharing common support functions and
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outsourcing research and development. This led to reduced staffing levels, which helped to
improve financial margins. It also provided the merged companies with new capital reserves to
finance the more challenging, and therefore riskier but with potentially higher return, exploration
and exploitation ventures.
Nevertheless, the challenges and associated risks were viewed by the industry as manageable
given the potential rewards, especially as the offshore industry had enjoyed a long run in the Gulf
without an environmental catastrophe.
The major oil-service companies, such as Halliburton and Dresser also consolidated. The
Transocean Offshore and Sedco Forex merger was announced in July 1999, and they eventually
became Transocean. These organisations provided the oil and gas companies with a variety of
services, such as drilling, evaluation, well-completion, and production services. It was during this
era that offshore oil exploration and production became an increaSingly global enterprise [349].
Managing UabJllty
The Report states, "The market has a financial mechanism for encouraging risk-managing
behaviours: the cost of insurance. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, early reports
indicated that insurance premiums rose by as much as 15 to 25 percent in shallow waters and up
to 50 percent for deepwater rigs. An energy underwriter predicted that premiums for deepwater
operations would rise 25-30 percent, and by 100 percent for deepwater drilling (350)".
Integrity of the Deepwater drilling rig
At the time of the disaster there was a backlog of rig maintenance on the Deepwater Horizon that
should have been done but was not. During September 2009, a BP safety audit produced a 30-
page list of 390 items requiring 3,545 man-hours of work [348].
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Role of the Regulator
When the disaster occurred, the MMS, a federal agency, was responsible for regulating offshore
drilling operations, including environmental enforcement. However, only 19 days after the
disaster, the U.S.Secretary of State, Ken Salazar,announced his intention to withdraw its leasing,
revenue collection, and permitting functions, and to place the former within a 'separate and
independent' entity. A week later, he announced that MMS would be reorganised into three
separate entities with distinct missions: a Bureau of Ocean Energy Management; a Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement; and an Office of Natural ResourcesRevenue. By June 19,
the Secretary had discarded the 'MMS' name altogether. It was argued that MMS suffered a
conflict of interest in that it had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension
with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and environmental protection.
Revenue generation, for industry and government, became the dominant objective. There
appears to have been a culture of revenue maximization, and for at least 15 years previously,
every former MMS Director had freely acknowledged that the royalty issues have taken most of
the Director's time, at the expense of offshore regulatory oversight. This problem, together with
lack of regulatory oversight, was amplified as revenue generation was also dependent on moving
drilling further offshore and into much deeper waters. However, there were commensurate
increased risks that were not matched by associated regulatory management. Unfortunately, the
US oil and gas industry regularly and intensely resisted greater regulatory involvement and
enforcement. MMS could not force change, partly because it had no political autonomy, and no
series of presidential administrations commanded the political support necessary to overcome
that opposition. The Report states, "On April 20, the inherent risks of decades of inadequate
regulation, insufficient investment, and incomplete planning were realized in tragic fashion. MMS
no doubt can fairly boast of many hardworking individual public servants who have in good faith
sought to achieve their agency's important safety mission over sustained industry opposition. But,
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notwithstanding their individual efforts and accomplishments, the overall picture of MMS that has
emerged since April 20 is distressing. MMS became an agency systematically lacking the
resources, technical training, or experience in petroleum engineering that is absolutely critical to
ensuring that offshore drilling is being conducted in a safe and responsible manner. For a
regulatory agency to fall so short of its essential safety mission is inexcusable".
MMS placed too much reliance on prescriptive regulation with an associated inspection model.
However, the Report stated that this approach is fundamentally reactive and therefore incapable
of driving continuous improvement in policies and practices. MMS did try to introduce changes to
improve safety, and in July 1991, three years after Piper Alpha, proposed a strategy to promote
safety and environmental protection, specifically, a requirement that outer continental shelf
leasees and/or operators develop, maintain, and implement 'a safety and environmental
management programme (SEMP)', similar to the United Kingdom's Formal Safety Assessment or
Norway's Concept Safety Evaluation programmes. However, at the time of the Macondo blowout,
almost 20 years after its original proposal, MMS had still not published a rule mandating that all
operators have plans to manage safety and environmental risks. The proposal was repeatedly
revisited, refined, delayed, and blocked, by industry or sceptical agency political appointees.
MMS tried to introduce a weakened version a decade later but was still unsuccessful, and then in
May 2006, it finally proposed a rule on Safety and Environmental Management Systems, but thiS
only required that 4 of the 12 widely-accepted elements of industrial process safety management
be put into place. Industry opposition, even to this limited proposal, was rapid and, ultimately, it
was only after the Macondo well blowout four years later that the federal agency finalised a more
comprehensive, mandatory SEMP rule. Other agencies also suffered a lack of resources; the
United States Coast Guard is responsible for regulating the 'safety of life and property on Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities, vessels, and other units engaged in OCS activities'. This is
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because most drilling rigs and even some production platforms fall under the definition of
'vessels', and part of the responsibility for regulating their safe operation (and full authority for
certifying their seaworthiness) is within the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. However, the Report
states that, "just when the need for Coast Guard oversight increased during the 1990s-as
industry drilled in deeper waters farther offshore and used more ambitious floating drilling and
production systems, it, too, faced more severe budgetary restraints. Accordingly, the Coast Guard
failed to update its marine-safety rules following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
given the nation's overriding need to focus on border and port security, the Coast Guard's
'solution'r-to transfer much of its responsibility for fixed platform safety to MMS"[113].
The Immediate Causesof the Macondo Well Blowout
As with all disasters, the cause of the accident was the product of a series of failures by
Transocean, BPand Halliburton and the political, economic and regulatory conditions previously
discussed. The Report recognised that it may never identify the motivations behind the decisions
that directly led to the blowout but it does state that, "What we nonetheless do know is
considerable and significant:
• each of the mistakes made on the rig and onshore by industry and government increased
the risk 0/ a well blowout;
• (2) the cumulative risk that resulted from these decisions and actions was both
unreasonably large and avoidable; and
• (3) the risk of a catastrophic blowout was ultimately realized on April 20 and several of the
mistakes were contributory causes 0/ the blowout".
The immediate cause of the Macondo blowout was the failure to contain hydrocarbon pressures
in the well, and the failure to understand that the risks compromised the primary barriers
designed to prevent loss of containment [351].
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The Root Causes: Failures In Industry and Government
Overarchl"l Management Failures by Industry
The Report is clear, in that it states that there is no uncertainty about the root causes of the
blowout. The root causes were systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP
to contractors), and also failures by government to provide effective regulatory oversight of
offshore drilling. The Report cited the following as factors that might prevent future such
disasters:
• "better management of decision-making processes within BPand other companies;
• better communication within and between BPand its contractors;
• more effective training of key engineering and rig personnel;
• BP and other operators must have effective systems in place for integrating the various
corporate cultures and internal procedures; and
• companies involved must have in place strict policies requiring rigorous analysis and proof
that less-costly alternatives ore in fact equally safe. Unless companies create and enforce
such policies, there is simply too great 0 risk that financial pressures will systematically
bios decision-making in favor of time- and cost savings".
The report also strongly advocated that it is critical that companies implement and maintain a
pervasive top-down safety culture that rewards employees and contractors who take action when
there is a safety concern, even though such action costs the company time and money.
The Government also failed to provide the oversight necessary to prevent these lapses in
judgment and management by private industry [351J. The Report states:
"SD/ety Is not proprietary.
The record shows that without effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry
will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies.
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However, government oversight, alone, cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible.
Government oversight must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry's internal reinvention:
sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety culture.
Only through such a demonstrated transformation will industry-in the aftermath of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster-truly earn the privilege of access to the nation's energy resources
located on federal properties ...Offshore oil and gas exploration and production are risky. But even
the most inherently risky industry can be made much safer, given the right incentives and
disciplined systems, sustained by committed leadership and effective training"
The Report examines in more detail BP's Safety Culture, and their perception of risk, both of
which were considered to be flawed. A safety survey carried out by Transocean of its employees,
prior to the disaster, also revealed that 34% of the workforce feared reprisals for reporting unsafe
situations.
Main Contractors
Halliburton is one of the world's largest oil and gas industry service providers, which in 2009, was
valued at $1.7 billion. It has significant resources and expertise in cementing operations, and was
contracted by BP to cement the Macondo well. Yet, despite the quality of the cement job on the
Macondo well failing Halliburton's own tests, BP, Haliburton and Transocean management still
allowed work to continue on the well [352].
Global operations and risk
The Report states that, "From 2004 to 2009, fatalities in the offshore oil and gas industry were
more than four times higher per person hours worked in U.S. waters than in European waters,
even though many of the same companies work in both venues (Figure 27)". It continues, '7his
striking statistical discrepancy reinforces the view that the problem is not an inherent trait of the
business itself, but rather depends on the differing cultures and regulatory systems under which
members of the industry operate".
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Figure 27 Comparisons of Fatalities with U.S. Performance
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The role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the only national trade association that represents all
aspects of America's oil and natural gas industry. In this context it has a potential conflict of
interests, since it acts as the industry's principal lobbyist and public policy advocate. Since safety
rules would make oil and gas industry operations potentially more costly, API regularly resists
agency rulemakings that government regulators believe would make those operations safer, such
as the Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS); although the SEMS is widely
applied elsewhere in the world, API prefers voluntary recommended safety practices instead
[353].
learning from Accidents: Exxon, Shell, and Bhopal
In order to emphasis the failure to learn lessons from previous disasters, the Deepwater Horizon
Investigation Report cites the Exxon Valdez disaster, a Shell incident in 1999, in which two men
died on a North Sea installation, the Texas City disaster (2005), and the disastrous 1984 chemical
leak in Bhopal, India, and states, U Of course, in drawing lessons from prior accidents, it is essential
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that they be projected beyond the particular circumstances of the accident at hand, to guide
present and future performance, lest government regulators and industry leaders make the classic
mistake of preparing to fight the last war."
While the Report acknowledges the needs for regulatory monitoring and intervention, where
necessary, it recognises the need for self-regulation, on the basis that, those who create the risks
should be responsible for managing them. However, based on the history of previous disasters,
unless there is a change in the industry that addresses the combination of a lax regulator, profit
maximisation by the private sector, poor safety culture and the failure of the industry to robustly
capture lessons learnt from previous disasters, then future disasters are likely.
Report Recommendations
To accomplish goals of creating a new approach to risk assessment and management the
following three sets of recommendations, relevant to safety performance, were made, and are
summarised as:
Al: To supplement the risk-management programme with prescriptive safety and pollution-
prevention standards that are at least as rigorous as the leasing terms and regulatory
requirements in peer oil-producing nations;
A2: To develop a proactive, risk-based performance approach specific to individual facilities,
operations and environments, similar to the 'safety case' approach in the North Sea;
A3: To work with interested parties, identify the standards that best protect offshore workers and
the environment, and initiate new standards, reviewed every 5 years, and produce revisions to fill
gaps and correct deficiencies;
A4/A5: To create an independent enforcement agency, with adequate resources, to oversee all
aspects of offshore drilling safety (operational and occupational), as well as the structural and
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operational integrity of all offshore energy production facilities, including both oil and gas
production and renewable energy production;
04: To design wells that demonstrate that:
• Well components, including blowout preventer stacks, are equipped with sensors or other
tools to obtain accurate diagnostic information-for example, regarding pressures and
the position of blowout preventer rams.
• Wells are designed to mitigate risks to well integrity during post-blowout containment
efforts;
F3: To enhance auditing and evaluation of the risk of offshore drilling activities by individual
participants (operator, driller, and other service companies);
G1: To increase and maintain congressional awareness of the risks of offshore drilling; and
G2: That Congress should enact legislation creating a mechanism for offshore oil and gas
operators to provide ongoing and regular funding of the agencies regulating offshore oil and gas
development [172].
5.7 Position of the UK Regulations regarding Deep Water Drilling
Following the Deepwater Horizon accident, a UK Department for Energy and Climate Change
(DECC)Committee raised serious doubts about whether the UK oil industry could tackle a deep
water blowout in the North Sea. The Government's response was that existing rules were
adequate. The Government had already taken a number of actions, including increasing the
number of inspectors and inspections to mobile drilling rigs to bolster the robust UK regulatory
regime [193].
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5.8 Comparison of key findings from the case study investigation reports
Analysis of the four major accidents, in general, excludes immediate causes, Le. those events that
led directly to the major accidents, since immediate causes are likely to be relatively unique to
each event. Therefore the analysis focuses on the root causes, since they are generally embedded
in an OH&S-MS, and therefore may have elements of commonality across all accidents which can
be used to help prevent future accidents. Consequently the comparison of case study key
investigation findings provides a timeline to judge whether there have been common failures that
should have helped prevent future disasters, and whether the industry had sufficient time to be
able to react to them. However, one of the problems encountered when comparing the findings
from the four case study investigation reports is that the investigation reports are not presented
in a consistent way. This makes extracting immediate and root causes for comparison difficult.
Also, in some cases different terms are used that may relate to either category, e.g. the use of
terms such as underlying causes and contributory causes, or none of the above terms are used.
Comparisons are listed in Table 15 below, and are benchmarked against the provisions contained
in HSG65. So independently of major accidents, and the associated lessons learnt, the provisions
within HSG65, if effectively implemented, should also provide the means to prevent accidents. It
should be noted that Piper Alpha preceded the introduction of HSG65 by approximately three
years.
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5.9 Summary
5.9.1 OH&S-MS Related Items
While Piper Alpha, Texas City (2005) and Deepwater Horizon have, or will, cause some step
changes in the way the industry manages safety, the comparison of causes, and using HSG65as a
benchmark for OH&S-MSimplementation (Table 15) suggests that while lessons have been learnt
during each investigation, the industry has failed to robustly capture these lessons to prevent
future disasters. The findings from each investigation have been relatively unambiguous, and with
the exception of the two disasters in 2005, there has been ample time for the industry to modify
their OH&S-Ms in order to address both the conclusions and recommendations from these
reports.
Repeated themes that are derived from Table 15 include:
With the exception of Occidental (owners of the Piper Alpha), the companies associated
with the disasters, who are reasonably representative of the global industry, have failed
to establish an effective OH&S-MS.
• Safety culture has been poor and this is probably reflected in the majority of findings, but
•
in particular that major hazards have not been adequately managed through suitable and
sufficient risk assessment.
• Resources, communications and organisational factors (all essential elements of an
effective OH&S-MS)have systematically failed, or been largely ineffective.
• Incidents, including near-miss reporting, have not provided opportunities to learn from
errors before they contributed to more serious incidents.
• Management of change has been inadequate and there has been a failure to recognise
and apply good or best practice to the various elements of the OH&S-MS.
Human factors were not properly considered and integrated into the system of work, and
the systems for ensuring design, operating and asset integrity has been poor.
•
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• Injury based incident performance was, inappropriately, seen as a good indicator of
future performance and the industry has focused on occupational safety rather than
process safety. Process safety failures are more likely to be a precursor to a major
accident.
• A significant theme for all four disasters is regulatory oversight. Lack of regulatory
intervention and enforcement may have been regarded by the industry as an indirect
acceptance of their management of safety. However, all investigations have
demonstrated that the regulator has been ineffective.
5.9.2 Non Specific OH&5-MS Items
Design
Of the 106 recommendations made by the Piper Alpha Inquiry, 38 relate to design, e.g. control of
the process, hydrocarbon inventory, risers and pipelines, fire and gas detection, fire and explosion
protection and temporary safe refuge, etc. Some of these design recommendations addressed the
features of inherent safety, e.g. minimising the hydrocarbon inventory by installing pipeline safety
valves, but failed to fully explore all the principles of inherently safe design. However, this should
have given the industry a strong signal that inherently safe design should be incorporated into
management systems. For example, this could have averted the 2005 Texas City disaster had
proposals to make the process inherently safer been accepted and implemented by BP
management.
Cost
A weakness with the Piper Alpha Inquiry is that it failed to understand why pipelines feeding
flammable product to the Piper Alpha had not been shut down earlier. Given the wealth of
information, about the events unfolding on the Piper Alpha, that was available to the DIMs on
adjacent installations responsible for these pipelines, it might be concluded that the pressure to
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maintain production, and therefore generate revenue, was so intense that it outweighed the
overwhelming evidence that the pipelines had to be shut down. This relates to the safety culture
within the organisation, and perhaps within the industry, at that time. Had this element been
explored in more detail, in the Inquiry, then the decisions taken at TexasCity not to install process
safety measures, and the flawed decision-making drilling the Macondo well may have been
avoided.
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6. DATABASE ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to present the findings from the deductive and inductive research
methodologies in a systematic, objective and unbiased format so that analysis, discussion and
conclusions can be established.
Deductive research was carried out in with four objectives in mind:
• To determine the number and trend of major accidents or disasters in the oil and gas
industry in order to establish whether they could be classified as 'random' events, or if a
discernible trend existed;
• to examine the magnitude of the economic losses incurred by oil and gas companies due
to major accidents or disasters, in order to establish whether this could affect their abilitY
to meet financial and safety performance requirements;
• to determine historical safety performance with regard to levels of performance, trends in
terms of continuous improvement and therefore sustainability of performance; and
• to assess UK regulator enforcement through their use of Prohibition and Improvement
Notices to the oil and gas industry, in order to identify levels and trends of enforcement in
relation to safety performance.
6.2 Major accldenta or disasters
Given the various definitions and labels associated with major accidents, limited access to
authoritative databases, and the variability of search criteria in available and relevant databases,
the results for major accidents or disasters can be highly variable and inconsistent. Consequently,
much of the information obtained in this part of the research was derived from a variety of
sources and has been validated where possible.
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The data used to populate Figure 28 can be found in Appendix B. This was created from a variety
of sources, including the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), lees, UK HSE and various
online sources where the data could be validated. The chart covers oil and gas onshore and
offshore major accidents and non-oil and gas over the period 1985 to 2010. This is to demonstrate
data prior to 1991, when the UK HSE introduced 'HSG6S Successful health and safety
management', and the period 1992 to 2010, to assess whether HSG65 had any subsequent
impact. Although the data is global, HSG65was a UK initiative.
The chart reveals the following patterns (accepting that in some cases the magnitude of the
difference can vary considerably):
a) a relatively level performance for the years 1986, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000,
and 2010
b) a reduction in events for the years 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2007;
c) no recorded disasters for 2008 and 2009;
d) spikes in disaster numbers for the years 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2001,
2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
The introduction of HSG65in 1991 and the outcome from the Piper Alpha Inquiry (published
November 1990) may have had some initial positive impact on the number of disasters until
1995 as companies focused on safety management. However, from 1996 to 2005 there
appears to have been an overall increase in the number of major accidents and then a sudden
decrease from 2006 to 2010. The overall pattern, and in particular the spike in 2005, is of
particular concern since it might give credence to those that consider these events are not
foreseeable and therefore difficult to prevent.
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The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) data (Figure 29), shows that there are variations in
annual performance, but given the relatively limited number of major accidents, the trend is
significantly influenced by single events. The pattern of major accidents does illustrate the huge
variation in numbers year-on-year, giving rise to the speculation that these events are 'random'.
However, it is evident that major accidents, up to 2002, still occurred in the ECon a regular basis.
Figure 29 MARS Number of major accidents in the petrochemical industry per year of occurrence 1985 to 2002
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6.3 Financial Losses
The economics associated with major accidents can have a significant impact on the reputational
and financial status of a company, which could be used as an argument to secure greater
investment in the prevention and mitigation of these events, as illustrated by the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and its impact on BP. Prior to Deepwater Horizon in 2010, the industry suffered a
number of major accidents and disasters, and the estimated financial losses incurred are
illustrated in Figure 30 and Figure 31 below [354]. The charts show a pattern of highs and lows
and, other than illustrating the variable costs to the industry over time, suggest that there are
significant financial savings still to be made if major accidents can be prevented. This may give
weight to the need to invest more in major accident prevention.
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Figure 30 The overall 20 largest petrochemical losses 1987 to 2009
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Figure 31 Global upstream (offshore) losses 1988 to 2009
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Figure 30 and Figure 31 exclude the losses associated with Deepwater Horizon. This data shows a
relatively weak trend but is consistent with the random nature of disasters.
6.4 Safety Performance
The aim of this section is to investigate whether a range of published statistics on major accidents
and other incidents can be used to assess the safety performance of the oil and gas industry.
Statistics from the period from 1985 to 2010 from various publically-available sources, described
below, were used. The following sections discuss oil and gas industry safety performance to
determine trends in preventing injury and ill health, and in the management of risk. However, it
should be noted that this is not an exhaustive assessment which includes all available incident or
accident databases, since many are not in the public domain, or access to interrogate the
databases is not readily available. Furthermore, given the various definitions or interpretations of
the term 'major accident' and the design and construction of the databases and their search
engines, interrogating them to achieve consistent and comparable results is virtually impossible.
Nevertheless, given the selected sources of data, it is believed that the approach Is suitable and
sufficient to provide a credible evaluation of performance.
6.4.1 Results and Discussion
Using available data from OGP, IADC, SINTEF,UK HSEand PSA,the general trends were assessed
for the period 1985 - 2010. However, as is evident from much of the data, there is considerable
variation in annual performance. Various methods were examined to derive the most appropriate
trend analysis. This included logarithmic, polynomial (quadratic) and exponential trend lines. The
polynomial trend line is a curved line that is used when data fluctuates (as in the present case),
and therefore this was applied to this analysis. A trend line is most reliable when its R-squared
value is at or near 1. Polynomial trend lines were confirmed as the best fit for the data. Describing
such trends with an appropriate polynomial is complicated by the fact that there are so many
possible parameters. However, it is appropriate, in this analysis, to find a simple polynomial of low
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degree that follows the general trend in the data. Such a polynomial may pass above or below
many of the data points, but still accurately describe the data as a whole. This is the method of
parametric curve fitting. While there are a variety of KPls used in the industry for injury-based
data, this analysis focuses on FARand LTIF since, based on 'accident theory' (see Analysis of
Performance below), both KPls are considered to provide suitable indicators of overall accident
trends.
6.4.2 Trends based on injurious outcomes
Figure 32 below shows the performance of OGPmembers for FARand LTIF.Rounding up has
resulted in some relatively minor differences between these results and those in the OGPReports.
Figure 32 OGPPolynomial Trends for FARand LTIFfrom 1985 to 2009
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There are variations in annual performance, particularly for FAR,although trends for both FAR
and LTIF suggests a continuous improvement in performance, with a downward trend in
incidents.
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Figure 33 shows the FARand LTIF performance of IADC members who provided data.
Figure 33 IADCPolynomial Trends for FARand lTIF from 1985 to 2009
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Again, there are variations in annual performance, particularly for FAR. While the trend in LTIF
implies a continuous improvement in performance, the trend in FAR seems to have reached a
plateau around 2000 - 2002, and then from 2003 shows an increasing FAR, representing
deteriorating performance. These data also demonstrate the first signs that the incident rates are
levelling off after a period of decline.
The injurious safety performance in the North Sea, as compiled by the UK HSE (Figure 34) also
shows variations in annual performance, for both FARand Major Injury Rate.
While the trend in FAR suggests a continuous improvement in performance, the trend in Major
Injury Rate increases from the year 1995 to 2001/2002, when it reaches a maximum and then
starts to decline.
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Figure 34 UK HSEPolynomial Trends for Offshore FARand Major Injuries from 1995 to 2010
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6.4.3 Trends based on non-injurious outcomes
Typical major hazardson offshore installations include hydrocarbon and toxic releasesfrom risers,
and pipeline and process leaks; transport accidents (e.g. helicopter crashes and ship collisions),
and structural collapse. These can result in fires and explosions, blowouts, loss of assets, and
occupational accidents (multiple fatalities and serious injuries), etc.
Due to process characteristics such as high pressure, and high temperature in combination with
relatively large inventories and the number of potential leak paths (e.g. valves, flanges, pumps,
compressors, etc.), the hydrocarbon risk tends to dominate the overall offshore risk profile, as
shown in Table 11. Hence, it is a particularly important indicator of safety performance when
considered in relation to operational practices and preventative maintenance regimes designed to
ensure asset integrity.
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Table 16 shows the release categories and definitions used to populate the UK HSEHydrocarbon
Release Database. This ensures consistency in the collection of data and presentation and analysis
of results.
Table 16 Definitions of UK HSERelease Categories
Release Category Product/Duration Potential Effect
Major Gas This could result in a jet fire of over 10 metres length (>lkg/s) capable of
>300kgs or >lkg/s causing significant escalation after 5 minutes duration, or a flash
and >5 mins fire/explosion on reaching LFL.Where 300 kg equates to approx. 3000 m3
explosive cloud at NTP, enough to fill an entire module or deck area, and to
cause serious escalation if ignited.
Liquid This could result in a pool fire over 10 metres in diameter (>10kg/s) filling a
>300kg or >10kg/s module or cutting off a deck, hindering escape and affecting more than one
and >15mins person directly if lasting for over 15 minutes duration.
Two-phase Combination of above
releases
Minor Gas This could result in a jet fire of less than 5 metres length « 0.1 kg/s) which
<lkg or <O.lkg/s is unstable « 2 mins duration) and therefore unlikely to cause significant
and <2mins escalation, or a flash fire/explosion on reaching LFL.Where <1 kg equates
to <10 m3 explosive cloud at NTP, probably insufficient to cause a
significant hazard if ignited.
Liquid This could result in a pool fire smaller than 2 metres in diameter « 0.2
<60kg or <0.2kg/s kg/s) unlikely to last long enough to hinder escape « 5 mins), but could
and <5mins cause serious injury to persons nearby.
Two-phase Combinations of the gas and liquids scenarios described above are
<lkg or <O.lkg/s possible, depending on gas-oil ratio involved.
Significant Gas Capable of jet fires of 5 to 10 metres lasting for between 2-5 minutes, or
(between minor release rates between 0.1 to 1.0 kg/s lasting 2-5 minutes giving explosive
and major) clouds of between 10 and 3000 m
3 in size.
Liquid Pool fires between 2 and 10 metres in diameter, lasting for between 5 and
15 minutes.
Two-phase Combinations of the gas and liquids scenarios described above are
possible.
Figure 35 suggests that there have been reductions in the numbers of both major and significant
hydrocarbon releases, although the reduction in minor releases is less pronounced.
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Figure 35 UK HSEPolynomial Trends for Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases
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Similar to the UK HSE performance data, a further indicator of [drilling/well engineering]
performance can be derived from the industry blowout statistics compiled by SINTEF.
These trends (Figure 36) suggest that there has not been any overall significant improvement in
development drilling blowout rate, and that the blowout rate during exploration drilling is
increasing.
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Figure 36 SINTEFPolynomial Trends for Exploration and Development Drilling Blowout Rates 1999 to 2006
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PSAdata from the Norwegian sector (Figure 37) shows there is a large variation in annual
performance and therefore defining trends has limited value.
Figure 37 PSANumber of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg s' (1996 - 2010)
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However, the overall trends seem to be improving after 2002, although there are still observed
significant leaks greater than 10kg s", perhaps commensurate with the observed frequency of
disasters, as major releasesare often a precursor of major accidents in the oil and gas industry.
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Similar to UK release data there are wide variations in performance, although in the UK there
appears to be a similar downward trend from 2001/2002 onwards.
Figure 38 indicates that in the Norwegian sector there is an improving trend in the rate of serious
injuries, particularly for mobile installations, whereas the rate on production installations appears
to have plateaued in the year 2006/2007.
This is reasonably consistent with OGP and IADC data but it is difficult to compare against UK HSE
FAR and Major Injury data, given the wide variations in annual performance.
Figure 38 PSASerious injuries on production and mobile installations in relation to man-hours
3.5
c,g 3
E
aJ 2.5
c.
Vl Vl
.~ 5 2
.~ _g
c c.~ E 1.5
o..:::
~ 1
- Production
-Mobile
-- Poly. (Production)
o 0.5
z
o
20002001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Note: Poly refers to polynomial trend analysis
Figure 39 shows well incidents in the Norwegian sector for both exploration and production
drilling activities. Again there are wide variations in annual performance and there is no value in
attempting to define trends. Consequently, it is difficult to compare performance with SINTEF
blowout data.
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Figure 39 PSAWell incidents per 100 wells drilled
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Figure 40 PSAComparison of gas/two-phase and oil releases on the Norwegian and UK Continental Shelf
Figure 40 compares Norwegian and UK sector release performance.
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In general, Norway has a higher number of gas releases while oil releases are similar for both
ReleaseType and Rate
Norway and the UK. However, the immediate risks and escalation potential of a gas release
Note: Two phase refers to liquid and gas
compared to an oil release are generally much greater.
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6.5 Regulator enforcement
In the UK, a potential measure of industry safety performance is the number of regulator
enforcement actions, through prohibition and improvement notices, issued to oil and gas
companies operating in the UKsector (Figure41). The data hasto be treated with some caution as
it does not reflect the amount of oil and gas activity in the sector over the period of the data.
Again, there are no discernible trends and given the variability of previous safety performance
data, it is not possible to correlate enforcement actions with safety performance.
Figure 41 UK HSENumber of Enforcement Notices Issued 2001 to 2010
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6.6 Accident Causation
In the UK, post-Piper Alpha, and subsequently in the general global oil and gas industry, the
introduction ofan OH&S-MSwas intended to prevent injury and ill health and therefore major
accidents. However, there is a recognition in the OGPreport [27], 'Managing major incident risks
(403, April 2008)', some 20 years after Piper Alpha and about 17 years after the introduction of
HSG65,that some companies were [still] failing to effectively apply an OH&S-MS, resulting in a
poor occupational OH&Sperformance; The OGPreport also implies that becausemajor accidents
are infrequent and often there are complex failure scenarios, the OH&S-MSmay not be able to
identify the hazard or risks [that contribute to the major accident], However, major accidents or
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disasters, in the petrochemical industry, suggest that they are not as infrequent as implied in the
OGP report. Furthermore, the trends for exploration and development blowouts also provide
some evidence that since 1999 the frequency of major accidents has remained reasonably
constant, i.e. there has been no significant reduction in blowout frequency. More recently, major
accidents at the U.S. BPTexas refinery, and the UK Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, both in 2005,
and Deepwater Horizon in 2010, reiterate the continuing susceptibility of the industry to major
accidents. However, from a reporting perspective it should be noted that:
• In the 1988 OGPSafety Performance Indicators Report, no statistical account was taken of
the 167 deaths associatedwith Piper Alpha;
• Since there were no fatalities or injuries associated with Buncefield, the event would not
have had any statistical significance in the OGPSafety Performance Indicators Report;
• The U.S. BP Texas refinery major accident was not included in the OGP Safety
Performance Indicators Report, 2006 [233]; and
• The IADCASPReports do not directly include information on blowouts, although these
are one of the major accident hazards that have the potential for multiple fatalities,
injuries and total loss of the asset.
It should also be noted that there is no universally-agreed definition of a 'major accident'. For
example, in Article 3 of the EU Control of Major Accidents Hazards Directive (Seveso II), three
criteria must be fulfilled:-
• the accident must be initiated by an 'uncontrolled development';
one or more 'dangerous substances' listed in Annex I of the Directive must be involved;
and
the accident must lead to 'serious danger' to human health, the environment or property.
•
•
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However, in the UK Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 3117, The Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations 2005, 'major accident' means:
• "a fire, explosion or the release of a dangerous substance involving death or serious
personal injury to persons on the installation or engaged in an activity on or in connection
with it;
• an event involving major damage to the structure of the instal/ation or plant affixed
thereto, or any loss in the stability of the installation;
• the collision of a helicopter with the installation;
• the failure of life support systems for diving operations in connection with the installation,
the detachment af a diving bell used for such operations, or the trapping of a diver in a
diving bel/ or other subsea chamber used for such operations; or
• any other event arising from a work activity involving death or serious personal injury to
five or more persons on the instal/ation, or engaged in an activity in connection with it".
The HSE hydrocarbon release data and SINTEFBlowout data provide more reliable sources of
information since, in the main, their reporting is based on statutory requirements, e.g. UK
RIDDOR, whereas OGP and IADC are entirely voluntary and this should be taken into account in
the analysis. While injury-based trends generally suggest a continuously improving performance,
the non-injury, i.e. hydrocarbon release based trends (SINTEFblowouts and UK HSEhydrocarbon
releases) imply, at best, a relatively level or deteriorating performance. As previously discussed,
the hydrocarbon risk tends to dominate the overall risk profile and the offshore industry and HSE
need to monitor offshore hydrocarbon releases, since these are widely-seen as the offshore
equivalent of the 'Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs),hazard on railways [356]. The large variation
in annual safety performance data, lack of discernible trends, and in some cases missing data,
provides a fragmented picture of overall safety performance. For example, in terms of accident
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theory, failure to report instances of property damage and near-misses constitutes a significant
omission as it effectively eliminates the opportunity to address their causes before the failures
that contributed to these events collude with other factors, resulting in a more serious outcome.
Also, applying the Bird accident ratios (1:10:30:600) to the OGP Safety Performance Indicators -
2006 data [233], comprising 115 fatalities, theoretically there would have been 1150 minor
injuries, 3450 cases of Property Damage, and 69000 near-misses. Consequently, the absence of
over 70,000 events from the data is obviously a serious loss of valuable information. The
published OGP Safety Performance Indicators for the years 1999 and 2006 are show in Figure 42.
Figure 42 OGPAccident Triangle
OGP 1999 Overall Accident Triangle
•
-85 Recordable
OGP 2006 Overall Accident Triangle
•.".' .
82 Recordable
Source: OGPSafety Performance Indicators 1999 and 2006
In 1999, it shows the fatality to LTI ratio of 1:28, and the LTI to Recordable ratio of approximately
1:3, with similar ratios in 2006. This is a significant departure from the ratios, and incident
categories used by Bird.
It is evident that OGP, IADC and HSE, in isolation, do not provide comprehensive performance
data, and when the available data are compared, they suggest potentially conflicting evidence of
performance. This may be due to the voluntary requirement for reporting, the use of reactive
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KPls, and the absence of major accident data, at one end of the accident triangle, and property
damage and near misses at the other end.
Furthermore, given the lack of global agreement in major accident definition and the difficulty
and uncertainty when using available accident databases, this problem is likely to be amplified for
global property damage and near-miss reporting. However, property damage and near-miss
reporting and recording ought to be happening at the organisational level, and this information
should then be fed into the process for global analysis. Since it does not appear in the global
safety performance data, then perhaps it is not being [adequately] reported and recorded at the
organisational level. Irrespective of the challenges in collating large amounts of data for learning
adequate lessons from the past, it follows that if industry performance is based on limited data
then there is a greater chance that major disasters will occur 'randomly,' as the conditions that
would have preceded these events would not have been fully recognised and therefore the
industry would not react in advance to prevent their occurrence
Due to the above limitations, It is argued that a more practical, robust and sustainable approach
in delivering desired safety performance is required. This has to be proactive, as many of the
problems associated with delivery of OH&S objectives, as discussed above, appear to stem from
the limited voluntary disclosure of incident data, extensive use of reactive KPls, and the restricted
scope for a comprehensive assessment of performance that can be used to develop actions
leading to sustainable improvements. Proactive hazard management also has to take place much
earlier, although not exclusively, in the development process, and in particular, during the design
phase. This is when many of the factors (such as error enforcing conditions) that contribute to an
accident/incident can be either eliminated, or suitable and sufficient risk mitigation measures
introduced which, at this stage, can be extremely cost-effective. Health and safety during this
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phase, at present, tends to focus almost exclusively, on major hazards management, with only
indirect effects relating to the prevention of lessserious events.
6.7 Summary
During the time before Deepwater Horizon, despite relatively large historical financial losses, the
industry was able to recover relatively quickly, without long term adverse impact. Therefore, the
motivation and incentive to establish better long-term safety management strategies to prevent
future disasters was diluted by a degree of financial resilience. However, the Deepwater Horizon
major accident, and its impact on BP,may change this short-term ism exhibited by the industry.
Evidence that the oil and gas industry is not achieving desired safety objectives is also manifest
through analysis of key industry safety performance indicators (KPls) provided by prominent and
reputable organisations such as the Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) [210], the International
Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) [357] and the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
[358].
Lack of consistent definition, variations in database search criteria design, and limits on free
access to some databases, restricts the ability to determine and evaluate the extent of major
accidents in the industry.
It is evident that major accidents still occur, and the spread from Piper Alpha 1988, to TexasCity
2005 and Deepwater Horizon 2010, is indicative of the continued recurrence of these events.
These major accidents, together with many others, are generally well documented, and
comprehensively investigated by independent competent bodies, with the lessons learnt being
made available to the public. While the immediate causes may differ between major accidents,
there are often many common root, or underlying causes,as they tend to reside within the higher
levels of decision-making within large organisations. Consequently, it would appear that the
lessons learnt from previous major accidents have not, historically, been adequately captured by
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some organisations, and therefore the industry will continue to be vulnerable to major accidents
if fundamental change (e.g. moving from safety regimes that are dominated by limited reactive
approaches to one that is comprehensive and proactive) in safety management does not take
place.
There are a number of organisations that publish industry safety performance data. In many
instances the data is derived from voluntary submission, from member organisations, of a
relatively narrow set of safety performance indicators (i.e. injurious incidents) or through
legislative requirements, e.g. in the UKRIDDOR.The non-regulatory submitted and published data
is focused on injurious incidents, and has omitted process safety data such as hydrocarbon
releases and blowouts, or well control problems that might lead to blowouts, and these, while not
always resulting in injurious outcomes, are generally the precursors to major accidents. The data
also omits near-misses which, according to accident causation theory, are the precursors to more
serious events. In terms of regulatory-produced data, such as hydrocarbon releases or SINTEF
blowout data, it tends to be more credible and accurate but is treated independently from
injurious events, although the same root, or underlying, causes of process-related incidents may
also be common with injurious events.
In general all the published data is highly variable and trends are difficult to determine.
The OGP and IADC injurious data shows relatively weak trends but, in the main, suggests an
improving performance. The HSE hydrocarbon release data does not show any marked
improvement while the blowout data trend shows no discernible improvement. The key point is
that the injurious trends generally appear to be divergent with the non-injurious data. If the
industry regards the injurious data as their benchmark of safety performance, it is likely to give
them a false sense of continuous improvement in safety performance, particularly as the
contradictory pattern in non-injurious events is more likely to result in major accidents. This
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discrepancy was emphasised in the Texas City (2005) and Deepwater Horizon investigation
reports.
Similar results are found in the PSAdata, although in absolute terms the number of hydrocarbon
releases is generally higher in the Norwegian sector than the UK sector. The reasons for the
difference have not been evaluated.
The publically-available safety performance data might give the impression that overall safety
performance is improving as the KPls are dominated by injurious events. However, this is not
consistent with non-injurious safety performance data, although in both cases the annual
performance data is highly-variable, making it difficult to discern any valid trending, or to
extrapolate that for future performance. The current data used for benchmarking performance
may be misleading and disguise an actual safety performance that has warning signals that the
industry is failing to recognise, and therefore act upon.
Many separate independent studies have been carried out on accident causation. These have
produced the concept of the 'accident triangle' with different studies producing variations in the
ratios associated with the incident categories. However, the principles underpinning the theory
are the same in all the studies. Application of the concept has not been fully implemented by the
industry, and this is indicated by the absence of major accident and near-miss data published by
the industry, and therefore global benchmarking against this data may lose some of its value,
although it may be happening at company level. This also results in an apparent disconnect
between the data published for injurious incidents and the data for non-injurious incidents,
although accident causation theory suggests that there is an important relationship between
these events. Failure to recognise this connection will mean that the data is partly devalued, and
opportunities are lost to interrogate the data to create suitable proactive strategies for safety
management.
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Given the limitations of available and comprehensive data it is extremely difficult to extrapolate
any firm conclusions about historical financial and safety performance and how this can be used
by the industry to benchmark success or failure. It is evident from much of the data that there is
considerable variation in annual performance in financial, injurious and non-injurious terms.
Consequently, where the data does not exhibit a statistically significant increasing or decreasing
trend it cannot be distinguished from random behaviour. Furthermore the relationship between
injurious and non-injurious incidents has not been developed to present a more consolidated
picture of safety performance although, according to accident causation theory, they may present
similar root causes.
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7. QUESTIONNAIRE
7.1 Introduction
The aim of the questionnaire used in this research was to assess whether a selected population
supported the views identified in the Literature Review, case studies, and the database analysis,
and to provide explanations for their views; or offer alternative views or explanations. The
questionnaire is listed in Appendix C and the results and analysis are in sections 6.2 to 6.9
inclusive.
The questionnaire was organised into the following categories:
• Respondent details (Not included in this thesis);
• Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (OH&S-MS) (Section 2.2);
• Project and RiskManagement;
o RiskAssessment (Section 2.6.2);
o Project Management (Section 2.6.1);
• Measuring Performance (Section 2.8.1);
• Recent Safety Management Theories and Concepts;
o Resilient Engineering (RE) (Section 2.9.4);
o High Reliability Organisations (HROs) (Section 2.9.5);
o Inherent Safety (Section 2.9.2);
o Question 85 Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (Section 2.9.3); and
• General comments.
The questions were not mutually exclusive and could apply across all of the above categories plus
other areas of an OH&S-MS, although they had specific relevance to the category in which they
were located.
Comments were provided by some respondents for some questions, and these were copied
verbatim (although some spelling and grammatical errors have been corrected for clarity), and
included in the Discussion paragraphs. Abbreviations have been listed in full to aid understanding.
Where respondents have named a company, it has been replaced by 'Operating Company (OpCo)'
for confidentiality.
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All questions, in the questionnaire, are considered equally, i.e. there is no weighting so that some
questions may be more important than others; this is because, in the context of this research, it is
the collective view that is of concern. This reflects the principles that underpin effective OH&S-
MSsthat all components need to be effectively implemented to achieve efficient and successful
safety performance.
The personnel listed in Table 17 were interviewed. Sixof the fifteen had not participated in the
questionnaire and thus provided an independent check on the design and responses of the
questionnaire. Gillham suggeststhat one hour of interview equates to twenty hours of analysis
[359]. However, since the 15 interviewees were, based on their competencies and qualifications,
able to articulate reasonably focused views, the analysis took less time than was suggested by
Gillham. Namesand companies have been omitted for confidentiality.
Table 17 Interviewees
No. Name Position Company Location Type of Participant In Agreement
Interview Questionnaire with
content
1 Dr.DP Head of Oil and Gas UK Aberdeen Face to No Yes
Technical Company face
Safety
2 Mr.GR Lead HSE Oil and Gas UK Aberdeen Face to No Yes
Advisor Company face
3 Mr. PB Senior HSE Oil and Gas Saudi Arabia Telephone No Yes
Advisor Company
4 Mr. AL (Senior Oil and Gas Holland Den Telephone No Yes
Exploration Company Haag
HSSE
Advisor)
5 Mr. DL Senior Oil and Gas UK Aberdeen Face to Yes Yes
Safety Company face
Engineer -
6 Dr. DC Senior Oil and Gas UK Great Face to Yes Yes
Safety Company Yarmouth face
Engineer
7 Mr.IC HSE Service UK Aberdeen Face to Yes Yes
Manager Company face -
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No. Name Position Company location Type of Participant In Agreement
Interview Questionnaire with
content
8 Mr. RH Senior Service UK Aberdeen Face to No Yes
Safety Company face
(Ex UK HSE Advisor
Inspector)
9 Mr. PV HSEProject Service UK Aberdeen Face to Yes Yes
Engineer Company face
10 Mr.CB HSEProject Service UK Aberdeen Face to No Yes
Engineer Company face
11 Mrs.lH lead Safety Safety UK Telephone Yes Yes
Engineer Consultancy Edinburgh
Re12 Dr. MR Technical Safety UK Telephone Yes Yes
Director Consultancy Manchester
13 Mr.JM HSEProject Service UK london Telephone Yes Yes
Engineer Company
14 Mr. RF lead Safety Safety UK Telephone Yes Yes
Engineer Consultancy Warrington
15 Mr. Svdl Director Safety UK Aberdeen Telephone Yes Yes
Consultancy
Notes: HSE IS Health, Safety and Environment. HSSE IS Health, Safety, Security and Environment
Given that the vast majority of discussioncoincided with the findings from the Literature Review,
the deductive analyses, and results from the questionnaire, there was little merit in conducting
more interviews, especially as the six who had not participated in the questionnaire offered no
significant added-value to the research.
The results have been categorised for ease and consistency. It should be noted that some
comments cross various categories but are assessedfor their primary relevance to a particular
category. Eachbullet point represents a statement made by one of the interviewees. Eachof the
following categories may contain statements made by one or more interviewees.
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7.20H&S-MSs
The organisation manages safety with the
same degree of expertise and to the same
standards as other core business
activities
Comments provided by respondents
None
Discussion
In principle the majority of oil and gas
companies state that safety is equally as
important as other elements of the
business.
The current safety management system
model lacks definition of its application
during all the lifecycle phases of a
development
Comments provided by respondents
None
Discussion
o
• Agree 48.1%
• Disagree 33.3%
Neither Agree or Disagree
11.1%
• Don't Know 7.4%
• See Comments 0.0%
• Agree 22 .2%
• Disagree 48.1 %
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.8%
• Don't Know 11.1%
..': ~%_
------_
OH&S-MSsassume that the principles that underpin particular models can be applied throughout the lifecycie phasesof
a development. However, there are some differentiating features within lifecycie phases that require some explanation
of how the model, or its elements, could be successfully and effectively applied. For example, this may relate to
emphasis where, during the design phases, inherent safety and process safety KPls are much more critical than
occupational safety. However, most disagree that the models lack this emphasis.
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The total money and resources in
general, allocated to various parts of the
business is largely influenced by company
culture.
o
• Agree 55.6%
• Disagree 7.4%
Comments provided by respondents
None Neither Agree or Disagree
11.1%
• Don't Know 25.9%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
Culture is considered to be the driver that enables the organisation to achieve its objectives. Since there are competing
demands for finite resources, decisions have to be made about the allocation of these resources. A company with a
strong safety culture is more likely to allocate a greater share of its overall resource allocation towards safety
performance than a company that may be indifferent to safety, or where profit is paramount, at any cost. The majority
agree that culture is the primary driver.
The safety culture in the organisation
always means that safety gets the
resources it needs to achieve safety
performance targets
o
• Agree 29.6%
• Disagree 37.0%
Comments provided by respondents
If safety culture can be 'good' or 'poor'. • Neither Agree or Disagree
22.2%
• Don't Know 11.1%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
A company may have a very positive safety culture but that does not necessarily mean its allocation of resources to
achieve continued and sustainable improvement in safety performance is a given. External influences, such as
stakeholder values, may well divert resources from safety in order to improve profit margins, especially if safety
performance is seen to be adequate when compared to that of competitors. The majority disagree that the organisation
always gets the resources it needs to achieve safety targets.
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Most senior management commitment to
achieving improvements in safety
performance is more rhetoric than
substance
Comments provided by respondents
• Everyone wants a safe plant with no
major incidents. However, people's
attitude to, and understanding of, risk
management varies
My feeling is that middle
management is blocking progress.
As in OpCo.
•
•
• Sometimes, it is well meaning
rhetoric!
• Agree 29.6%
• Disagree 48.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.8%
• Don't Know 3.7%
• See Comments 3.7%
Discussion
In developed nations; the ethical and legal imperative requires that people are protected against harm. Consequently,
companies normally set an annual safety performance target that seeks improvement on the previous year's
performance. The ability to achieve this performance is based on factors such as company culture and resource
allocation. However, what companies do and what they achieve may differ considerably, and without any reconciliation
of performance or incentive to meet targets, objectives may not be met. If there is no significant recourse when targets
are not met, then the process is largely devalued and is unlikely to produce continuous and sustainable improvements.
Most disagree that it is just rhetoric, although this is contradicted by the BP Texas City and Deepwater Horizon
Investigation Reports.
Senior management commitment to
achieving improvements in safety
performance becomes more
diluted/filtered as it cascades down the
organisation
Comments provided by respondents
Senior management commitment and
leadership is vital.
Discussion
r · "'.""'"
o
• Disagree 18.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.8%
• Don't Know 3.7%
• See Comments 0.0%
L- _
In large organisations, even if there is a genuine management commitment to make safety improvements this intent
can be diluted as it cascadesthrough the organisation, particularly if elements of middle management cannot buy into
the commitment, have insufficient resources to achieve the necessary results, or do not believe there is a genuine
senior level commitment. The majority agree that this is the case.
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There is effective workforce involvement
in producing safety improvements, e.g.
through safety committees
aAgree42.3%
• Disagree 30.8%
Comments provided by respondents
• We do expect more from the
contractor world.
• In a major hazards plant (with safety
cases) this is generally true, but
usually because the legislation
requires it.
• Generally for occupational safety; less
so for major hazard safety.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
7.7%
• Don't Know 19.2%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
The people who really know what is happening in an organisation are those who are typically at the workface.
Consequently, in the UK, it is necessary to involve the workforce in policy and decision making. The majority agree that
the workforce is adequately involved in this process.
The lessons that should have been learnt from major accidents such as
Piper Alpha have been adequately captured and addressed by the
organisation
•D1sallfee18.S"
Comments provided by respondents
• But have to be repeated.
• Just after Piper Alpha this happens, but 20 years later there is a big
shortfall.
• Generally true.
• On the whole yes, but realisation that we are still vulnerable is
weak.
• Piper Alpha has been around for 23 years so is well understood.
More recent major incidents (Texas City, Buncefield) are less
understood.
• NeIther Agree or Dluillree
22.2"
• Do,,'1 Kno ....7"'''
• Set Comments 0.0""
Discussion
Incidents, including major accidents, continue to be repeated, e.g. Deepwater Horizon occurred more than 30 years
after Piper Alpha. Most agree that the lessons learnt from Piper Alpha have been adequately captured to prevent a
similar event but this might relate to the specific causes that led to this particular disaster. Consequently, some
comments imply that the lessons from Piper Alpha have been addressed but that other contributory factors have
caused subsequent disasters. This may be the casewhere the apparent causes are likely to vary between disasters but
there may be relatively common root, or underlying, causes.
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Given future challenges the organisation
is more vulnerable to major accidents
Comments provided by respondents
• What do you mean by future
challenges? How do we know what
the future holds?
• To the degree that projects are bigger
so hazards are bigger, bigger
inventory, higher pressure,
temperature, more complex
operations. I take vulnerable to mean
'more exposure'.
Physically, they are no more
vulnerable. Politically, they will be
more vulnerable.
•
• Agree 48.1%
• Disagree 14.8%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.9%
• Don't Know 7.4%
• See Comments 3.7%
L_ _
Discussion
The oil and gas industry is facing greater competition from renewables, and is operating in more technically, politically
and geographically complex areas for exploration and exploitation. Consequently, development costs are rising while
profit margins are being squeezed. This adds to the pressure to compromise safety. The majority agree this is the case
By applying the current approach to
safety management the organisation can
achieve both continuous and sustainable
improvements in safety performance
Comments provided by respondents
• Agree, but can be done better!
• Yes but the problem is the new OpCo
HSE-Control Framework hasn't been
properly rolled out and people are
unaware of the local documentation
needed to implement it.
• There is no consistent approach. The
current approach is all over the map.
If/when the new HSSE&SPControl
Framework is fully functional THEN
the organisation will be well placed
for continuous improvement.
• It can. The challenge is will the
organisation implement the systems
to deliver this.
• Agree 30.8%
• Disagree 23.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
26.9%
• Don't Know 15.4%
• See Comments 3.8%
Discussion
Currently OH&S-MSs have been in place for at least a couple of decades. However, policies, practices and techniqueS
have had to be changed to reflect the dynamic nature of global oil and gas operations. This is one of the reasons the UK
moved away from prescriptive to goal-setting regulatory regimes. The majority agree that the current OH&S-MS is
adequate to meet future challenges, the caveat being the ability to apply these systems consistently and effectively.
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The Regulator has sufficient resources to
carry out inspections that are frequent
enough and in appropriate depth to
discharge their duties
Comments provided by respondents
• Yes in the UK. The situation is
different in other countries.
Regulators are looking for gross
incompetence, not at good
performing majors that are ahead of
the pack.
Only one (part-time) regulator for the
whole New Zealand industry.
Depends on geographical location.
SeeMacondo report for view on U.S.
• Depends on the country. I would
agree in the UK, but not in the U.S.
Third world countries have no
effective regulator.
•
•
------- -- -- -- --l
I
I
I
I
I
Discussion
In a goal-setting regime, organisations have significant freedom to determine safety performance. There is obviously
the potential to abuse this freedom (as illustrated in Deepwater Horizon) unless there is an independent regulator
monitoring and intervening, etc. It also emphasises the need for companies operating in a global environment to apply
good/best practices, based on their global experience since the level of regulatory competence and statutory
requirement may vary considerably between countries. If companies work to the lowest common (safety)
denominatot, this will be reflected in their performance. The majority disagree that the regulator has adequate
resources to discharge this duty.
The Regulator provides authoritative,
proactive and accessible advice and is
readily available to all personnel
Comments provided by respondents
• Yes in the UK. The situation is
different in other countries.
Advice on simple matters.
Where he can - resource constrained.
Depends on geographical location.
In the UK, advice tends to be
accessed by the safety group.
Distribution to all personnel is
•
•
•
•
variable.
• Agree 14.8%
Discussion
Often companies will take advice from the regulator given their status. Consequently, there is a move to make the
regulator more proactive, rather than reactive. Given their wider remit, they see a much broader group of companies
within their industry sector, and can benchmark to provide examples of good and best practice. The majority disagree
that the regulator has this approach, and where it exists it may be variable.
• Disagree 51.9%
Neither Agree or Disagree
14.8%
• Don't Know 11.1%
• See Comments 7.4%
• Agree 23.1 %
• Disagree 53.8%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
3.8%
• Don't Know 11.5%
• See Comments 7.7%
L _________ ....J
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The Regulator uses its power of
enforcement in a way that deters the
organisation from taking intolerable risks
or risks that should readily be reduced
further
Comments provided by respondents
• In some casesthis is the only reason a
project will apply HSE. Regulations
are very closely watched and
complied to re. sour gas pipelines and
wells.
Depends on geographical location.
In the UK.
•
•
I
I .Agree44.4%
• Disagree 18.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
7.4%
• Don't Know 22.2%
• See Comments 7.4%
l
Discussion
The calculation and determination of risk may be extremely variable. In a goal-setting legislative regime, it is not for the
regulator to define these criteria, other than through guidance or the demonstration of ALARPin offshore safety cases
or onshore safety reports. Proactive regulator intervention is more difficult given that there is a much broader approach
to risk tolerability by different companies, with different risks. Consequently, the regulator might become more
reactive, given their resource limitations, only intervening when there are serious incidents, e.g. fatalities. The majority
agree that the regulator does use its power of enforcement to help improve safety performance, other than in high
profile failures which seems contradictory.
Since Piper Alpha, the goal-setting
regulatory regime has improved safety
performance more than if it had
remained a prescriptive regime
Comments provided by respondents
• Overall safety performance has
improved. However, in certain cases,
this has not been the case.
Initially it did, but it seems that now
projects work on the basis that 'legal'
or 'minimum compliance' is the same
as ALARP,any other $$$ spent are a
waste of $$$. Any requirement in
company standards is up for debate
(sometimes valid).
•
• Agree 61.5%
• Disagree 3.8%
Neither Agree or Disagree
15.4%
• Don't Know 11.5%
• See Comments 7.7%
Discussion
Goal-setting was proposed and supported by the UK oil and gas industry so that it could take accountability for
managing the risks it creates, and because prescriptive safety legislation was seen to lag behind the technological
progress of the industry. The majority agree that safety performance has improved as a result of the goal-setting
regime.
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7.3 Project and Risk Management
Risk Management
Excluding the HSE Department, the
concept of Risk Assessment is well
understood throughout the organisation,
including main and subcontractors
Comments provided by respondents
• It is well understood by more senior
management. Not dear if it is
understood throughout the
organisation.
Known, but not 'well understood'.
Could be better, hence part of the
•
•
improvements for 2011.
• Agree 36.7%
Discussion
Hazards, both major and minor, are inherent in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, total elimination of the hazard(s) is
ohen not possible and therefore requires controls (mitigations) to reduce the remaining risks to levels that are tolerable
and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).The concept of suitable and sufficient risk management, apart from
statutory requirements, has moral and reputational benefits for organisations. The majority disagree that the concept
of risk assessment is well understood in the industry, and this has significant safety performance implications, since
risks that are not understood may not be adequately controlled and represent potential latent failures.
Risk assessment principles and tools are
applied effectively throughout the
organisations
Comments provided by respondents
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within the
industry.
• Massive misuse of the RAM (Risk
Assessment Matrix).
Risk assessment tools are widely
used, but to be effective, risk
management principles must be fully
used (especially dose out and
monitoring of dose out).
• The OpCo RAM is applied
inconsistently across the
organisation. Re-ramming is
prevalent.
• Generally, where there is a strong
safety group to push.
•
• Disagree 40.0%
Neither Agree or Disagree
16.7%
• Don't Know 3.3%
• See Comments 3.3%
• Agree 36.7%
Discussion
The quantitative tools for risk assessment tend to be used by safety engineers while the qualitative tools are designed
to be used by all personnel in the industry, i.e. limited specialist skills and knowledge are required. A small majority
agree that the tools are applied effectively but not necessarily consistently and there can be abuse or misuse of the
tools.
Page 230
• Disagree 33.3%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
20.0%
• Don't Know 6.7%
• See Comments 3.3%
There are wide variations in the quality
of risk assessments within the
organisation
Comments provided by respondents
There are wide variations across the
industry.
Discussion
o
• Agree 86.7%
• Disagree 3.3%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
6.7%
• Don't Know 3.3%
I
I • See Comments 0.0%
L
Management of risk is, in general, only as good as the weakest link in the process. For example, successfully managing
risk in one part of an offshore installation may be offset by poor risk assessment in another, particularly in tightly-
coupled, dynamic processes,where failure in one area can rapidly escalate to another. A significant majority agree that
the quality of risk assessment is variable.
The 'as low as is reasonably practicable'
(ALARP) concept is applied on the basis
that all measures/controls are initially
implemented to eliminate or mitigate
risks, unless it can be demonstrated
there is a gross disproportion between
the costs and the benefits
Comments provided by respondents
• ALARP is very subjective. Cost-
benefit figures are very outdated and
only used to discredit mitigation
measures. ORA is often used to
justify tolerability without
understanding its limitations or
accuracy, and using flawed data.
Additional guidance on ALARP is
required.
ALARP may be used to justify risk
improvements. However, 'reverse
ALARP' (explained on the discussion
from these results) to justify risk
•
•
increases, is avoided.
• Agree 43.3%
• Disagree 30.0%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
20.0%
• Don't Know 3.3%
• SeeComments 3.3%
Discussion
ALARPis fundamental in the UK. ALARPhas to achieve a level of risk that is tolerable but also makes economic sense.
Riskmitigations should be applied until a point is reached where the cost of any further risk reduction becomes grossly
disproportional to the benefits. The majority agree that ALARPis applied but given its relative subjectivity, it is open to
interpretation and possible abuse.
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Financial screening criteria, such as Net
Present Value (NPV) do not adequately
reflect risks and uncertainties because
they are too prescriptive
Comments provided by respondents
• NPVis not the only criteria.
It does not tell the whole story .•
o
• Agree 53.3%
• Disagree 6.7%
Neither Agree or Disagree
16.7%
• Don't Know 23.3%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
Part of the ALARPequation allows an assessment of cost 'v' benefits. Therefore organisations often use Net Present
Value (NPVj to factor costs. The majority agree that this is not a good tool since changes in legislation, interest rates,
safety standards, and practices can all influence future performance.
Risks that sit in the ALARP region (e.g.
quantitative 1 x 10.3 to 1 X 10.6 or yellow
region of the Risk Assessment Matrix,
RAM), are generally considered
adequate and no further action is
seriously considered to assess whether
further reductions are possible at
relatively low cost
Comments provided by respondents
• However, this should not be the
case. All risks should be assessedto
seewhether risks could be reduced.
• This question illustrates the
response to Q44. The example given
that 'yellow' is 10.3 to 10.6 is
nonsense as is the concept of the
'yellow' region being the ALARP
region.
• Sometimes.
o
• Agree 36.7%
• Disagree 36.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
16.7%
• Don't Know 10.0%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
Risksthat are defined within the tolerable region of a risk profile can often be reduced but providing they sit within the
tolerable range, companies often accept the risk, although it may not incur disproportionate costs to reduce the risk
even further. There are obvious temptations not to do anything and therefore save money. No clear majority either
way.
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There is sufficient benchmarking or
cooperation between oil and gas
companies to implement good, If not
best, practice
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
Discussion
The UKOOA(now Oil and GasUK) decision support framework, and UKHSEguidance on risk management consider that
benchmarking, and compliance, with good or best practice is one way of demonstrating compliance with regulatory
provisions and standards. The majority disagree that the industry adequately benchmarks its safety practices. OGP
annual safety performance reports are intended to allow the industry to benchmark performance, but given the
limitations of the data this may not be effective or efficient, and can be misleading.
There is sufficient benchmarking or
cooperation within the global
organisation to implement good, if not
best, practice
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
o
• Agree 31.0%
Discussion
This reflects the multinational elements of most global oil and gas organisations. This question relates to internal
benchmarking. The majority disagree that there is sufficient benchmarking within an organisation to identify good/best
practices. The consequence is that ALARPdecisions may not reflect good or best practice, although they may still be
justified by organisations if the risk level sits within the ALARPregion of their risk tolerability criteria.
• Disagree 44.8%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.3%
• Don't Know 13.8%
I
I'--- J
• See Comments 0.0%
o
• Agree 31.0%
• Disagree 44.8%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.3%
• Don't Know 13.8%
• See Comments 0.0%
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Project Management
I have been involved in Projects and
believe I can answer questions about
some aspects of safety in project
management
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
Discussion
Not applicable
The requirements for managing safety
risks during the design stages of a
project are well understood
Comments provided by respondents
• Depends on the Project
Management HSE competencies.
DCAF(Discipline Controls Assurance
Framework) in the OpCo helps.
I agree. However, there is always
room for continuous improvement.
The role out of the Discipline
Controls Assurance Framework
(DCAF) and OpCo Standards in
projects is slowly taking effect but
awareness levels are low.
Concerted effort is required to
speed up delivery and
understanding of expectations and
deliverables in this area.
•
•
Discussion
The safety performance of a development over its llfecvcle is shaped by decisions taken at the design stage. This is
where decisions can be most cost-effective. However, decisions made at this stage may simply transfer costs (e.g. the
costs to manage risks) to subsequent phases, as this reduces CAPEX,and improves project KPlsthat include cost. The
design teams are not accountable for aPEX where most of the transferred risks have to be managed. Most agree that
the requirements for managing risks, in design, is understood, but this not does necessarily prevent the unnecessary
transfer of risk.
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• Yes93.3%
• No 6.7%
No answered question
• No skipped question
.Yes93.3%
• No 6.7%
• No answered question
• No skipped question
There are no conflicts between the
management of risks in design and other
project aims and objectives
Comments provided by respondents
HSE as important as Cost and
Schedule? You're having a laugh!
This is up to the safety engineers, to
separate management risks from
safety risks.
There are always conflicts. The issue
is whether these lead to effective
and efficient management of risks,
or are they used to overrule good
risk management.
• Cost and Schedule are always
•
•
•
primary drivers.
o
Discussion
Projects have tended to be driven, almost exclusively by cost and schedule constraints. This is not surprising given the
high capital costs of most major oil and gas projects and also the frequency with which initial project costs are often
significantly exceeded. This is not a new or novel phenomenon and should be part of the initial project feasibility study.
Equally it is not surprising that safety could be compromised in order to preserve cost, and schedule targets, to secure
project viability. A significant majority agree that there are conflicts between safety and cost and schedule.
In terms of cost-effectiveness and,
when considered over the lifetime of a
development, the design phase (from
inception to detailed design inclusive)
provides the greatest opportunity to
eliminate or minimise risk
Comments provided by respondents
Design is often good but practice tends
to change over the years. Review of
design on a regular basis is required.
• Agree 14.3%
• Disagree 78.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
3.6%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• See Comments 3.6%
00
• Agree 85.7%
J
Discussion
It becomes progressively less-cost effective to make changes or modifications to facilities as the project moves through
the various lifecycle phases. This is particularly so for offshore operations as this involves the logistics of transporting
crews, providing accommodation (often additional accommodation vessels), and typically the need to shut down the
facilities, resulting in loss of revenue. There is significant agreement that the design phase is the most cost-effective
period to implement safety measures and to minimise subsequent lifecycle risks.
• Disagree 7.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
7.1%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• See Comments 0.0%
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During the design phase sufficient
resources are provided to ensure that
risks are adequately identified and
mitigated to demonstrate an ALARP
case, not just related to design, but
when considered over the entire
lifetime of a development
Comments provided by respondents
• Resources are there, but processes
are not understood and staff are not
trained.
• An area of improvement, but further
change required to deliver.
• Abandonment is often neglected.
o
• Agree 42 .9%
Discussion
Resources include people, and they need to have the right competencies, and experience to view risk over the life cycle
of a development. Therefore they need to be aware, not only of risk in design, but also in the subsequent phases such
as operations and decommissioning (abandonment). This should ensure that risks are managed adequately over the
whole lifecycle. At present ALARPis not normally applied as a lifecycle concept but is often ring-fenced, covering only
certain parts of the lifecycle. Most agree that the resources are available but there may be vulnerabilities in terms of
training and not taking into account the abandonment phase.
During the design phase the project
team has sufficient accountability to
prevent the transfer of risks to
subsequent lifecycle phases
Comments provided by respondents
• Project teams simply do not deliver.
Middle management does not
enforce accountability.
• There can be a tendency to leave
some risk management activities to
the operations phase, thereby
shifting costs from CAPEX (Capital
Expenditure) to OPEX (Operating
Expenditure). Conversely,
operations often try to get the
project to pay for controls they can't
get through OPEX.
• Many risks are defined as requiring
'procedural control' during
operation, and not considered
further.
• Disagree 28.6%
Neither Agree or Disagree
2S.0%
• Don't Know 3.6%
Discussion
In order to minimise capital expenditure, and often to meet project schedules, design teams sometimes transfer risks
from the design phase to subsequent phases (for example, by designing a system requiring lower order procedural
controls). Typically, design teams are not normally held accountable for the unnecessary transfer of risks since they are
often disbanded on handover of the project. Most respondents agree they are not held accountable.
• See Comments 0.0%
• Agree 29.6%
• Disagree 44.4%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
11.1%
• Don't Know 11.1%
• See Comments 3.7%
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There are adequate KPls for project
teams, in the design phase, to measure
safety deliverables to achieve lifecycle
safety performance targets
Comments provided by respondents
• Not seen KPlsthat address this.
• Design safety KPlsare very difficult
to define.
o
• Agree 17.9%
• Disagree 57.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
7.1%
• Don't Know 17.9%
• See Comments 0.0%
- .~- ------------------- --
Discussion
KPls are intended as a means to improve performance. In the design phase the KPls are dominated by cost and
schedule, and therefore there is little motivation or incentive to make improvements. For example, there is no evidence
of a KPI that ensures inherent safety in design. The majority disagree that there are adequate safety-related KPls for
project teams.
Project teams in general have sufficient
operational experience to ensure that
they can proactively minimise risks
during the operational phase
Comments provided by respondents
• This is not always the case.
Operations personnel are assigned
to support project and additional
support provided by Operational
Readiness & Assurance Team
(typically seasoned operators).
•
00
• Agree 40.7%
• Disagree 44.4%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.8%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
It is normally the operational phase, within a development's lifecycle, that is the longest and presents the most
significant risks to personnel. Consequently, there is value in providing adequate operational competencies, and
experience, in the design phase to ensure that, for example, systems are designed to take into account operational
lessons learnt, since they could be very different from those that are simply based simply on the implementation of
recognised standards. Operations also have the opportunity to consider risk transfer implications, e.g. what risks they
will inherit. There is disagreement that projects have sufficient operational input into the design.
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The project assurance process, and its
implementation, are sufficiently robust
to prevent intolerable and non-ALARP
risks being carried over into subsequent
project phases
_ Agree 34.6%
- Disagree 34.6%
Comments provided by respondents
• The level of assurance undertaken
is often related to the economic
size of the project.
High variability depends on
Assurance/Audit teams. Criteria for
the team make-up to ensure
sufficient HSE Risk Management
Neither Agree or Disagree
19.2%
- Don't Know 7.7%
• - See Comments 3.8%
expertise is not clear.
• Only if applied diligently.
Discussion
As previously discussed, there are opportunities to transfer risks from one stage of a project to another. If an
unnecessary, or high risk, is transferred to the operational phase, then the control/mitigations for this risk are likely to
be less effective than, for example, in an inherently safe design. There is no clear agreement about whether the existing
process prevents this type of risk transfer.
Comments provided by respondents _ Disagree 32.1%
• Teams are rewarded on cost and
schedule, workplace (construction) a Neither Agree or Disagree
safety can have an effect, and 17.9%
design safety is hidden. Often _ Don't Know 0.0%
safety is deemed to be ONLY (what
I catl) workplace safety with very _See Comments 7.1%
little focus on technical/process
safety. Senior management
continue to use the term 'non-
technical' safety! But this is
complicated. Significant safety risks
are usually dealt with.
• High degree of variability again - in some projects I would agree cost and schedule over-rides safety; others ensure
ProcessSafety Management & Safety is at the forefront of design decisions.
• Strive for a good intermediate level in between.
• Safety has an equal influence, but it has to be demonstrated more rigorously than cost and schedule to be
accepted.
Projects targets are still driven by cost
and schedule, and safety has a
secondary influence - Agree 42.9%
Discussion
rvpicauv project viability requires a minimum cost, short schedule, approach to get approval, particularly for marginal
projects in mature operating assets. The majority agree that cost and schedule take precedence over safety, and
therefore safety can be compromised.
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When projects are fast-tracked, safety
is not compromised
•
•
resourced.
Discussion
o
• Agree 28.6%
Fast-tracking projects come about for a variety of reasons. One may be that as field depletion models become more
sophisticated, the process facilities may need modification to maximise production. This is crucial as it relates to
revenue, and the faster these facilities can come on stream, the quicker the additional revenue is generated. In these
cases,the majority agree that safety is often compromised.
Comments provided by respondents
• Safety is the first thing that is I.Disagree 50.0%
compromised.
Occasionally the converse is true .
Provided safety is adequately
The type and level of risk transferred
from the design process to subsequent
development phases is often unknown
or not quantified
Comments provided by respondents
The risk transfer from design phases is
often documented and requirements for
further study, etc. described.
Quantification is not conducted.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
17.9%
Discussion
If risks are transferred and are not identified as part of the handover or transition from one stage to another, then they
may not become evident until an incident occurs. If the risk is identified, the controls may not be able to be
immediately implemented in a way that achieves ALARP.Opinion was equally divided on this question.
• Don't Know 3.6%
• See Comments 0.0%
o
• Agree 35.7%
• Disagree35.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Don't Know 7.1%
• See Comments 0.0%
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7.4 Measuring Performance
The industry is too focused on
reactive (lagging/injurious based)
key performance indicators (KPls)
and not enough on proactive
Comments provided by respondents
• KPls are used more as a goal on
which you should score a high,
than as an indicator of possible
trouble / a weak signal.
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
• There are plenty of examples of
safety case driven performance
standards and KPls (perhaps not
in U.S.).
• However, defining pro-active
KPlsis not easy!
• Agree 60.0%
Discussion
Reactive measures (e.g. fatalities and lost time injuries). as a means of preventing accidents is too late for some people.
Proactive measures try and identify what may be going wrong so that remedial action(s) can be introduced and
implemented before people are injured or the environment is damaged, etc. The majority agree that the industry is too
focused on reactive forms of safety performance measurement.
The current approach to safety
performance measurement provides
an immediate and reliable indication
of the level of performance
• Disagree 16.7%
Neither Agree or Disagree
16.7%
• Don't Know 3.3%
• See Comments 3.3%
Comments provided by respondents
• The preponderance of data
means the big picture is lost and
low-probability catastrophic
consequence events are placed
(consciously or subconsciously)
in the "won't happen to us"
bucket.
• ..for 'PAST performance. It only L..__ _
provides a rough indication of
future performance.
Discussion
Safety metrics help an organisation define and measure progress towards organisational goals. Incomplete and/or
inaccurate information can mislead organisations and result in a failure to meet safety objectives. The majority disagree
that the current approach helps meet safety objectives, in some casesdue to the volume of data and complacency.
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o
• Agree 33.3%
• Disagree 40.0%
Neither Agree or Disagree
16.7%
• Don't Know 10.0%
• See Comments 0.0%
The current approach to safety
performance measurement ensures
that those responsible for
management of the risks understand
and take ownership of the results,
and take suitable and sufficient
action to make improvements
Comments provided by respondents
• Manager's attitudes to HSE
should not be driven purely on
fear of poor HSEresults.
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
• For all operators I have recently
worked with.
Discussion
Collecting and collating safety data is futile unless the information can be used to define strategies for improvements,
and if these are effectively and efficiently implemented. Most respondents agree that there is ownership of the risks
and the associated actions necessary to mitigate those risks, but if the information is poor then the benefit will also be
limited.
Informal reporting schemes such as
safety suggestion, STOP,FOCUS,etc.
are given adequate attention by the
organisation in order to make a
significant contribution in
developing a proactive safety
strategy
Comments provided by respondents
• Only by those who actively
implement the programme (it
falls by the wayside in many
companies).
• Whilst these tools have their
place, STOP, etc. provide high
volumes of data and then KPls
are used to track recording of
the volume. Evaluation of data
to assesstrends is weak.
• Agree 33.3%
Discussion
STOP (Safety Training Observation Programme), and safety suggestion schemes are a less formal way of collecting
information about safety performance. Typically, they would identify unsafe acts or unsafe conditions before they fell
under the umbrella of a more formal reporting regime that incorporates near-misses, etc. The majority agree that these
schemes provide valuable data but their usefulness depends on how the information is used. There is no evidence that
the industry usesthis type of data in an effective and efficient way to proactively promote safety improvements.
, • Disagree 16.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
36.7%
• Don't Know 10.0%
• See Comments 3.3%
• Agree 50.0%
• Disagree 20.0%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.0%
• Don't Know 16.7%
.See Comments 3.3%
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The organisation is sufficiently
aware that minor hydrocarbon
releases may be an underlying
symptom of a larger problem that
has the potential to lead to major
accidents.
r
• Agree 62.1 %
• Disagree 10.3%
Comments provided by respondents
• In particular, offshore.
Neither Agree or Disagree
20.7%
• Don't Know 3.4%
Not always - some in the
organisation think minor leaks
are part of doing business!!!
• Not always true.
•
• See Comments 3.4%
• We are not a production unit.
Not relevant.
Discussion
In the oil and gas industry the major hazards are dominated by hydrocarbons under pressure. Any small release can
quickly escalate into a larger release. The root causes of a small release are often similar to those for a larger release.
The majority agree that organisations are aware of this relationship, although some believe that this is a normal
occurrence.
Employees are discouraged from
reporting incidents or near-misses
for fear of reprisal .Agree6.7%
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
• Disagree 73.3%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.0%
• Don't Know 6.7%
• See Comments 3.3%
L_ ~
Discussion
Comprehensive and accurate data are essential if improvements are to be achieved on a sustainable and cost-effective
basis. The majority disagree that employees are discouraged from reporting incidents but the value remains dependent
on how this information is used.
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There is a significant under-
reporting of incidents and near-
misses
Comments provided by respondents
• In particular, for near misses.
Significant is objective! And
without being on the spot, it's
hard to say.
There may be some level of
under-reporting but I would not
think it is 'significant'.
Most organisations stress the
need to report. However,
human nature is to 'avoid the
hassle'.
•
•
•
._------- --- __j
• Agree 24.1 %
• Disagree 31.0%
Neither Agree or Disagree
24.1%
Discussion
Near-misses are a fundamental prerequisite for initiating improvements in safety as the cause(s) of a near-miss is often
similar to more serious incidents. Incident causation theory advocates that by identifying, and then minimising, near-
misses by addressing their root cause, it should then be possible to prevent more serious incidents. The majority
disagree that there is under-reporting of incidents, but also indicate that the value depends on how this information is
used.
Annual HSE plans have clear and
transparent links to the previous
year's performance to remedy past
failures, prevent repetition, and
provide a sound basis to achieve
future sustainable improvements in
safety
Comments provided by respondents
• More often, they don't.
• Sometimes. Depends on
whether a simple KPI system is
in place.
• Don't Know 17.2%
• See Comments 3.4%
L _
• Agree 40.0%
• Disagree 33.3%
o
----------------------
Discussion
To achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in safety it is necessary to set plans for how this can be achieved.
Normally this is by analysis of previous performance to establish what went right and what went wrong, so that actions
can be taken to build upon the good practices and rectify the bad. The majority agree that HSEplans, in principle, fulfill
these requirements.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
13.3%
• Don't Know 13.3%
• See Comments 0.0%
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The resources provided to
effectively implement the annual
HSEsafety plan are always adequate
to achieve success
Comments provided by respondents
• Line commitment can improve.
This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
•
Discussion
o
• Agree 13.3%
For any plan to succeed it requires the resources to meet its aims and objectives. More people than not disagree that
HSEplans are given sufficient resources to meet objectives.
7.5 Resilient Engineering
The concept of Resilient Engineering
(RE)is well understood.
Comments provided by respondents
None
• Disagree 36.7%
Neither Agree or Disagree
33.3%
• Don't Know 16.7%
• See Comments 0.0%
L__
.Agree4.5%
Discussion
This question was predominantly aimed at experienced and qualified safety practitioners who help influence the means
of improving safety performance. A large percentage of respondents >80%, (the sum of those who don't know and
those who disagree) are uncertain about whether the concept of REis well understood.
• Disagree 18.2%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
9.1%
• Don't Know 63.6%
• See Comment 4.5%
I
L_
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Incidents are often prevented, not
by policies and procedures, but by
people who are flexible and
competent enough to adapt to
changing conditions
• Agree 52.9%
•
Comments provided by respondents
• Based on last Minute Risk
Analysis and competent
judgment, people can avoid
incidents.
The word 'often' is subjective.
You need basic policies and
procedures but you have to
back this up with training and
competence assurance plus
• Neither Agree or Disagree
17.6%
• Oisagree 11.8%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• See Comments 17.6%
J
common sense.
• Policies and procedures cannot account for all possible incidents and should always be implemented in
conjunction with training and competence management.
• Policies and procedures are necessary. However, competent people to apply these procedures are also
necessary.
• But policies and procedures are part of the equation.
• Competent people, high quality MaC (Management of Change) etc. are all important to ensure hazards are
managed. Understanding of the control and mitigation measures, what they are, and how performance is
maintained, are all part of the management of risks. People have a key role, but are not the only control.
• Both have a role to play in accident prevention.
• Sometimes this may be the case - but at other times last minute changes without proper thought or assessment
may lead to hazards.
• Policies and procedures set a framework - flexibility is essential to adapt to specifics.
• Depends upon the task. Not all activities can be proceduralised into black and white (such as effective manner of
isolation), so a combination of robust procedure and competent personnel is required.
• They must still meet standards though - effective "good old boys" may be non-compliant and still successful until
something outside their experience comes along and catches them.
Discussion
Fundamental to REis the assertion that given the relative complexity and dynamic nature of organisations and systems,
accidents are often prevented by people rather than by hardware or software controls. There is general agreement that
this is the case but it is subject to people having the necessary competencies in combination with other control
mechanisms. However, there is also recognition that people may be increasingly vulnerable to error when exposed to
factors such as time pressure or operating outside their 'comfort' zones.
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Personnel are always given
sufficient time to reflect on
decisions to ensure avoidance of any
unintended consequences
Comments provided by respondents
• Sometimes it's external pressure
but in many cases also hasty
work.
A lot of middle management pay
lip service to HSE but do not
make themselves fully aware or
take ownership and implement
HSEMS. They may say they do
but cost and schedule always
come first.
• Sometimes. The nature of the
business requires decisions to
be made on the fly.
•
r
• Agree 11.8%
• Disagree 70.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
11.8%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• SeeComments 5.9%
• Not always true, however. Up to the individual to take the necessary time.
• But people do not always choose to take sufficient time.
• In theory, all O&G operators stress the importance of this. However, not all personnel take this time or know
what to consider.
Discussion
The ability for people to take informed decisions is necessary in RE in order to avoid unintended consequences. A
large percentage disagree that people are always given sufficient time to make decisions, although it is stated by one
respondentthat decisions often have to be made "on-the-fly". It is also stated that even if people are given the time,
they may not choose to take it. Given plant complexity, tight-coupling and the dynamic nature of organisations and
processes, this supports the need for inherent safety to avoid the potential for human error. However, in the absence
of inherent safety, the importance of ensuring that people are adequately prepared and have time for suitable
decision-making, becomes more critical, the more complex and dynamic the changes, although this may not be a
solution in the event of emergencies.
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time.
• Check lists are usually provided
but people get used to the list
and often neglect to actually
check the status as per the tick
boxes
• Extremely company specific.
• Within the OpCo, various procedures and work instructions have been implemented with a view to identifying
and analysing the work at the location in question, and taking measures to minimise such risks and demonstrate
that control measures have been defined. This has to do with procedures and work instructions relating to Work
Planning, Project Risk Analyses, Safeguarding of lnstallations and Work Safety Plans. The Project Risk Analysis
(PRA), in particular, has the aim of effectively identifying and communicating the risks of work activities in
relation to the production system, and the interactions between the various work activities on site. The
outcome of a PRAis intended to establish those measures that will create a safe workplace on the basis of the
planned activities.
• Pressure to get production back on track, either directly or indirectly, influences the level of checks and balances
performed.
• Pressure at a site to get the job done may mean that adequate checks are not carried out in accordance with
procedures.
• Team input to e.g. toolbox talks, is far better than a single person who just wants to get on with a job.
The workforce is given sufficient
time to provide adequate levels of
checks and balances to proceed with
their tasks safely (whether they
choose to take it is not relevant
here)
Comments provided by respondents
• Depends on the Company and
their management priorities.
Not always true. However, up to
individual to take the necessary
•
.Agree47.1%
• Disagree 26.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.7%
• Don't Know 2.9%
• See Comments 8.8%
Discussion
REsuggests that levels of success cannot be maintained when, for example, there is too little time for appropriate
checks and balances. The majority agree that people are given time to allow them to carry out their tasks safely,
although a significant percentage still disagrees. Comments show that the processes and procedures, including
planning and toolbox talks, support the provision of checks and balances, but time constraints might dilute their
effectiveness. It is also dependent on people having the discipline to use the tools that are available (e.g. checklists,
to ensure adequate checks and balances).
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Comments provided by respondents
• Reference big incidents all over
the world.
Neither Agree or Disagree
17.6%
The company emphasis on factors
such as cost, schedule, production
etc. has had, and continues to have, I. Agree 52.9%
a detrimental impact on safety
• Disagree 23.5%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• In general within the industry an
emphasis on cost, schedule etc.
would have had an impact on
safety but this has been partially
outweighed by the improved
training which is given to
personnel.
The culture from a company level has been changing over the last 5 to 10 years, with respect to safety and its
various external factors such as cost schedule and production. Whether this has been fully accepted by the
grassroots management and personnel is still variable. If there is no clear distinction, then they will have an
impact.
In many cases cost and schedule still threaten safety performance in both project execution and in operability
issues, including Human Factors Engineering (the discipline of applying what is known about human capabilities
and limitations to the design of products, processes, systems, and work environments) issues, particularly.
Whatever is preached, these factors will always be a consideration.
This may not be directly related. However, there are signs of this.
• See Comments 5.9%
•
•
•
•
Discussion
REargues that a company is safe if it is impervious to perturbations and that systems need to be resilient against
various threats [affecting safety performance]. Cost, schedule and production pressures can create the conditions
that can contribute to unsafe acts and conditions, and deviations from policies and procedures, etc. The majority of
respondents agree that these factors still exist but there are potential mitigations such as training and changes in
[safety] culture. Cost and schedule were dominant factors that contributed to the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
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The employees (staff and
contractors) have the means, and
sufficient empowerment, to identify
any increased potential for incidents
or unnecessary risks and then
prevent them
Comments provided by respondents
• It's their right and mandatory
task to mention/pick up and
intervene in case of unsafe
situations.
The employees should have the
means. Whether they have the
empowerment will vary from
location to location.
•
• Agree 54.5%
• Disagree 6.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
27.3%
• Don't Know 3.0%
• See Comments 9.1%
• I've worked on asmany projects that do, as projects that don't.
• The changing demographic across the industry means that overall experience is less, and thus empowered or
otherwise, individuals do not have the confidence to always speak up.
• Sometimes! But a lot of contractors are probably concerned that refusing to do a task will lead to no repeat work
for the company ...
• In general all O&G operator personnel have this power, although not always the knowledge to exert it.
• They can frequently identify them. Prevention: the jury is still out.
• Identification of hazards and risk assessment is generally the easy part but follow-up and close-out is much
harder, as it requires ownership, planning and resources.
Discussion
RE requires the ability to identify drifts towards failure modes. In a complex and dynamic organisation where the
potential for failure is seen to be continuously present, people need the authority and competence to identify
potential failure modes and intervene where necessary. The majority of respondents believe people have this
empowerment, although it is variable, and there is doubt that people may exercise this option forfear of retribution if
they get it wrong.
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Company-specific.
Senior Management set clear
direction, or believe they set
clear direction. Clarity on what
is actually required (clear
guidance) is missing. The
philosophy is clear, but without
education, implementation will
lag.
• Depends both on organisations and individuals. Buncefield is a prime example of failure of this. Procedures were
poor and ignored, and there was no auditing of actual practices against procedures.
• Think there is a health difference. Mutual understanding of on and offshore wishes should be narrowed in the
industry.
• What senior management believes may often have little relationship to what is actually going on.
People within the organisation have
sufficient understanding of what is
actually being practised and this is
consistent with what senior
management believe is happening
Comments provided by respondents
• Alignment can improve, in
particular, for ad-hoc
subcontractors.
•
•
• Agree 17.6%
Discussion
REassumesthat there is no difference between what is being practised and what management assumes is happening.
This ensures that adequate resources are committed to maintaining suitable and sufficient controls over risks.
However, die majority of respondents believe there is a difference between management understanding and actual
practice. This can, for example, lead to misplaced confidence in safety performance and under-resourcing strategies to
improve safety performance, which is a finding in some accident investigations such as Texas City (2005) and
Deepwater Horizon.
• Disagree 55.9%
Neither Agree or Disagree
20.6%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• SeeComments 5.9%
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The current incident investigation
process provides sufficient
information to understand the
complexity of incident causation,
particularly in root cause analysis
Comments provided by respondents
• Yes, but the incident
investigation process has to be
facilitated by competent people.
• Most companies in the O&G
business seem to have good
incident investigation processes.
• Not relevant.
• Most O&G operators have a
comprehensive incident
investigation process.
• Agree 51.5%
• Disagree 12.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
9.1%
• Don't Know 15.2%
• SeeComments 12.1%
• There are various tools available for an investigation and the quality of the outcome of the investigation depends
on the experience of the facilitator, and the knowledge and experience of the team.
• The processes are good but the application is often poor
• Company-specific.
• Depending on the nature and potential of the incident the investigation team is capable to doing so. Involvement
from onshore safety consultants often makes investigation vague.
• The process has the potential. However, the application of the process is deficient.
• It requires very high level and independent discussions, as well as site investigation.
Discussion
Re argues that current 'linear' accident causation models are not suitable to explain accidents in complex and
dynamic industries and therefore, de facto, the true causes of accidents. Typically the root or underlying cause(s) may
not be identified. Consequently, measures to prevent recurrence may also be missed. The majority of respondents
believe that current linear models appear adequate, subject to the competence of investigation personnel, and
effective implementation.
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Safety defences start to erode when
under pressure, e.g. controls may be
compromised due to cost, schedule,
production pressures, etc.
Comments provided by respondents
• A human factors issue.
Except where there is a strong
safety input at management
level,; and even then it's a fight.
I agree. Not in the company I
work for but companies / clients
we work with, often show this
behaviour to our impression.
•
•
1-----
Discussion
This is similar to the previous question but specially examining whether safety defences can be compromised. RE
states that there are a number of potential conflicts in organisations that are often difficult to reconcile, e.g,
incompatible goals, and by implication they need to be resolved in a way that does not compromise safety. A
significant percentage of respondents agree that, in this context, safety is often compromised, but it depends on
factors such ascompany culture.
There is a perception within the
organisation that when past safety
performance has been good, this is
taken as a reason for future
confidence about the adequacy of
current risk control practices
Comments provided by respondents
• Therefore it is necessary to also
have a strong focus on near-
missesand potentials.
• Please note this comment is
common to all
companies/organisations I have
worked with until now.
00
• Agree 78.8%
• Past performance is often looked at and if it hasn't happened, confidence that it can't / won't is high this is
despite the fact that the industry as a whole has major events with alarming regularity. It seems difficult for
non-technical safety specialists to understand the reality of low probability catastrophic consequence events.
• Disagree 3.0%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
18.2%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• SeeComments 0.0%
• Agree 67.6%
Discussion
REstates that companies who become complacent about future [safety] performance, and therefore the need to
maintain effort and resources in this area, based on previous' performance, may be vulnerable to increased risk. The
majority of respondents agree this is the case. This is especially relevant in the case of major accidents where their
absence is seen to be a good predictor for the future, despite the fact they are low likelihood but high consequence
events.
• Disagree 11.8%
Neither Agree or Disagree
14.7%
• Don't Know 2.9%
• SeeComments 2.9%
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Within the global or local
organisation there is a fragmented
approach to problem-solving that
often clouds the big picture, i.e.
there is not a shared risk picture
when dealing with common hazards
Comments provided by respondents
• This is mainly because
companies want to
themselves against a
public perception.
• Areas for improvement exist.
Sharing of risks and the controls
associated with common
hazards are shared reasonably
well.
protect
negative
• Very much depends on the
organisation.
.Agree 70.6%
• Disagree 17.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
5.9%
• Don't Know 2.9%
• SeeComments 2.9%
Discussion
RE suggests that fragmented problem-solving devalues the safety management process, particularly in large
organisations, where there are ample opportunities for sharing lessons learnt, benchmarking good/best practices,
etc. and this can lead to duplicating errors or failures within an organisation. The majority agree that there is a
fragmented approach, perhaps as a guard against external scrutiny.
Once risk assessments are carried
out, they are not always revised to
reflect changing circumstances
Comments provided by respondents
• Reference Incident
•
investigations.
Some projects / companies treat
safety and risk reports as a one-
off, which are only of use in
gaining regulatory approval.
This is hardly ever done because•
of the additional costs involved.
• Very much depends on the
organisation.
• HAZOPSand site changes (MoC)
are frequently omitted.
.Agree82.4%
• Disagree 2.9%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
2.9%
• Don't Know 5.9%
• See Comments 5.9%
Discussion
REargues that failure to manage risk leads to instability and drifts into failure modes, i.e. a lack of resilience against
threats, etc. A significant percentage agrees that risk assessments are not always accurate, particularly where they
might need to be revised following change.
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There is often a breakdown in
communications and coordination
between disciplines and
departments that may contribute to
errors and failures
• Agree 72.7%
• Disagree 3.0%
Comments provided by respondents
Very much depends on the
organisation.
Neither Agree or Disagree
15.2%
• Don't Know 6.1%
• SeeComments 3.0%
----------
Discussion
RE indicates that one of the contributory factors leading to a lack of resilience is a failure in communications and
coordination within an organisation. The majority agree that this is the case.
The organisation can respond
flexibly and rapidly to changing
demands, e.g. asset integrity issues .Agree26.5%
Comments provided by respondents
• See focus assets supported by
engineering integrity.
• Disagree 29.4%
Neither Agree or Disagree
23.5%
• Organisation response to
changing demands is reactive
and usualIy happens as the
result of an incident.
Depends on
organisation/company.
• See Comments 8.8%
• Don't Know 11.8%
• the
• I suppose it depends on the size of the organisation - a lot of paperwork and bureaucracy just slows down the
response.
Very much depends on the organisation.
• The roll-out of new processes during a project life is always a challenge but the end point to be achieved must
be agreed in time for the PSUA(Platform Start Up Audit).
Discussion
RErequires that organisations have a buffering capacity to absorb change without negative consequences, and are
sufficiently flexible to respond to perturbations without adverse outcomes. The response is almost equally divided
but indicates that it is organisation-specific and that it could be hampered by the use of reactive indicators and
bureaucracy.
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Lessons learnt are adequately
captured via the relevant
management systems to ensure that
similar errors or failures cannot be
repeated in the future
Comments provided by respondents
• Not all learnings from incidents
are picked up on other locations
with similar activities / issues.
In some companies / projects
the answer is "yes", others "no".
They are often identified but
often not implemented.
•
•
Depends on
organisation/company.
• Lessons are captured - but not
always so that they are not
repeated.
•
• Agree 18.2%
• Disagree51.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.2%
• Don't Know 0.0%
.SeeComments 9.1%
the
• Very much depends on the organisation.
• Lessonslearnt are captured, but the mechanism for holding them and distilling the essence is fragmented. Very
often vendor or contractor companies will sign up to providing feedback as part of their ISO process, but
implementation is always lacking, unless it impacts on a manufacturing process.
Discussion
REadvocates a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to safety management. The majority of respondents do not
believe that lessons learnt, e.g. from auditing, were adequately captured to prevent recurrence of incidents or other
failures. This is perhaps due to weaknesses in the systems that administer them, their implementation, or how
information is cascaded.
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There are sufficient detailed audits
on the organisation to ensure that
there is adequate compliance with
safety policies, procedures and
practices
• Agree 26.5%
• Disagree 17.6%
Comments provided by respondents
• Number of audits often enough,
quality of audits sometimes
questionable.
• But the competences of auditors
have to ensure, etc.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
32.4%
• Don't Know 17.6%
• See Comments 5.9%
• I agree. However, continuous
improvements are necessary.
There can never be enough
audits to ensure effective
compliance with safety.
Desktop, paper exercise audits are reasonably good but the implementation of the processes are in general
•
I __j
•
•
poor.
Depends on the organisation/company.
There are sufficient audits - the sharing and dissemination of the findings to the wider organisation to enable
improvement prior to having the same audit at a later date is weak.
Although compliance can be seen to be accomplished in different ways.
Very much depends on the organisation, but generally auditing is a budget line which gets cut.
The process does have sufficient audit but the commitment and application are sometimes deficient.
•
•
•
•
Discussion
In REit is stated that safety is the sum of the accidents that did not occur, although this is a difficult concept to apply
any quantitative form of measurement to. However, auditing is designed to not only reveal what could go wrong,
but also what is being done well, in terms of incident prevention. The majority of respondents agree that there are
sufficient compliance audits for policies, procedures and practices but this is also dependent on a number of factors,
i.e. the quality of the audit, the competency of the auditors and how the results are implemented. It should be noted
that the question relates to compliance rather than an assessment of effectiveness, i.e. it assumes that the
procedures being audited are fit-for-purpose and being effectively applied.
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The organisation has sufficient
proactive key performance
indicators (KPls) to help identify
whether it is drifting from a stable
into a less stable state where risks
may be increasing
Comments provided by respondents
Should be the case. However
not sure whether the KPls are
defined well enough.
Reference PRM guideline and
dashboard reporting.
• Depends on what the KPls are -
are they leading or lagging
indicators and what is the
motivation behind them?
•
•
• Agree 34.4%
• Disagree 25.0%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.9%
• Don't Know 12.5%
• See Comments 6.3%
• There is a lack of consistency and understanding of proactive indicators.
• Depends on the organisation/company.
• Very much depends on the organisation; I would say it's about 50/50 in O&G operators I have worked with.
• This depends on the company / project and varies widely within the industry.
Discussion
A key feature of REis the ability to detect a drift into failure modes in order to take corrective action(s) before the
drift escalates into an undesirable outcome. The majority of respondents agree that there are sufficient proactive
KPlsto help identify this drift (trend). However, a high percentage disagrees on the basis that they may not be well
enough defined, and often lack consistency and understanding. Perhaps this would make them less effective than,
say, lagging/reactive KPls.
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There are always sufficient
competent and experienced people
with adequate resources, e.g. time
and money, in place to consistently
deliver asset integrity
• Agree 34.4%
• Disagree 25.0%
Comments provided by respondents
• On occasions it is a struggle to
get the experienced people to
deliver asset integrity.
• Largely depends on which part
of the world you work in. New
Zealand, for example, has a very
low population / resource pool.
Not always.
Neither Agree or Disagree
21.9%
• Don't Know 12.5%
• See Comments 6.3%
•
• Asset integrity is usually
undermanned, especially for
ageing/ declining operations.
Discussion
The application of REshould ensure asset integrity in oil and gas installations. However, UK HSEresearch has shown
that there is a lack of resilience in the systems that are designed to ensure asset integrity. This is supported by a
significant percentage of respondents who disagree that there are always sufficient resources and competent
personnel to deliver asset integrity. This may be especially true for normally unattended installations (in which case
the risk to personnel is commensurately lower) and/or ageing installations, hence the recent UKHSEKeyProgramme
campaigns.
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There is a top-level commitment to I
achieving desired safety
performance • Agree 58.8%
Comments provided by respondents
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
Disagree, safety performance
actively discouraged.
There is always a statement of
top level commitment (and I
believe senior management
intend this to be taken as real)
but the message does not
always get through because of a
perception that production is
•
•
more important.
• Disagree 14.7%
Discussion
REconsiders that safety performance is related to the commitment of senior/top management and that poor or
unsustained levels of commitment contribute to a lack of resilience. Most respondents agree that there is a top
management commitment to safety but their intent can be diluted as it filters down through the various layers of
the organisation, or the commitment is subject to financial constraints, or it is simply management rhetoric to satisfy
stakeholders.
To achieve the desired level of
safety performance, the
organisation always proactively
commits appropriate resources, e.g.
money, people and time
Comments provided by respondents
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
Small companies are unable to
financially support the level of
safety as much as larger
•
•
companies.
Not always.
• In budget terms, safety is always
an 'unnecessary' cost.
Occupational safety tends to get
the resources it requires; major
hazard safety may not.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
17.6%
• Don't Know 2.9%
• See Comments 5.9%
Discussion
This question examines the link between safety performance and resource allocation. Suitable and sufficient
resources are needed to obtain desired safety performance and this includes the means to implement RE.The
majority disagree that there are sufficient resources to meet desired safety performance, particularly for smaller
companies, and in the prevention of major accidents.
o
• Disagree 46.9%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
28.1%
• Don't Know 9.4%
• See Comments 0.0%
Page 259
There is a 'Just Culture' in the
organisation that encourages
reporting of incidents but does not
accept negligent behaviours
Comments provided by respondents
• Inherent to Life SavingRules.
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
Somedo, some don't.
Depends on the
organisation/company.
True for all the operators I have
worked with.
•
•
•
Discussion
RE states that a 'just culture' encourages the reporting of incidents but does not accept negligent behaviours.
Incident reporting is necessary to understand both the immediate and root causes of incidents in order to develop
improvement and preventative strategies. However, negligent behaviour cannot be tolerated as it exposes people to
unnecessary risk, e.g. ignoring procedures. The majority of respondents agree that there is a 'just culture'.
There is a learning culture where
there is no denial of adverse events
but these are seen as positive and
contribute to improvement
Comments provided by respondents
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
Depends on
organisation/company.
This is often counteracted by
the need to report KPls - i.e.
potentially major incidents are
downgraded in the reporting
system to meet KPls and
therefore do not get the
investigation or publicity that
would be most beneficial.
•
•
o
• Agree 55.9%
Discussion
One of the seven themes present in a highly resilient organisation (the others are discussed in the preceding
questions) is the need to learn from all adverse events. Therefore, the reporting of any incident is seen as positive as
lessons can be learnt and improvements made. Most respondents agree that there is a learning culture in the
industry but serious events may be 'downgraded' because of reputational implications.
• Disagree 14.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
20.6%
• Don't Know 8.8%
• SeeComments 0.0%
,-
• Agree 38.2%
• Disagree 17.6%
the
Neither Agree or Disagree
35.3%
• Don't Know 8.8%
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7.6 High Reliability Organisations
The concept of High Reliability
Organisations (HROs) Is well
understood .Agree 14.7%
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
• Disagree 20.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
11.8%
• Don't Know 52.9%
• SeeComments 0.0%
o
Discussion
The questionnaire was predominantly aimed at experienced and qualified safety practitioners who help establish the
means of improving safety performance. A large percentage of respondents, 73.5%, the sum of those who don't
know and those who disagree, are uncertain about whether the concept of HRO is well understood. This is a similar
figure to that for RE.
The organisation is wary of success
since this tends to breed
complacency • Agree 12.5%
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
I • Disagree 40.6%
Neither Agree or Disagree
28.1%
• Don't Know 18.8%
o
I
I
J
Discussion
Processes in HRO focus on failures rather than success and have a state of 'mindfulness' that maintains constant
vigilance on performance. A large percentage disagree that the organisation is wary of success. This is a feature
identified in the Texas City and Deepwater Horizon investigations, that the lack of 'significant' incidents
demonstrated effective safety management, etc.
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Even minor incidents are treated as
evidence of a more serious,
underlying, problem, and these are
considered as an early warning
signal to take decisive action
Comments provided by respondents
• This depends on the company /
project and varies widely within
the industry.
Some organisations have a
system for reviewing repeated
minor incidents; or identifying
minor incidents which had the
potential to be major incidents.
Most minor incidents receive
little attention.
•
,-- -----
Discussion
In HROs,small errors are seen as evidence of a potentially more serious situation. This triggers a response in HROs
that might be ignored elsewhere. The majority agree that even minor incidents are treated seriously.
There is an over-simplification of
incident information generated in
the organisation that could result in
the loss of some vital data and/or
the information that is available is
not processed effectively
Comments provided by respondents
• Sometimes, not ALWAYS!!
• Statistical reports have to be
simplified. This does lead to loss
of detail which can only be
retrieved if people read the
underlying incident reports.
00
• Agree 62.5%
Discussion
HROshave a pool of people who can commit to ensure that there is no oversimplification and therefore loss of vital
data that could be used to prevent the next incident. Most respondents disagree that oversimplification exists.
• Disagree 12.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.0%
• Don't Know 0.0%
• See Comments 0.0%
• Agree 25.0%
• Disagree 37.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
15.6%
• Don't Know 12.5%
• SeeComments 9.4%
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There is a suitable and sustained
level of near-miss/near-hit/minor
incident reporting in the
organisation that allows the
organisation to make proactive
decisions to prevent recurrence or
prevent escalation to more serious
events
• Agree 53.1 %
• Disagree 3.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.0%
Comments provided by respondents
• Depends which part of the
organisation and on the
middle management
attitude and behaviours.
• This depends on the
company / project and
varies widely within the
industry.
• Agree that organisations have systems in place and expectations of reporting, but quality of reporting is
often very poor (hard to get at root causesfrom descriptions), and amount of data can 'flood' the system.
• There is a suitable level of reporting and the organisation has the data to make proactive decisions; it just
doesn't have the learning culture to do so.
• Don't Know 6.3%
I • See Comments 12.5%
,
L_
• There is incident reporting but this does not always prevent recurrence.
• True within some, but not all, operators.
• Reporting level is very high, perhaps too high, but not convinced that this is allowing proactive decisions to
prevent re-occurrence.
Discussion
HROsare seen to be preoccupied by events they seldom see and therefore even the smallest error could be a signal
that something is wrong with the system. The majority agrees that there is an adequate level of near-miss (or near-
hit) reporting although some caveats suggest that the quality of reporting is very poor (and therefore diminishes the
ability to learn lessons)and that translating these lessons into proactive strategies may also be poor.
There is an overload of incident
information that leads to inaction
due to the volume that requires
assimilation
Comments provided by respondents
• Most companies capture the
'big picture' of incidents with
consequences, even if they
don't translate them into
frequencies
• Possible, but not in my
experience.
• Agree 21.9%
• Disagree 40.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
18.8%
I • Don't Know 15.6%
I .See Comments 3.1%
l
Discussion
In HROs,data is king since this allows informed decisions to be made. Most respondents disagree that there is an
overload of information but it is uncertain whether the data that is available is suitable and sufficient, and is
managed in a way that ensures a fast and appropriate reaction.
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There are sufficient competent and
experienced people in the
organisation to maintain consistency
and continuity during periods of
change
Comments provided by respondents
• The OpCo does a lot of complex
work to assure HSE
competencies. However, I'm not
sure how consistent or objective
it is.
• Becoming a bigger issue.
• Due to frequent job rotations,
some knowledge is just lost.
• Depends on the operator.
-- --- - --------------,
• Agree 22.6%
• Disagree 35.5%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
29.0%
• Don't Know 9.7%
• See Comments 3.2%
Discussion
HROshave a history of safe operations and one of the characteristics of a HRO is that it must act as a single entity
rather than the fragmented behaviours of many. Consequently, personnel need to be able to provide the
consistency and continuity to achieve this objective. The majority disagree that there are sufficient personnel to
provide continuity and consistency.
Job rotation and using employees
with non-typical job experience
provides greater depth and more
challenges. in decision-making
thereby allowing the organisation to
cope better with the unexpected
Comments provided by respondents
• Agree but critical core of
knowledge should be assured
(not always the case).
• Depends on the position and the
person. It is useful for graduates
to spend some time in HSE as
part of their development
programmes.
• Job rotation can mean that
valuable experience is lost. But
it can also bring a 'fresh pair of
eyes'.
.Agree38.7%
• Disagree 19.4%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
19.4%
• Don't Know 16.1%
• See Comments 6.5%
Discussion
HROsneed to be able to cope with both the expected and unexpected. Therefore personnel within an organisation
should have a wide range of experience and competencies to provide depth and understanding of situations, to be
able to understand what is happening and why and therefore take timely and appropriate corrective action(s). The
majority of respondents agree with the need for non-typical job experience, greater depth and more challenges in
decision-making.
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In general, there is a 'silo' culture
that inhibits openness and exchange
of lessons learnt, practices and
technologies
o
Comments provided by respondents
Usual. Neither Agree or Disagree
25.0%
J
• Agree 21.9%
• Disagree 46.9%
• Don't Know 6.3%
• SeeComments 0.0%
Discussion
In HROs,silo mentality is discouraged and openness and awareness of the big picture endorsed to improve the
ability to capture lessons learnt and ways to prevent failure. About half of the respondents disagree that there is a
silo mentality.
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7.7 Inherent Safety
The concept of Inherent Safety is
well understood.
Comments provided by respondents
• It is understood but often
ignored as the higher- placed
barriers are more expensive, so
discounted as impractical (e.g.
fin fan coolers selected in
preference to shell & tube in
sour service).
This is correct for major
projects. However, small
projects do not always apply IDS
(Inherently Safer Design).
• Well-understood but not always
well-implemented.
•
• Agree 60.0%
• Disagree 13.3%
Neither Agree or Disagree
10.0%
• Don't Know 13.3%
• SeeComments 3.3%
Discussion
A large percentage of respondents agree that inherent safety is well understood.
The current risk control hierarchy
uses the following approach
consistently in the following order:
a) Risk reduction by inherent safety
b) Risk reduction by basic process
control c) Risk reduction by pre-
alarms d) Risk reduction by
Instrumented Protective Function
(IPF) e) Risk reduction by
mechanical devices f) Risk reduction
by other means
Comments provided by respondents
• They are in part, but not
necessarily in this order.
• Our OpCo tries to do this, other
operators less so.
• Disagree with the hierarchy. An
alarm (alone) does not reduce
risk. It is really 'operator
monitoring and intervention'.
I
I
I
Discussion
The risk control hierarchy is designed to maximise the control and mitigations over the lifecycle of a development.
Hence inherent safety avoids controls, such as procedures or active controls that are more susceptible to error.
About half agree that this hierarchy is applied, or at least that the concept is.
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• Agree 46.4%
• Disagree 17.9%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.7%
• Don't Know 17.9%
.SeeComments 7.1%
Often designs are not inherently
safe but tend to rely on procedural
control
Comments provided by respondents
This rarely occurs in process
safety for steady-state
operation ...there should be
other devices that prevent
failures ....processes usually can
shut down safely but often
startups rely on procedures ....
procedures are the norm in
workplace safety where people
are actively doing tasks ....e.g.
tank cleaning, steam out,
turning valves.
• Sometimes, not often.
•
• The major hazards are generally
well-handled, but inherent
safety of lesser hazards is less
well controlled.
• Agree 35.7%
• Disagree 32.1%
Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Don't Know 7.1%
• See Comme nts 3.6%
Discussion
In the absence of factors such as safety KPls in design, robust auditing of design principles, cost and schedule
priorities, it is possible, and in many casesseen to be legitimate, to design systems that rely solely on procedures as
a means of system integrity. No firm conclusions are drawn either way.
Procedures are often incomplete or
inaccurate
Comments provided by respondents
Procedures tend to be developed
during detailed design and
commissioning.
o
• Agree 46.4%
• Disagree32.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.7%
• Don't Know 10.7%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
If there is a significant reliance on procedures to ensure asset integrity and personal protection it is incumbent, as a
minimum, that the procedures are accurate, complete and understood, etc. The majority agree that procedures are
often incomplete or inaccurate.
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Procedures often do not have
sufficient detail e.g. that considers
lessons learnt, the experience of
users and their specific
responsibilities
Comments provided by respondents
• Work Instructions are more
specific.
• True but procedures often have
too much irrelevant detail (for
fear of leaving something out).
• Procedures typically include
experience and key steps
(higher degree of risk)
highlighted. Lessons learnt are
not often documented.
--------- ------------------------------------
o
• Agree 46.4%
Discussion
Procedures should capture lessons learnt to avoid any repetition of previous errors or failures, particularly for new
systems and/or personnel that are going through the learning curve. The majority agree that procedures do not have
sufficient detail that adequately captures lessons learnt. In this context it is always seen to be a compromise, in that
capturing all relevant lessons learnt may result in voluminous procedures, which may be self-defeating, while
concise procedures that are easily read and understood may lack important safety information. There are different
forms of p.rocedures (e.g. written instructions) that may require different categories of compliance, e.g. statutory
requirements and some company standards may be mandatory, while some others are intended for guidance only.
Procedures are often not concise
and contain information that does
not contribute to work performance
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
• Disagree 28.6%
Neither Agree or Disagree
17.9%
• Don't Know 7.1%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
Procedures may contain irrelevant information, making their implementation more difficult. Inaccurate and
irrelevant aspects of procedures are more likely to cause. people to ignore or bypass them. Most agree that
procedures often contain information that does not contribute to work or safety performance.
o
.Agree46.4%
• Disagree 35.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
7.1%
• Don't Know 10.7%
I • SeeComments 0.0%
I
L
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Procedures often have an
inconsistent presentation/format
therefore making them less
comprehensible
o
• Agree 39.3%
I
_J
• Disagree 28.6%
Comments provided by respondents
Generally, an operator specifies
format at the outset.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.0%
• Don't Know 7.1%
• See Comments 0.0%
I
1_.
Discussion
Procedures contain the written instructions about how to execute tasks. The procedures need to be understandable,
and should be written so that what needs to be done can be easily followed by all users. Inconsistent styles and
formats may cause confusion and error. About two-fifths agree that procedures are often inconsistent.
Hydrocarbon or other hazardous
processes are always designed to
minimise the maintenance burden .Agree 7.4%
I
I_J
Comments provided by respondents • Disagree 55.6%
• Not always.
We are not a production
platform.
• See Comments 3.7%
• • Neither Agree or Disagree22.2%
• Don't Know 11.1%
Discussion
Inherent safety is about applying a hierarchy of controls in a sequential way, so eliminating the hazard is the first
step, etc. When, for example, there are residual risks, due to the presence of hydrocarbons, removing people from
the hazard is another way of effective risk control. Most respondents disagree that hydrocarbon processes are
designed to minimise the intervention of people.
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Hydrocarbon or other hazardous
processes are always designed to
minimise intrusive instrumentation
• Agree 14.3%
Comments provided by respondents
• Not always.
• Disagree 39.3%
• We are not a production
platform.
Neither Agree or Disagree
28.6%
• Don't Know 14.3%
• See Comments 3.6%
Discussion
An inherently safe design would ensure that the design, maintenance and operating parameters of a process could
never be exceeded beyond safe limits by internal or external events, in either normal or abnormal conditions.
Intrusive instrumentation often provides a 'weak' point in the system since it is generally less robust than the
process. Where this is not possible, non-intrusive instrumentation can often be used to manage the process within
prescribed limits. About two-thirds disagree that process design minimises the need for instrumentation.
Hydrocarbon or other hazardous
processes are always designed to
minimise piping joints .Agree 17.9%
Comments provided by respondents
• Not always.
• Disagree 46.4%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.3%• We are not a production
platform.
• Don't Know 17.9%
• See Comments 3.6%
--------
Discussion
From a quantitative risk perspective, the more piping joints there are the more the potential leak paths and the
greater the risk of a release. It is often possible to minimise joints (e.g. flanges) by providing welded connections,
although this may make installation of the piping more difficult. However, welded joints result in a greater cost
compared with flanged connections. Most disagree that piping joints are minimised.
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There is sufficient emphasis on
process safety KPls to achieve
continuous and sustainable
improvements in asset integrity
Comments provided by respondents
• Just started.
• As per earlier comments - KPI's
data is tracked. Degree of
evaluation and actions to
address learnings are weak.
Organisation does not have a
strong leaning culture.
• We are not a production
platform.
• Agree 25.0%
• Disagree 35.7%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
14.3%
• Don't Know 21.4%
• See Comments 3.6%
Discussion
Historically, KPlshave focused around preventing injuries to people. In recent years process safety has gained more
prominence following disasters such as Piper Alpha (1988), TexasCity (2005) and Deepwater Horizon (2010). These
major accidents were initially caused by process-related safety failures which are more likely to result in a major
accident than an occupational incident. About a third disagree that there is sufficient emphasis given to process
safety KPls.
Facilities are always initially
designed to be unmanned, or to
eliminate or minimise personnel
exposure to hazards
Comments provided by respondents
• Reference aging installations.
• But many are.
• Not always.
• We are not a production
platform.
• Agree 21.4%
• Disagree 50.0%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Don't Know 3.6%
• See Comments 3.6%
Discussion
Removing people from hazards means they cannot be hurt. There are technologies and techniques for managing oil
and gas facilities remotely, although not continuously without any maintenance or breakdown interventions. About
half agree that facilities are not generally designed to be unmanned since interruptions/breakdowns, and any
associated stoppage of production, can outweigh the cost of manned installations. Furthermore, there may be
reliability issuesassociated with remotely controlled facilities.
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Designs always favour passive rather
than active control systems o
• Agree 50.0%
Comments provided by respondents
• Useof "always" is a problem.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
systems are always the major
hazard primary control.
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Disagree 14.3%
•
• Don't Know 14.3%
• See Comments 0.0%
Discussion
Passive protection is inherently reliable as there are few parts that could fail, e.g. passive fire protection where
coatings are applied to vulnerable surfaces to protect structures (and thereby prevent premature failure that could
affect the safety of people) against thermal effects. In comparison water curtains require firewater pumps and
drivers, etc. About half agree that providing passive control systems is preferred to active forms of protection.
Maximising inherent safety in design
is seen as a cost-effective approach
when considered over the life cycle
of the development (even if this
requires greater initial investment)
o
• Agree 33.3%
• Disagree 25.9%
Comments provided by respondents Neither Agree or Disagree
29.6%
• But not always done.
Sometimes.
Not often.
• See Comments 0.0%
• Don't Know 11.1%•
•
Discussion
The greatest opportunity to shape lifecycle safety performance is during design when changes are readily
accommodated and can be relatively cheaply applied. As a development progresses through the lifecycle phases,
introducing the same principles of inherent safety becomes progressively more expensive (when normalised for
comparison), and therefore lower orders of control are often applied. About a third agree that maximising inherent
safety in design is a cost -effective approach.
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Safety studies include inherently
safer design guidewords to ensure
that they are properly considered in
the decision-making process
Comments provided by respondents
• This is the case for large projects
with some clients but is not
always the case for smaller
projects.
Sometimes.•
o
• Agree 32.1%
Discussion
Aviation, aeronautics, and product manufacturing have come to rely heavily on checklists to reduce human error.
The checklist is an important tool in error management across all these fields, contributing significantly to reductions
in the risk of costly mistakes and improving overall outcomes. If inherent safety is not part of a designer's checklist
then its application may well be missed. There is no firm conclusion either way about the use of checklists containing
inherent safety.
Senior management project sanction
is conditional on the effective
consideration of inherent safety in
the design
Comments provided by respondents
• But not always done.
• Answered on basis of meaning
'agreement'. This is a very
unusual word with two
contradictory meanings. To
sanction can mean to endorse,
to ratify or to approve but
confusingly, it can also mean to
punish.
• Disagree 32.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
32.1%
• Don't Know 3.6%
• See Comments 0.0%
o
Discussion
Project assurance processes often involve gates where an assessment is made about the viability of a project, and if
sufficient and suitable work has been done, to justify moving onto the next phase. One of the conditions within the
assurance process could be the degree of inherent safety in the design. About a third disagree that project sanction
is conditional on the effective consideration of inherent safety in the design.
• Agree 28.6%
.Oisagree32.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Don't Know 17.9%
• See Comments 0.0%
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True lifecycle costs of projects (not
just the cost of design, fabrication,
installation and commissioning) are
taken into account when assessing
risks to enumerate the benefits of
inherently safer design
Comments provided by respondents
No comments.
o
• Agree 17.9%
Discussion
While it may be difficult to determine overall lifecycle costs, estimates can often be made by using data from
previous comparable projects. The benefits of higher initial capital expenditure ((APEX) to improve the
implementation of inherent safety in a design could more readily be justified if it was evaluated in relation to overall
lifecycle costs. Absolute figures may not be necessary as the analysis would be to compare designs. About half
disagree that lifecycle costs are taken into account.
Concept selection is based on the
ranking of various options with
transparent safety criteria Including
the application of inherently safer
design principles
Comments provided by respondents
• Often not enough detail for
transparency during concept.
Safety aspects are part of the
process though.
• Too many examples where it
wasn't (Op(o included).
• Application of inherently safer
design not often transparent.
• Sometimes; safety criteria may
be transparent, but inherent
safety by itself may not be.
• Disagree 46.4%
Neither Agree or Disagree
21.4%
• Don't Know 14.3%
I • See Comments 0.0%
I
I
l_
Discussion
Part of an ALARPdecision is to look at all design options available in order to select the one that optimises project
specifications when considered against criteria such as finance, operations, maintenance, HSEand schedule, etc.
Each of these categories is normally given a weighting to reflect its relative importance when compared to other
categories. About a third agree that concept selection is based on the ranking of various options with transparent
safety criteria, including the application of inherently safer design principles
• Agree 33.3%
• Disagree 29.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
22.2%
• Don't Know 11.1%
• See Comments 3.7%
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Applying inherent safety during
design is likely to be compromised
due to cost constraints, e.g. capital
expenditure (CAPEX)
o
• Agree 61.5%
• Disagree 23.1%
Comments provided by respondents
No comments • Neither Agree or Disagree
7.7%
• Don't Know 7.7%
I • See Comments 0.0%
L
Discussion
Oil and gas companies have little influence on oil and gas prices, and therefore to achieve suitable margins they
focus on cost control. Consequently, there is an endemic cost culture within oil and gas companies that competes
with the need to adequately fund safety improvements. Therefore, irrespective of the evidence that it can be cost-
effective to include inherent safety in a design, there might be an overwhelming resistance if there is no statutory or
company mandate that enforces its application. About two-thirds agree that application of inherent safety is likely to
be compromised due to cost constraints.
Applying inherent safety during
design is likely to be compromised
due to competency and experience
constraints of project personnel
o
• Agree 50.0%
• Disagree 30.8%
Comments provided by respondents
No comments • Neither Agree or Disagree
I
11.5%
• Don't Know 7.7%
I · See Comments 0.0%
l_
Discussion
If project personnel do not have the necessary competencies and experience to apply inherent safety during design
then it is less likely to happen. About half agree that project personnel, not just the safety professionals, may not
have the requisite skills to apply inherent safety.
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In the design of critical combinations
and complex integrations of
engineered systems, the design
criteria for reliability, availability
and maintainability (RAM analysis)
is identified as a KPI to ensure
desired design integrity, not just
what can be achieved, but what
should be assured
Comments provided by respondents
No comments
-- ---- -----------------,
o
• Agree 22.2%
Discussion
Processescan be designed to meet reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) targets. The higher the target,
the less demand for breakdown interventions, and therefore exposure of people to risk. Consequently, in design,
there should be a KPIagainst which the project design is assessed,and the project sanctioned, through an assurance
procedure that meets production and safety objectives. About a third disagree that RAM KPlsare set to satisfy this
requirement.
Project teams always study past
incidents associated with designs to
mmtrmse the potential of
error/failure (hardware, software
and human) by eliminating or
mitigating the causes
(immediate/root) of past problems.
Comments provided by respondents
Not 'always'.
• Disagree 29.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.9%
• Don't Know 22.2%
• See Comments 0.0%
o
• Agree 22.2%
Discussion
Learning from the past can help in developing strategies that prevent repetition in the future. This is widely applied
to occupational safety but should also be applied to errors in design, or incidents that have subsequently been
caused by design failures. About a fifth agree that there is enough assessment of historical performance that enables
a design team to reduce potential failures in design. Irrespective of the resources committed to achieve safety goals,
it is argued by Charles Perrow, that given factors such as tight-coupling, and complexity of plant design, accidents
will happen and therefore are 'normal'.
• Disagree 29.6%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
25.9%
• Don't Know 22.2%
.SeeComments 0.0%
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7.8 Normal Accidents
We mislead ourselves due to various
pressures that the risks that are
currently tolerated by the
organisation are acceptable
Comments provided by respondents
Many do not know the difference
between acceptable and tolerable.
----------
o
• Agree 50.0%
Discussion
In normal accident theory it is proposed that given cost, schedule, production and other influences, the residual risks
within an operation are 'part of the job' or an inherent feature of the company's activities for which little can be
done. Consequently they are generally accepted by the workforce, e.g. not challenged, and therefore may remain
higher than they need to be. About half agree that this is the case.
• Disagree 32.1%
• Neither Agree or Disagree
10.7%
• Don't Know 7.1%
• See Comments 0.0%
l_
7.9 General Comments - Question 100
What, if anything, do you think is 1---
required by your company (or the
industry) to achieve continuous and
sustainable improvements in safety
performance?
Comments provided by respondents
SeeNotes below.
• answered question
• skipped question
Discussion
No additional comments were made by 56%of respondents.
General DiscussionOpen Comments (Question 100)
The comments repeated or emphasised previous information contained and since they offer no
added value they have been excluded for expediency.
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7.10 Summary
The questions were based on general principles for key themes in the literature review for
Traditional OH&S-MSs (Chapter 2) including some specific components of an OH&S-MS,
Challenges to Traditional OH&S-MSs (Chapter 3), some theories, and Case Studies (Chapter 5).
The questions were selected to provide a reasonable analysis of opinion and were not intended to
be a comprehensive analysis of each category. The Database analysis (Chapter 6) was not included
in the questionnaire as it wa specific and unique to this research. The results and discussion are
summarised below. For simplicity, the tables do not include response options of 'Neither agree or
disagree' or 'Don't know'.
7.10.1 Traditional OH&S-MSs
There were 14 questions in this category.
Table 18 Questionnaire Traditional and Challenges to Traditional OH&S-MSs
Question summary % % Disagree
Agree
OH&S-MS is managed same as other core business activities 48.1 33.3
OH&S-MS lacks definition for all project phases 22.2 48.1
Money and resources for safety is driven by company culture 55.6 7.4
The safety culture ensures the company provides the resources to meet safety goals 29.6 37.0
Senior management safety commitment is purely rhetoric 29.6 48.1
Senior management safety commitment is properly cascaded down 63 18.5
There is effective workforce involvement in safety 42.3 30.3
Lessons from Piper Alpha have been adequately captured 51 18.5
Future challenges means more vulnerability to major accidents 48.1 14.8
Current approach to OH&S-MS allows for continuous and sustainable safety 30.8 23.1
improvement
The regulator is adequately resourced 14.8 51.9
The regulator provides authoritative advice and is available 23.1 53.8
The regulator uses its power of enforcement to deter poor risk management 44.4 18.5
Goal-setting legislative regime has helped improve safety performance 61.5 3.8
In terms of effective implementation of an OH&S-MS there is some uncertainty but there is strong
agreement that safety culture is a dominant driver affecting safety performance (in agreement
s2.3.3). There is also strong agreement that there is a senior management commitment to deliver
safety goals, that lessons from Piper Alpha have been adequately captured (somewhat contrary to
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the findings in ss.9) and that a goal-setting legislative safety regime has improved safety
performance, although there is no evidence to support this view. The is reasonable agreement
that the regulator is ineffective and this supports the conclusion from the four case studies, ss.9)
7.10.2 Project and Risk Management
There were 19 questions in this category (Question 20 identified whether responders had project
experience and therefore were eligible to answer this series of questions).
Table 19 Questionnaire Project and Risk Management
Question summary %Agree %Disagree
Risk assessment is well understood 36.7 40
Risk assessment tools and techniques are effectively applied 36.7 33.3
There are wide variations in the quality of risk assessments 86.7 3.3
ALARPis properly applied 43.3 30
Financial screening criteria does not reflect risks 53.3 6.7
No action is taken if risks sit in the ALARPregion 36.7 36.7
There is benchmarking between companies to achieve good/best practice 31 44.8
There is benchmarking in the global organisation to achieve good/best practice 31 44.8
Managing risks in design is well understood 93.3 6.7
There are no conflicts in risk management in design with other objectives 14.3 78.6
Design provides the greatest opportunity to achieve cost-effective safety solutions 85.7 7.1
for the lifetime of a development
There are adequate resources during design to achieve ALARP 42.9 28.6
During design project teams have accountability for the transfer of risks 29.6 44.4
There are KPlsfor project teams in design to ensure ALARPfor the development 17.9 57.1
In design project teams have suitable operational expertise 40.7 44.4
Project assurance prevent intolerable and non-ALARP risks being transferred 34.6 34.6
Projects, in design, are driven by cost and schedule. Safety is secondary 42.9 32.1
When design projects are fast tracked, safety is compromised 28.6 SO
Riskstransferred to subsequent phases are not always transparent 35.7 35.7
There is considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of risk assessment and whether ALARP
is being achieved. This may also be reflected in the risk differences between Europe, North
America and the US identified in Figure 27. Similarly, it is inconclusive whether benchmarking is
helping identify good/best practices in the industry. There is strong agreement that safety design
is well understood and this phase provides the greatest opportunity for cost-effective solutions
for the entire lifetime of a development (in agreement with s2.s and s2.8). There is strong
agreement that the current financial screening criteria used in projects does not reflect risks and
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can compromise the ability of projects to achieve both tolerable and ALARP conditions (s2.3 and
s2.5).
7.10.3 Measuring Performance
There were 9 questions in this category.
Table 20 Questionnaire Measuring Performance
Question summary % % Disagree
Agree
The industry is too focused on injurious KPls 60 16.7
Safety performance measurement is reliable 33.3 40
Safety measurement provides decision-makers with suitable information 33.3 16.7
Non-formal incident reporting systems, e.g. STOP,are given adequate attention SO 20
The organisation is aware that minor hydrocarbon releases can lead to major 62.1 10.3
accidents
Employees are discouraged from reporting incidents 6.7 73.3
There is sufficient understanding of incident reporting requirements 24.1 31
Annually HSE address past deficiencies to provide a sound basis to achieve 40 33.3
improvements
Resources to implement HSEplans are adequate 13.3 36.7
There is strong agreement that the industry is too focused on injurious KPls (at the expense of
non-injurious and process KPls), and this is in agreement with s2.7). Also, there is strong
agreement that organisations are aware of the potential danger arising from minor events
(including hydrocarbon releases) which is in agreement with accident causation theory (accident
triangles) in s2.7) and that reporting is encouraged. However, there is uncertainty about the
general reliability and ability of these systems to improve safety performance.
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7.10.4 Resilient Engineering (RE)
There were 22 questions in this category.
Table 21 Questionnaire Resilient Engineering
Question summary % % Disagree
Agree
The concept of REis well understood 4.5 18.2
Incidents are prevented by the flexibility of people 52.9 11.8
People are given adequate time to make safety decisions 11.8 70.6
People have time to review tasks (checks and balances) 47.7 26.5
Company emphasis of cost and schedule targets compromises safety performance 52.9 23.5
People have empowerment to stop unsafe acts 54.4 6.1
People and senior management know what is actually happening 17.6 55.9
Incident investigation is adequate to identify root causes 51.5 21.1
Safety defences erode under pressure 78.8 3
Past safety performance is taken as an indicator of future performance especially if it 67.6 11.8
has been good
There is a fragmented approach to problem-solving that clouds the 'big picture' 70.6 17.6
Risk assessments are never updated to reflect change 82.4 2.9
Communications are poor 72.7 3
The organisation can respond rapidly and effectively to change 26.5 29.4
Lessons learnt are robustly captured to prevent recurrence 18.2 51.5
Auditing is adequate 26.5 17.6
KPls prevent drifting into unstable conditions 34.4 25
There are adequate competent people to deliver asset integrity 34.4 25
There is a top-level commitment to deliver safety goals 58.8 14.7
The organisation is proactive to achieving safety goals 15.6 46.9
There is a 'Just culture' 55.9 14.7
There is a 'Learning culture' 38.2 17.6
The concept of RE does not appear to be well understood by the specialists who should have
expertise in this area. Therefore the ability of responders to answer questions in this category
might relate to the similarly of REwith traditional OH&S-MSs. On the positive side, there is strong
agreement that incidents are prevented by the actions of people, rather than compliance with
procedures, and they have the empowerment to stop unsafe acts. On the negative side, there is
strong agreement that safety defences erode under pressure, risk assessments are not updated
following change, and communications are poor. Issues about the time allowed to take decisions
appear to be contradictory. There is uncertainty in the remaining features that are applicable to
RE(reference s3.4).
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7.10.5 High Reliability Organisations (HROs)
There were 9 questions in this category.
Table 22 Questionnaire High Reliability Organisations
Question summary % % Disagree
Agree
The concept of HROs is well understood 14.7 20.6
The organisation is wary of success 12.5 40.6
Minor incidents are regarded as significant warning signals 62.5 12.5
There is an oversimplification of information 25 37.5
Near-miss reporting is adequate 53.1 3.1
There is an overioad of incident information 21.9 40.6
There are sufficient competent people to accommodate change 22.6 35.5
Job rotation creates greater flexibility 38.7 19.4
There is a 'silo' culture 21.9 46.9
As with RE the concept of HROs does not appear to be well understood by the specialists who
should have expertise in this area. Similarly, the ability of responders to answer questions in this
category might relate to the similarly of HROs, and therefore RE, with traditional OH&S-MSs.
Again considerable uncertainty exists about the application of HRO principles but the strongest
area of agreement is that near-miss reporting is adequate (reference s3.5).
7.10.6 Inherent Safety
There were 22 questions in this category.
Table 23 Questionnaire Inherent Safety
Question summary % % Disagree
Agree
The concept of inherent safety is well understood 60 13.4
The risk control hierarchy is applied 46.4 17.9
Designs are not always inherently safe 35.7 32.1
Procedures are often incomplete 46.4 32.1
Procedures often do not contain adequate detail 46.4 28.6
Procedures are often not concise 46.4 35.7
Procedures are often inconsistently formatted 39.3 28.6
Hydrocarbon systems are designed to minimise maintenance 7.4 55.6
Hydrocarbon systems are designed to minimise intervention 14.3 39.3
Hydrocarbon systems are designed to minimise joints 17.9 46.4
Process safety KPlsensure integrity 25 35.7
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Question summary " " DisagreeAgree
Facilities are designed to be unmanned 21.4 50
Designs favour passive rather than active protection 50 14.3
Using inherent safety is cost-effective 33.3 25.9
Safety studies use inherent safety in decision-making 32.1 32.1
Senior management only sanction designs that are inherently safe 28.6 32.1
Lifecycle costs are considered in design to maximise inherent safety 17.9 46.4
Concept selection uses inherent safer design principles 33.3 29.6
Inherent safety in design will be compromised due to CAPEX 61.5 23.1
Inherent safety in design will be compromised due to lack of competent practitioners 50 30.8
RAM is identified as a KPI in design 22.2 29.6
Past incidents are addressed in the design phase 22.2 29.6
Unlike REand HROs,the concept of inherent safety appears to be reasonably well understood.
This may be because the concept has tangible and practical applications and is significantly
different from REand HROtheory. There is reasonable agreement that hydrocarbon systems
follow the inherent safety hierarchy to reduce risk and that hydrocarbon systems are designed
accordingly. However, the remaining responses were fairly balanced to present a level of
uncertainty in the application of inherent safety in other areas (reference s3.2)
7.10.7 Normal Accident Theory
There was 1 question in this category.
Table 24 Questionnaire Normal Accident Theory
Question summary " " DisagreeAgree
Riskstolerated are often acceptable 50 32.1
Risksthat are taken mayor may not be challenged. This is consistent with the findings in 7.10.1
where the quality of risk assessmentwas identified asvariable (reference s3.3).
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8. INTERVIEWS
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain specific qualitative information from
a sample of the respondents in relation to information relevant to this research, (Le. to probe for
what is not known, and gain a range of insights on specific issues). The use of semi-structured
interviews also allowed open discussion of the main research objectives to give interviewees the
chance to expand on a particular topic. While there were other options available, such as
structured and unstructured techniques, this approach provided an appropriate balance, to
remain relatively focused without being too prescriptive. The interviews were either recorded
electronically or hand written and the narrative that summarises the analysis from the interviews,
extracted into subject areas, is provided below with subsequent examples that were quoted in
the interviews.
8.20H&S-MS
The ineffectiveness of OH&S-MSs is comprised of factors such as inconsistent implementation of
standards, lack of competencies, and a failure to cascade or communicate the safety culture of an
organisation. While it is seen as positive to give managers more accountability for safety
performance, this may actually have a negative impact if their ability to improve performance is
limited, and they manipulate performance to give the impression of a better performance than
the reality. If audits are undertaken, for example to meet targets, but the lessons learnt are not
robustly captured, then the process is de-valued. Similarly, an OH&S-MS needs to deliver the
means for improvement, and if new theories and concepts are excluded, opportunities to achieve
safety goals are missed. Examples from the interviews are given below.
"The opeo corporate OH&S-MS was not applied globally, so different standards were being
applied, resulting in different risk levels for essentially similar activities within their operation".
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"There is a lack of young people being trained in the industry. When many of the older and
experienced population retire, there is likely to be a huge loss of corporate memory".
"From a safety advisor's perspective, coaching people seems to yield good results".
"Middle management are a barrier/filter between senior management wishes and the workforce,
so the safety message may not get through, or is obstructed, when the workforce try to implement
senior management safety expectations".
"On a positive note, more line managers are being held more accountable for HSEperformance".
"Still a large variation in the safety approach between oil and gas companies, also within an
organisation, and even between departments".
"Many concepts such as resilient engineering, inherent safety and high reliability organisations,
not fully understood".
''There is often a breakdown in communications and coordination between disciplines and
departments that may contribute to errors and failures. Especially as Ops don't talk to projects
who don't talk to maintenance who don't talk to Ops.....etc.l".
"There are sufficient detailed audits on the organisation to ensure that there is adequate
compliance with safety policies, procedures and practices, and although we have the information,
/ don't think we share and compare, therefore we don't learn".
"t believe that most senior management is committed to achieving improvements in safety
performance".
''There is effective workforce involvement in producing safety improvements, e.g. through safety
committees, but you will never please everyone!".
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The regulator can help guide, or through enforcement, demand improvement in, the OH&S-MS.
The outcome from interviews relating to the regulator appears in this section. The general
consensus amongst interviewees was that the North Sea regulator (UK HSE) is probably the most
competent and active compared to others, but they suffer from under-resourcing and lack of
experience. UK HSEfinds recruitment of suitably-qualified and experienced personnel difficult as
the salaries are generally lower than comparable positions in the private sector. Other, overseas
global regulatory regimes are generally much slacker than the UK HSE, so it is easier to avoid
implementing measures overseas to prevent /control/mitigate risks.
The ability of an organisation to achieve its safety goals is largely influenced by the resources it
allocates to managing its risks. However, resource allocation is detailed in OH&S-MSs. In the
interviews there was general consensus that cost management dominates decision-making.
Although there are signs of improvement in safety culture, this may be a product of the recent
(2010 - 2012) level of oil and gas prices and therefore higher revenues. However, proportionately,
the amount of resource allocated to maintaining or improving safety performance is comparably
the same as before.
"Cost drivers dominate decision-making, especially in this OpCo, as it used to be a contractor but it
is now also an oil and gas operator, i.e. Duty Holder".
"Four key pillars of projects: cost, schedule, reputation, and safety. The weighting given to each of
these and the overall balance is driven by managers. But there is a large variation in the attitude
of different managers to safety, and hence large variability in outcome".
"Safety culture improving, but safety performance is still driven by cost and schedule".
"Some managers still believe safety is the responsibility of the safety department, rather than the
line".
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"Management spent money on HSE,but as a proportion of overall expenditure, it's still relatively
"Safety has a higher profile, compared to the past, but it is often just rhetoric, as enforcement and
implementation of expectations meet various obstacles, e.g. cost, schedule, people".
"Key concerns are:
• Toofew good men on the ground.
• There is a need to bring life to projects (practice rather than preaching) rather than just
aim for ticks in the boxes.
• Root cause - lots of politics in the organisation resulting in a dilution of genuine safety
expertise, not enough senior competent safety people and people with practicable
experience in key functions, e.g. production and well engineering".
"High cost-cutting in the production function, especially as unit costs increase (operating costs
increasing while production rates declining) but this is not as relevant to well engineering, as high
costs of drilling can absorb more easily higher safety expenditure. Also, well engineering is less
prone to cast-cutting in the same way as production. But the proportion of safety costs compared
to overall drilling expenditure still relatively small".
"Lots of pressure to complete the work load on fewer people, for 011 disciplines, especially in
exploration, due to high costs, tight schedules, and the need to get fast results".
"The company emphasis on factors such os cost, schedule, production, etc. has had, and continues
to have, 0 detrimental impact on safety performance but it's about balance. HSEmust be in there,
and is, in most cases".
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"Safety defences (e.g. bow-ties) start to erode when under pressure, e.g. controls may be
compromised due to cost, schedule, production pressures, which can be the case but I often think
it's an excuse as to why things go wrong".
"We are pretty good at providing the resources we need to achieve safety performance targets
(normally injurious-based targets}".
It is evident, from the interview statements below, that while companies recognise the
importance of a safety department (or personnel), there is concern about the ability to deliver
professional safety support in conjunction with uncertain organisational expectations. In the
worst case,this combination can be counter-productive and fail to improve safety performance.
"Although OpCo is now a major oil and gas company, until about 9 months ago (when interviewee
joined) they had no Technical Safety Engineering expertise - a huge gap in the organisation. Much
of the technical safety requirement is outsourced. Senior management does not understand the
role of safety engineering and technical safety".
"Quality of HSE/Safety Professional crucial in educating all employees, including senior
management. OpCo has had a number of poor safety advisors".
"No real 'apprenticeship' for safety people. While many are academically well qualified, their lack
of practical experience limits their ability to influence safety decision-making, due to their inability
to grasp basics".
8.3 Risk and Project Management
Project Management
While project risks may be understood this does not mean they are managed to provide a lifecycle
ALARPdesign. There may be various reasons for this deficiency but conflicts with other project
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objects, e.g. cost and schedule, unnecessary transfer of risk to subsequent project phases, and
lack of suitable competencies, may all contribute to poor [safety] designs. Examples from the
interviews are given below.
• "I think the requirements for managing safety risks during the design stages of a project
are well understood".
• "There are always conflicts between the management of risks in design, and other project
aims and objectives".
• "During the design phase sufficient resources are rarely provided to ensure that risks are
adequately identified and mitigated to demonstrate an ALARP case (always on the back
foot}".
• "We often see issues arise after the design phase because they haven't been understood
and managed early enough to prevent the transfer of unnecessary risks to subsequent
lifecycle phases".
• "Project Teams in general have insufficient operational experience to ensure that they can
proactively minimise risks during the operational phase".
RiskManagement
Interviewees suggest, as demonstrated below, that the combination of poor quality procedures in
an environment where risks are not fully understood is a recipe for failure to achieve safety
objectives. The fact that the risk process is fragmented, and results are variable or out-of-date, is
a recipe for poor safety performance. In the case of major accidents, continued focus on
occupational safety distracts from the importance of process safety. A statement that an
organisation remains vulnerable to blowouts is consistent with the SINTEFFresults identified in
the deductive research.
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• "Operations will always take the easiest route - procedures are often ignored or bypassed.
Also, compliance with procedures not checked or audited".
• "Good practice is being used in various OpCos, e.g. face fit PPEbut often through informal
networking".
• "OpCostill focuses on occupational safety rather than process safety".
• "People recognise the difference between occupational and process safety but there is a
lack of attention given to process safety at the corporate level".
• "Mentoring exists in the organisation but focus remains on occupational safety rather
than process safety. Generally organisation waits for events like Deepwater Horizon
before proactive interest is shown. Still lots of reliance on people 'intuitively' doing the
right thing rather than taking a more scientific approach".
• "Big problem with pipeline corrosion from saddles used on pipe work supports. However,
these are used extensively throughout the process and seem to be ignored as it's in the
'too difficult' box and is likely to incur significant/major costs to rectify. No one wants to
deal with issue".
• 'Verification big issue as some valves not working and/or leaking".
• "Often risks are not fully understood and the quality of toolbox talks is poor".
• "Well engineering still vulnerable to blowouts, altha ugh lots of positive noises about
process safety. While well design is highly influenced by geology, it is not subject ta a more
holistic analysis and therefore tends to ring-fence individual wells as far as safety is
concerned. For example, the choice of drilling technique could be wider to include
underbalanced techniques that reduce safety-related risks but might increase drilling
risks".
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• "Huge thrust on road safety (several road traffic fatalities) and Life Saving Rules (LSR)but
no equivalent LSRfor inherent safety, etc. Thefocus on road safety diverts attention away
from process safety. Culture in Arabic nations seems less interested in safety culture so
more difficUlt in these regimes".
• "Continue using HAZOPs and FMEAs, etc. but normally these are used generically.
However, more use of bowties, although many techniques are avoided at the corporate
level because they don't understand them or appreciate their value".
• "Within the global or local organisation there is a fragmented approach to problem-
solving that often clouds the big picture, i.e. there is not a shared risk picture when dealing
with common hazards because we just make things too complicatedl Having said that, the
'eliminate, simplify, standardise, automate' (ESSA) approach to things like the control
framework in OpCo is starting to get rid of the crap we have out there, and allow for
standardisation".
• "Once risk assessments are carried out, they are not always revised to reflect changing
circumstances as change management in general is not well carried out".
• "The concept of Risk Assessment is well understood only by the HSEdepartment. I don't
think other people really understand how to do this".
• "there are wide variations in the quality of risk assessments within the organisation".
• "There are sufficient opportunities for benchmarking or cooperation between oil and gas.
companies to implement good, if not best, practice but not extensively used".
8.4 Measuring Performance
Interviewees state that the industry mainly focuses on injurious incidents which are likely to have
a greater impact on organisational behaviour than process-related incidents. While some
improvements in reporting have taken place the data collected is often not used effectively in
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incident prevention. Personnel may not fully understand the value of incident reporting and this
may be reflected in the lack of data, in some cases. Annual HSEPlans, designed to identify safety
improvement measures, are seen to be useful but are often rushed. This may produce reactive
firefighting measures rather than well thought-out plans.
• "All safety KPlsare injurious-based. Only recently did OpCo include first aid cases in their
reporting requirements".
• "Minor Lost Time Injury is still likely to have a greater impact in the OpCo than a minor gas
release".
• "Spills to sea are regular but no action is taken".
• "Stillemphasis on injurious KPlsrather than well kicks".
• "Improvements have been made in well engineering to report near-misses, especially in
process safety terms but often people do not see the value".
• "There is a perception within the organisation that when past safety performance has
been good, this is taken as a reason for future confidence about the adequacy of current
risk control practices. Consequently we still focus on the 'reds' and don't challenge the
'greens' enough".
• "There is sufficient emphasis on process safety KPlsto achieve continuous and sustainable
improvements in asset integrity but I think we could still improve on what we measure and
how, but it has to be smart and meaningful".
• "the current approach to safety performance measurement should provide an immediate
and reliable indication of the level of performance and although we have the data, I don't
think we use it well enough".
• "Informal reporting schemes such as safety suggestion, STOP, etc. should have adequate
attention by the organisation in order to make a significant contribution in developing a
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proactive safety strategy but we don't use the data these schemes give us to identify weak
areas".
• "The organisation is sufficiently aware that minor hydrocarbon releases may be an
underlying symptom of a larger problem that has the potential to lead to major accidents.
But again we have to act on it. Measuring weeps and seeps is ok, but we fail to look at the
wider picture and then identify trends, root cause, etc".
• "Employees are not discouraged from reporting incidents or near-misses for fear of
reprisal".
• "there is a significant under reporting of incidents and near-misses as people often fail to
recognise/identify what constitutes a near-miss",
• "Annual HSE plans have clear and transparent link to previous year's performance to
remedy past failures, prevent repetition, and provide a sound basis to achieve future
sustainable improvements in safety".
• "Tbe resources provided to effectively implement the annual HSEsafety plan are always
adequate to achieve success. However, it's all about timing as it's always a rush as we
have to wait for the 'top' to give us their steer".
In the interviews there was one example, below, where there exists potential for a future major
accident. This was identified in the following extract. It illustrates that the industry is still reactive,
Le. it waits for a disaster to happen before it considers its vulnerability.
• "Following the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, assessment was carried out far the potential
for a similar disaster in coco's global offshore operations. It was concluded that the
potential for a major accident was higher than desirable".
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8.5 Resilient Engineering
Interviewees suggest that provision is made to allow people to work safely but it is often the
people themselves that choose to rush decisions. This may be a cultural legacy, when the industry
had to get the job done 'at any cost'. A feature of resilient engineering is to ensure stability by
responding to change before adverse outcomes, but large organisations may be too bureaucratic
to achieve this response, or indeed recognise that change is taking place. Many of the issues
raised by interviewees are that systems are in place but not effectively applied. These are
illustrated by the statements on HROsand Inherent Safety, below.
• "Personnel should always hove sufficient time to reflect on decisions to ensure avoidance
of any unintended consequences. However, people don't think they hove the time and
more often than not, create their own 'worklood', believing it's others doing it".
• "The workforce is normally given sufficient time to provide adequate levels of checks and
balances to proceed with their tasks safely but whether they choose to use it is another
matter".
• "People within the organisation have sufficient understanding of what is actually being
practised and this is consistent with what senior management believe is happening,
although managers often hear or see what they want to see and miss the reality".
• "The organisation can respond flexibly and rapidly to changing demands, e.g. Asset
integrity issues, although we are getting better at this, but the ooco is too big (still) and
decisions take too long to be made".
• "Lessons learnt ore adequately publicised. However, we don't learn from them because we
don't reach root cause and hence we get a repeat".
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• "The organisation has sufficient proactive key performance indicators (KPls) to help
identify whether it is drifting from a stable into a less stable state where risks may be
increasing, but we don't use them effectively enough ....".
• "There are always sufficient competent and experienced people with adequate resources,
e.g. time and money, in place to consistently deliver asset integrity but I doubt whether
they are being used effectively".
• 'There is a 'Just Culture' in the organisation that encourages reporting of incidents but it
does not accept negligent behaviours and the Life Saving Rules (LSR)has forced this, but I
still think we need to be tougher and more consistent".
8.6 High Reliability Organisations
Statements given by interviewees indicate, as for OH&S-MSs, that the principles of accident
causation and prevention are understood but a process for adequately capturing lessons learnt is
lacking, and particularly for large organisations there is a failure to cascade information
throughout the organisations.
"Even minor incidents are treated as evidence of a more serious, underlying, problem and these
are considered as an early warning signal to take decisive action but we just don't learn from
incidents".
"Not sure whether there is a 'silo' culture that inhibits openness and exchange of lessons learnt,
practices and technologies".
8.7 Inherent Safety
Procedures are considered lower order controls since they are often linked to numerous incidents
and frequently cited as one of the causes of major accidents. The main causes of incidents was
said to be too much reliance placed on procedures to control risk, a failure to follow safe working
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procedures, or the use of inadequate procedures. Consequently, procedures may not be the best
way of controlling hazards, particularly as the sole defence against human error, and this is
supported by interviewees:
• "Procedures are often incomplete or inaccurate, and this could be improved and
simplified".
• "Procedures often do not have sufficient detail e.g. that considers lessons learnt, the
experience of users and their specific responsibilities. I don't think we update our
procedures robustly enough".
8.8 Summary
The interviews further support the results and discussions presented in the case studies,
questionnaire and data analysis.This is illustrated by the following examples:
• The effectiveness of OH&S-MSs is compromised by factors such as inconsistent
implementation of standards, lack of competencies, and a failure to cascade or
communicate the safety culture of an organisation;
• While project risks may be understood that does not mean they are managed to provide a
lifecycle AlARP design;
• The industry mainly focuses on injurious incidents which are likely to have a greater
impact on organisational behavior than process-related incidents;
• Safety systems are in place but not effectively applied;
• The industry often lacks a robust process for adequately capturing lessons learnt and/or,
particularly for large organisations, a system to cascade information throughout
organisations; and
• Procedures may not be the best way of controlling hazards, particularly as the sole
defence against human error.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, each of the paragraphs discussed represents a specific issue in relation to the
research aims and objectives. They are not mutually exclusive, and collectively provide a broad
set of conclusions. Since they generally relate to OH&S-MSs there are applicable globally.
9.10H&S-MS
The various publically-available OH&5-MSs provide a framework to achieve safety goals but lack
detail regarding resource allocation. Resource allocation, particularly in terms of cost, is seen to
be a key driver underpinning safety performance which in turn is partly derived from an
organisation's safety culture. However, it would be difficult to prescribe the level of resource
allocation on an industry basis as variables such as hazard type(s), risk tolerability and risk level,
differ conslderablv, both within large organisations, and across the spectrum of companies in the
oil and gas business (re: sl.2. s2.3, s2.4, s2.5, s2.6, s2.8, s7.8, s8.2). Consequently, it may be
beneficial to create more industry-wide recognised safety-related codes or standards that require
mandatory implementation. This avoids the difficulties of achieving global statutory consistency,
it allows ownership by the industry, and ensures a degree of continuity that provides a
commercial 'level playing field'.
OH&S-MSs lack emphasis to ensure safety by design, i.e. inherent safety, during the early phases
of a project, which is considered to be the most cost-effective approach when considering risk
over the lifecycle of a development (re: s2.2, 5.9, 7.3, 7.10). This has resulted in inappropriate
reliance on lower order controls, in the operational phase, e.g. procedures, to manage both
occupational and major accident hazards (re: 8.7). This is due to a number of factors, but revolves
around the traditional method of project management that tends to 'ring-fence' the financial and
technical design elements at the start of a project's development to achieve the primary project
viability and associated KPls of cost and schedule (re: s2.5, S7.3). However, this approach is not
likely to be cost-effective, when considered over the lifecycle of a development, since reducing
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design costs associated with safety management is likely to disproportionately increase costs in
subsequent project phases in order to combat the effects of lower order controls (re: s2.2, s2.5,
s7.1O).
It is evident in disaster investigation reports that effective implementation of OH&S-MSs has
failed. This implies that effective implementation would have prevented the disaster, but given
the continued occurrence of major accidents in the industry, it would suggest that this is not a
random, unforeseeable problem, but represents a more fundamental failure to apply basic, well-
established, tried and tested, safety management controls. Therefore, while OH&S-MSsmay need
revision to accommodate new safety management theories and concepts, there is no guarantee
that these will be applied by some parts of the industry (re: ss.8).
Understandably, the industry has to manage its costs to achieve margins that allow it to operate,
compete, invest, and satisfy stakeholders. Equally the industry has inherent major accident
hazards that it creates and therefore has to manage safely (re: s2.3). When the balance swings
more towards reducing costs than protecting people, major accidents can ultimately occur as
safety systems are compromised. Unfortunately the swing towards cost reduction, and its
eventual effects, such as a major accident, may lay dormant for some time, during which further
cost reductions may have occurred or the industry has assumed that the reductions have had no
adverse impact on safety performance. This has been demonstrated through major accident
investigation reports (re: s2.s, s3.2, s7.3, s7.s, s7.7).
There are examples demonstrating that the regulator has been ineffective in its role of protecting
people at work. This may be due to a number of factors, such as conflicting interests, and/or
inadequate resourcing. Moreover, in the UK, given the move from a relatively prescriptive
regulatory regime to a goal-setting regime, it is difficult to determine how this change of
accountability or emphasis has, or will, improve regulatory oversight, and industry safety
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performance. This may be especially important if there is a safety culture that 'normalises' risk to
levels that may not be tolerable or ALARP (re: s3.3, s5.6).
In recent years the industry has focused on human behaviour as a means of trying to improve its
safety performance. While themes such as 'just culture' and human factors are likely to help
towards improvements in safety, although they might be regarded as 'tail-pipe' solutions, any
overemphasis of their contribution is equally as likely to distract from implementation and
development of the more important concepts such as inherent safety (re: s3.5, s8.5).
The safety department is instrumental in supporting an organisation meet its safety goals, and
implementing the OH&S-MS. However, disparities between organisational expectations of its
safety personnel, and the ability of those personnel to provide professional services is seen as a
potential issue (re: s3.7).
9.2 Project and Risk Management
Developments are typically divided into distinct phases, each of which is normally subject to
different projects characteristics relating to people, environment, risk, economics, and so on (re:
s.2.5). Early phase project teams are usually transient and consist of contractor personnel, since
in IIfecycie terms this is a relatively short period and therefore has little longer-term viability (re:
s7.3). This allows organisations to shed employees on completion of this phase, and the team may
thus lack the authority or motivation to seek inherently safer designs, especially if this could
compromise conventional project KPls of cost and schedule. Cost and schedule are driven by the
need to minimise design and construction costs, and maximise revenue generation, by achieving
production as soon as possible after a final investment decision for a development is obtained.
This combination could result in designs that might satisfy specifications but still fail to achieve
inherent safety (re: s3.2, s7.7). This results in the unnecessary transfer of risks to subsequent
phases that will either require a relatively higher expenditure to rectify or place reliance on lower
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order controls (re: s3.2, s7.3). Furthermore, this situation may not be identified given the
variability, and flexibility, of risk management tools, techniques and assessment of the tolerability
of risk.
9.3 Measuring performance
The industry primarily relies on reactive and injurious based data to assess its safety performance
(re: s2.7, s7.4, s8.4). However, the way it collects, collates, analyses and disseminates this
information is flawed and only provides a very limited picture of actual safety performance. The
data tends to be reactive and include only injurious events (re: s2.7, ss.6, s6.6, s7.4, s8.4). Only
recently have process safety-related events been considered important, although these are the
events that are more likely to lead to a major accident. In this context the warning signals
required by the OH&S-MS, and theories such a resilient engineering and high reliability
organisations, are missing. The data may be misleading, for example it could give the impression
of a better safety performance than actually exists or could cause organisations to target the
wrong accident prevention strategies. Compilation and access to major accident industry-wide
data sources appears to be fragmented and limited despite this being a valuable asset for
decision-making. Even the UK HSEdoes not make its major accident database freely available to
the public. The data itself is often confusing due to the ways databases are constructed, with
variations in definitions (re: s2.s, Ch 6). While many of the immediate causes of incidents are
relatively unique, many of the root causes have elements of commonality. The OH&S-MS links
both occupational and safety incidents although they are often treated separately. Measuring
performance, at the industry-wide level, is therefore unlikely to be cost-effective and provide the
information needed to reflect actual safety performance and provide warning signals in sufficient
time to allow proactive measures to be implemented before adverse outcomes occur.
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9.4 Challenges to Traditional OH&S-MSs
Resilient engineering and high reliability organisations require systems to be sensitive to change
in order that timely and appropriate adjustments are made before a failure occurs (re: s3.4, s3.s,
s7.s, s7.6, s8.s, s8.6). This is particularly important when management demands that an
organisation act faster, cheaper and better (re: s3.4). Resilient engineering suggests that OH&S-
MS are too linear and this does not reflect organisational complexity, which requires a more
systemic approach to safety management. While the theory has merit, its practical application
has uncertainty although the concept does support the concerns associated with the traditional
methods of measuring performance described above. High reliability organisations stress the
importance of 'mindfulness', placing emphasis on individuals, as discussed in Human Factors.
While this concept also recognises the value of safety departments in accurately measuring
performance and feeding this information back as part of accident prevention strategies, both
concepts appear to reinforce components that have previously been identified by the industry.
However, what they propose is essentially more effective implementation of the relevant
components of an OH&S-MS.
Inherent safety generally relates to design and hardware systems. It provides a hierarchy of
measures that can eliminate, by removing the hazard or the people, or mitigating the potential
risk (re: s3.2, s7.7). It is a 'first-order' control but is not applied extensively across the industry.
This may be due to a number of contributing factors such as potentially higher initial costs
compared to non-inherently safe designs, and/or a lack of understanding of inherent safety by the
industry, and its practitioners, e.g. technical safety professionals. It may also be due to the
methods used to allocate costs during project phases, as inherent safety may involve higher initial
costs but it is believed that the overall lifecvcle costs can be considerably lower compared to non-
inherently safe designs. There is also a lack of KPls that steer projects towards inherent safety,
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and therefore there is no incentive to produce designs that might compromise traditional project
KPlsof cost and schedule. However, inherent safety offers the industry an opportunity to produce
cost-effective designs that can either eliminate, or substantially reduce, the future potential for
disasters, and through mandatory application, ensure a commercially 'level playing field'. This also
allows the industry to become more competitive against other forms of energy producer but
would require a radical re-think of project development strategies, for implementation.
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) assumes that accidents are inevitable, i.e. it is just a matter of
time, due to the complexity and tightly-coupling of plant designs that cannot identify, and
therefore control, all the various failure permutations (re: s3.3, s7.8). The recommendations of
NATare essentially to improve the effectiveness of OH&S-MSs,and where this cannot be done, to
achieve suitable levels of risk tolerability. The project should be abandoned if it offers society little
value. However, this is not a new theory but, perhaps, a better description of existing ones.
9.5 Case Studies
The case studies, and inductive research, demonstrate that since Piper Alpha, the industry
remains vulnerable to major accidents (re: s7.2, s8.3). While the immediate causes of the
disasters may vary considerably, and therefore are unlikely to be repeated, many of the root
causesshow some commonality. The industry does not appear to have learnt lessons from past
disasters, or if it has, the lessons have not been robustly captured on an industry-wide basis (re:
s5.8). Given that many of the controlling systems, e.g. OH&S-MSs, are essentially unchanged
since Piper Alpha, there is no reason to suggest that the industry is better placed to prevent
future disasters, as the root causesof failure, (re: 55.3, s5.4, s5.5 and s5.6) are deeply embedded
in these systems.
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9.6 Database Analysis
The primary objective of an OH&S-MS is to achieve continuous and sustainable improvements in
safety. Unfortunately this is not demonstrated by the data, which often shows wide variations in
annual performance. There is no link between occupational safety and process safety data, and
the data published shows little direct comparison with accident causation theory. The primary aim
of an OH&S-MS is to obtain continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance.
However, in the main, these objectives are not supported by the data (re: Ch 6).
9.7 Questionnaire
The questionnaire was aimed at qualified and experienced safety practitioners, i.e. those people
with the necessary competencies to help direct organisations achieve their safety goals. The
results are very mixed which perhaps reflects the diversity and complexity of the subject matter,
but also differences between the global industry approach, and possible variations in
implementation, of OH&S-MSs and associated components, between individual oil and gas
companies (re: s7.10). The results from the questionnaire did not reveal anything that
significantly contradicted the other findings in this research nor did it add any significant new
findings that might influence these conclusions.
9.8 Interviews
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain specific qualitative information from
a sample of the respondents In relation to Information relevant to this research, (Le. to probe for
what is not known, and gain a range of insights on specific issues). The use of semi-structured
interviews also allowed open discussion of the main research objectives to give interviewees the
chance to expand on a particular topic (re: Ch 8). Similar to the results from the questionnaire,
although interviewees were not influenced by the questionnaire, the results did not reveal
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anything that significantly contradicted the other findings in this research nor did it add any
significant new findings that might influence these conclusions.
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The oil and gas industry operates in a particularly dynamic and competitive environment, which is
subject to constant, and often unpredictable, change. Therefore it is difficult to obtain the
consistency and continuity required to achieve the goal of continuous and sustainable
improvements in safety performance, given all the variables that can, and in some cases cannot,
be influenced by oil and gas companies. Consequently, the industry has to look for solutions that
are less affected by the vagaries of the internal and external influences impacting safe global oil
and gas exploration and exploitation, while ensuring they are cost-effective, and add value.
10.1 Recommendations
• OH&S-MSsmust be applied more effectively by developing global mandatory safety-related
standards that provide a 'level playing field' within the oil and gas industry. This ensures,
assuming compliance, that no organisation has a commercial or competitive advantage over
another. It mitigates the vagaries of cost-dominated decision-making on the ability to achieve
safety goals. It also allows the industry to consolidate good and best practice, and is
consistent with a goal-setting regulatory regime that requires the industry to adequately
manage the risks it creates. Given the global nature of many oil and gas organisations it also
provides for greater consistency and continuity of safety practices used by the global
workforce.
• OH&S-MSs need greater focus on how to address safety management during the lifecycle
phases of a development, and in particular, to emphasise how the design phase can be
exploited to provide the most cost-effective safety-related solutions in achieving safety goals
over the life time of a development.
• There needs to be a more informed basis for safety performance decision-making.
Consequently, the industry has to improve the way it reports, collates, conducts analyses,
and disseminates safety-related performance data. This ensures that suitable and sufficient
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warning signals alert the industry to general industry instabilities that need to be corrected
before adverse outcomes. This should, as a minimum, also include the findings from major
accident investigation reports. It will allow the industry to more accurately benchmark
performance, but requires a more balanced view of reactive and proactive measures of
safety performance, together with occupational and process safety data.
• In each project, the industry has to embrace and implement, more fully, the concept of
inherent safety, to focus the industry on the hierarchical safety-related decision-making that
contributes to achieving both tolerable and ALARP risks. This should be included as an
industry-mandatory standard. The application of inherent safety should also be included as a
primary project KPIwhich is sanctioned by senior management.
• Financing design projects should be based on total lifecycle costs rather than ring-fencing
each project phase. This provides greater opportunity to increase capital costs at the design
phase, when compared with like-far-like traditional design projects, to create more cost-
effective safety solutions when viewed over the lifetime of a development.
• The quality and consistency of risk management has to be improved in the industry. Since
many oil and gas companies have similar hazards, a universal set of risk assessments should
be published to aid risk-based decision-making. Similar to the HAZIOguidewords provided in
ISO 17776, these risk assessments provide a generic approach that can be used by the
industry to help benchmark good or best practice but are not intended to be a substitute for
work or site specific risk assessments.
10.2 Future Research
The recommendations require further research to establish how they can be applied, and
potentially improved, to increase their contribution in making cost-effective, continuous, and
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sustainable safety improvements in the oil and gas industry. However, additional areas of
research that could also contribute to improve safety performance are discussed below.
• The move from a prescriptive to goal-setting regime, and the associated role of the
regulator, requires research to ascertain how this might improve safety.
• Research is needed on how design teams can be held more accountable for how safety is
managed in subsequent project phases, especially when transferred risks are often not
understood by the departments which are to manage them.
• Research is required into how new concepts such as resilient engineering, high reliability
organisations, and normal accident theory are evaluated by recognised industry bodies
(such as the British Standards Institute) to see whether they offer added value and ought
to be incorporated into OH&S-MSs, or identify the justification for their exclusion.
• The role of the safety professional, and safety department, needs to be reviewed to
ensure that the type and quality of the support available, and their ability to influence
decision-making, is commensurate with the risks created by the organisation.
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Appendix C Questionnaire
Category Question
OH&S-MS The organisation manages safety with the same degree of expertise and to the same standards as
other core business activities
The current safety management system model lacks definition of its application during all the
lifecycle phases of a development
The total money and resources in general, allocated to various parts of the business is largely
influenced by company culture.
The safety culture in the organisation always means that safety gets the resources it needs to
achieve safety performance targets
Most senior management commitment to achieving improvements in safety performance is more
rhetoric than substance
Senior management commitment to achieving improvements in safety performance becomes
more diluted/filtered as it cascades down the organisation
There is effective workforce involvement in producing safety improvements, e.g. through safety
committees
The lessons that should have been learnt from major accidents such as Piper Alpha have been
adequately captured and addressed by the organisation
Given future challenges the organisation is more vulnerable to major accidents
By applying the current approach to safety management the organisation can achieve both
continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance
The Regulator has sufficient resources to carry out inspections that are frequent enough and in
appropriate depth to discharge their duties
The Regulator provides authoritative, proactive and accessible advice and is readily available to all
personnel
The Regulator uses its power of enforcement in a way that deters the organisation from taking
intolerable risks or risks that should readily be reduced further
Since Piper Alpha, the goal-setting regulatory regime has improved safety performance more than
if it had remained a prescriptive regime
Excluding the HSEDepartment, the concept of Risk Assessment is well understood throughout the
organisation, including main and subcontractors
Project and Risk Excluding the HSEDepartment, the concept of Risk Assessment is well understood throughout the
Management organisation, including main and subcontractors
Risk Management
Risk assessment principles and tools are applied effectively throughout the organisations
There are wide variations in the quality of risk assessments within the organisation
The 'as low as is reasonably practicable' (ALARP) concept is applied on the basis that all
measures/controls are initially implemented to eliminate or mitigate risks, unless it can be
demonstrated there is a gross disproportion between the costs and the benefits
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Category Question
Financial screening criteria, such as Net Present Value (NPV) do not adequately reflect risks and
uncertainties because they are too prescriptive
Risks that sit in the ALARP region (e.g. quantitative 1 x 10·'< to 1 x 10-0 or yellow region of the Risk
Assessment Matrix, RAM), are generally considered adequate and no further action is seriously
considered to assess whether further reductions are possible at relatively low cost
There is sufficient benchmarking or cooperation between oil and gas companies to implement
good, if not best, practice
There is sufficient benchmarking or cooperation within the global organisation to implement
good, if not best, practice
Project Management I have been involved in Projects and believe I can answer questions about some aspects of safety
in project management
The requirements for managing safety risks during the design stages of a project are well
understood
There are no conflicts between the management of risks in design and other project aims and
objectives
In terms of cost-effectiveness and, when considered over the lifetime of a development, the
design phase (from inception to detailed design inclusive) provides the greatest opportunity to
eliminate or minimise risk
During the design phase sufficient resources are provided to ensure that risks are adequately
identified and mitigated to demonstrate an ALARP case, not just related to design, but when
considered over the entire lifetime of a development
During the design phase the project team has sufficient accountability to prevent the transfer of
risks to subsequent lifecycle phases
There are adequate KPls for project teams, in the design phase, to measure safety deliverables to
achieve lifecycle safety performance targets
Project teams in general have sufficient operational experience to ensure that they can
proactively minimise risks during the operational phase
The project assurance process, and its implementation, are sufficiently robust to prevent
intolerable and non-ALARP risks being carried over into subsequent project phases
Projects targets are still driven by cost and schedule, and safety has a secondary influence
When projects are fast-tracked, safety is not compromised
The type and level of risk transferred from the design process to subsequent development phases
is often unknown or not quantified
Measuring The industry is too focused on reactive (lagging/injurious based) key performance indicators (KPls)
Performance and not enough on proactive
The current approach to safety performance measurement provides an immediate and reliable
indication of the level of performance
The current approach to safety performance measurement ensures that those responsible for
management of the risks understand and take ownership of the results, and take suitable and
sufficient action to make improvements
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Category Question
Informal reporting schemes such as safety suggestion, STOP, FOCUS, etc. are given adequate
attention by the organisation in order to make a significant contribution in developing a proactive
safety strategy
The organisation is sufficiently aware that minor hydrocarbon releases may be an underlying
symptom of a larger problem that has the potential to lead to major accidents.
Employees are discouraged from reporting incidents or near-misses for fear of reprisal
There is a significant under-reporting of incidents and near-misses
Annual HSE plans have clear and transparent links to the previous year's performance to remedy
past failures, prevent repetition, and provide a sound basis to achieve future sustainable
improvements in safety
The resources provided to effectively implement the annual HSEsafety plan are always adequate
to achieve success
Resilient Engineering The concept of Resilient Engineering (RE) is well understood.
Incidents are often prevented, not by policies and procedures, but by people who are flexible and
competent enough to adapt to changing conditions
Personnel are always given sufficient time to reflect on decisions to ensure avoidance of any
unintended consequences
The workforce is given sufficient time to provide adequate levels of checks and balances to
proceed with their tasks safely (whether they choose to take it is not relevant here)
The company emphasis on factors such as cost, schedule, production etc. has had, and continues
to have, a detrimental impact on safety
The employees (staff and contractors) have the means, and sufficient empowerment, to identify
any increased potential for incidents or unnecessary risks and then prevent them
People within the organisation have sufficient understanding of what is actually being practised
and this is consistent with what senior management believe is happening
The current incident investigation process provides sufficient information to understand the
complexity of incident causation, particularly in root cause analysis
Safety defences start to erode when under pressure, e.g. controls may be compromised due to
cost, schedule, production pressures, etc.
There is a perception within the organisation that when past safety performance has been good,
this is taken as a reason for future confidence about the adequacy of current risk control practices
Within the global or local organisation there is a fragmented approach to problem-solving that
often clouds the big picture, i.e. there is not a shared risk picture when dealing with common
hazards
Once risk assessments are carried out, they are
not always revised to reflect changing
circumstances
There is often a breakdown in communications and coordination between disciplines and
departments that may contribute to errors and failures
The organisation can respond flexibly and rapidly to changing demands, e.g. asset integrity issues
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Category Question
Lessons learnt are adequately captured via the relevant management systems to ensure that
similar errors or failures cannot be repeated in the future
There are sufficient detailed audits on the organisation to ensure that there is adequate
compliance with safety policies, procedures and practices
The organisation has sufficient proactive key performance indicators (KPls) to help identify
whether it is drifting from a stable into a less stable state where risks may be increasing
There are always sufficient competent and experienced people with adequate resources, e.g. time
and money, in place to consistently deliver asset integrity
There is a top-level commitment to achieving desired safety performance
To achieve the desired level of safety performance, the organisation always proactively commits
appropriate resources, e.g. money, people and time
There is a 'Just Culture' in the organisation that encourages reporting of incidents but does not
accept negligent behaviours
There is a learning culture where there is no denial of adverse events but these are seen as
positive and contribute to improvement
High Reliability The concept of High Reliability Organisations (HROs) is well understood
Organisations
The organisation is wary of success since this tends to breed complacency
Even minor incidents are treated as evidence of a more serious, underlying, problem, and these
are considered as an early warning signal to take decisive action
There is an over-simplification of incident information generated in the organisation that could
result in the loss of some vital data and/or the information that is available is not processed
effectively
There is a suitable and sustained level of near-miss/near-hit/minor incident reporting in the
organisation that allows the organisation to make proactive decisions to prevent recurrence or
prevent escalation to more serious events
There is an overload of incident information that leads to inaction due to the volume that requires
assimilation
There are sufficient competent and experienced people in the organisation to maintain
consistency and continuity during periods of change
Job rotation and using employees with non-typical job experience provides greater depth and
more challenges in decision-making thereby allowing the organisation to cope better with the
unexpected
In general, there is a 'silo' culture that inhibits openness and exchange of lessons learnt, practices
and technologies
Inherent Safety The concept of Inherent Safety is well understood.
The current risk control hierarchy uses the following approach consistently in the following order:
a) Risk reduction by inherent safety b) Risk reduction by basic process control c) Risk reduction
by pre-alarms d) Risk reduction by Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) e) Risk reduction by
mechanical devices f) Risk reduction by other means
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Category Question
Often designs are not inherently safe but tend to rely on procedural control
Procedures are often incomplete or inaccurate
Procedures often do not have sufficient detail e.g. that considers lessons learnt, the experience of
users and their specific responsibilities
Procedures are often not concise and contain information that does not contribute to work
performance
Procedures often have an inconsistent presentation/format therefore making them less
comprehensible
Hydrocarbon or other hazardous processes are always designed to minimise the maintenance
burden
Hydrocarbon or other hazardous processes are always designed to minimise intrusive
instrumentation
Hydrocarbon or other hazardous processes are always designed to minimise piping joints
There is sufficient emphasis on process safety KPls to achieve continuous and sustainable
improvements in asset integrity
Facilities are always initially designed to be unmanned, or to eliminate or minimise personnel
exposure to hazards
Designs always favour passive rather than active control systems
Maximising inherent safety in design is seen as a cost-effective approach when considered over
the lifecycle of the development (even if this requires greater initial investment)
Safety studies include inherently safer design guidewords to ensure that they are properly
considered in the decision-making process
Senior management project sanction is conditional on the effective consideration of inherent
safety in the design
True lifecycle costs of projects (not just the cost of design, fabrication, installation and
commissioning) are taken into account when assessing risks to enumerate the benefits of
inherently safer design
Concept selection is based on the ranking of various options with transparent safety criteria
including the application of inherently safer design principles
Applying inherent safety during design is likely to be compromised due to cost constraints, e.g.
capital expenditure (CAPEX)
Applying inherent safety during design is likely to be compromised due to competency and
experience constraints of project personnel
In the design of critical combinations and complex integrations of engineered systems, the design
criteria for reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM analysis) is identified as a KPI to ensure
desired design integrity, not just what can be achieved, but what should be assured
Project teams always study past incidents associated with designs to minimise the potential of
error/failure (hardware, software and human) by eliminating or mitigating the causes
(immediate/root) of past problems.
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Category Question
Normal Accident We mislead ourselves due to various pressures that the risks that are currently tolerated by the
Theory organisation are acceptable
General What, if anything, do you think is required by your company (or the industry) to achieve
continuous and sustainable improvements in safety performance?
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Glossary
This is a glossary of some of the terms used in this research. Note that the sources used often
have different definitions for the same term. Selection of the source was based on available
definitions and relevant bodies.
Term Definition Note
Acceptable risk Risk that has been reduced to a level that can be tolerated by the organisation 1
having regard to its legal obligations and its own OH&Spolicy
Accident See Incident below 2
As low as reasonably To reduce a risk to a level which is 'as low as reasonably practicable' involves 2
practicable (ALARP) balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of
achieving it. This level represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the
time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become
unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
Audit Systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining 'audit 1
evidence' and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which 'audit
criteria' are fulfilled
Blowout An uncontrolled flow of gas, oil, or other well fluids from the well. 3
Continual improvement Recurring process of enhancing the OH&S management 1
system in order to achieve improvements in overall
OH&S performance consistent with the organisation's OH&S policy
Development well A well drilled within the proved area of an oil or gas reservoir to the depth of a 4
stratigraphic horizon known to be productive; a well drilled in a proven field for
the purpose of completing the desired spacing pattern of production.
Downstream When referring to the oil and gas industry, this term indicates the refining and 4
marketing sectors of the industry. More generically, the term can be used to
refer to any step further along in the process.
Hazard Source, situation, or act with a potential for harm in terms of human injury or ill 1
health, or a combination of these
Hazard identification Processof recognising that a hazard exists and defining its characteristics 1
Health, safety and A description of the means of achieving health, safety and environmental 2
environmental (HSE) objectives.
management plan
Hydrocarbons Organic compounds of hydrogen and carbon whose densities, boiling points, 3
and freezing points increase as their molecular weights increase. Although
composed of only two elements, hydrocarbons exist in a variety of compounds,
because of the strong affinity of the carbon atom for other atoms and for itself.
The smallest molecules of hydrocarbons are gaseous; the largest are solids.
Petroleum is a mixture of many different hydrocarbons.
Incident Work-related event(s) in which an injury or ill health (regardless 1
of severity) or fatality occurred, or could have occurred
Jacket The lower section, or 'legs', of an offshore platform. 4
Kick An entry of water, gas, oil, or other formation fluid into the wellbore during 3
drilling. It occurs because the pressure exerted by the column of drilling fluid is
not great enough to overcome the pressure exerted by the fluids in the
formation drilled. If prompt action is not taken to control the kick, or kill the
well, a blowout may occur.
Land rig Any drilling rig that is located on dry land. 3
Natural gas A highly compressible, highly expansible mixture of hydrocarbons with a low 3
specific gravity and occurring naturally in a gaseous form.
Occupational health and Conditions and factors that affect, or could affect, the health and safety of 1
safety (OH&S) employees or other workers (including temporary workers and contractor
personnel), visitors, or any other person in the workplace
OH&S management Part of an organisation's management system used to develop 1
system and implement its OH&S policy, and manage its OH&S
risks
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Term Definition
OH&Sobjective OH&Sgoal, in terms of OH&S performance, that an
organisation sets itself to achieve
OH&S performance Measurable results of an organisation's management of its
OH&S risks
OH&S policy Overall intentions and direction of an organisation related to its
OH&Sperformance as formally expressed by top management
Oil A simple or complex liquid mixture of hydrocarbons that can be refined to yield
gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, and various other products.
Operator The company that has legal authority to drill wells and undertake production of
hydrocarbons. The operator is often part of a consortium and acts on behalf of
this consortium.
Organisation Company, corporation, firm, enterprise, authority or institution, or part or
combination thereof, whether incorporated or not, public or private, that has
its own functions and administration
Petroleum A generic name for hydrocarbons, including crude oil, natural gas liquids,
natural gas and their products.
Performance criteria Performance criteria describe the measurable standards set by company
management to which an activity or system element is to perform. (Some
companies may refer to performance criteria as 'goals' or 'targets'.)
Platform An offshore structure that is permanently fixed to the seabed.
Preventive action Action to eliminate the cause of a potential nonconformity or
other undesirable potential situation
Proactive performance
(Preventative risk
management)
Also known as leading performance indicators. Leading indicators ...can be
considered as measures of process or inputs essential to deliver the desired
safety outcomes ... Lagging indicators show when a desired safety outcome has
failed or has not been achieved
Procedure A specified way to carry out an activity or a process
Reactive performance
indicators (reactive risk
management)
Also known as lagging performance indicators. Lagging indicators are
generated by a process of reactive monitoring, while leading indicators are the
outcome of active monitoring. Reactive monitoring amounts to keeping track
of undesired events, such as gas releases; active monitoring involves routine,
planned testing and inspection (361)
Reservoir A subsurface, porous, permeable or naturally fractured rock body in which oil 3
or gas are stored. Most reservoir rocks are limestones, dolomites, sandstones,
or a combination of these. The four basic types of hydrocarbon reservoirs are
oil, volatile oil, dry gas, and gas condensate. An oil reservoir generally contains
three fluids-gas, oil, and water-with oil the dominant product. In the typical
oil reservoir, these fluids become vertically segregated because of their
different densities. Gas, the lightest, occupies the upper part of the reservoir
rocks; water, the lower part; and oil, the intermediate section. In addition to its
occurrence as a cap or in solution, gas may accumulate independently of the
oil; if so, the reservoir is called a gas reservoir. Associated with the gas, in most
instances, are salt water and some oil. Volatile oil reservoirs are exceptional in
that during early production they are mostly productive of light oil plus gas,
but, as depletion occurs, production can become almost totally completely gas.
Volatile oils are usually good candidates for pressure maintenance, which can
result in increased reserves. In the typical dry gas reservoir natural gas exists
only as a gas and production is only gas plus fresh water that condenses from
the flow stream reservoir. In a gas condensate reservoir, the hydrocarbons may
exist as a gas, but, when brought to the surface, some of the heavier
hydrocarbons condense and become a liquid.
Risk Combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or 1
exposure(s} and the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by the
event or exposure(s}
Riskassessment Processof evaluating the risk(s} arising from a hazard(s}, taking 1
into account the adequacy of any existing controls, and deciding
whether or not the risk(s} is acceptable
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Term Definition Note
Screening criteria The values or standards against which the significance of the identified hazard 2
or effect can be judged. They should be based on sound scientific and technical
information and may be developed by the company and industry bodies, or
provided by the regulators.
Semi-structured A method of survey that takes a flexible approach and permits questions to
interview arise in response to the dialogue. In a semi-structured interview, the
interviewer will often put together a series of themes to be explored, rather
than having a formal structure and fixed question set.
Shutdown A production hiatus during which the platform ceases to produce while 4
essential maintenance work is undertaken.
Structured Interview Fixed format interview in which all questions are prepared beforehand and are 5
put in the same order to each interviewee. Although this style lacks the free
flow of a friendly conversation (as in an unstructured Interview) it provides the
precision and reliability required in certain situations. Also called directive
interview.
Upstream The exploration and production portions of the oil and gas industry. 4
Well The hole made by the drilling bit, which can be open, cased, or both. Also called 3
borehole, hole, or wellbore.
Well control The methods used to control a kick and prevent a well from blowing out. Such 3
techniques include, but are not limited to, keeping the borehole completely
filled with drilling mud of the proper weight or density during operations,
exercising reasonable care when tripping pipe out of the hole to prevent
swabbing, and keeping careful track of the amount of mud put into the hole to
replace the volume of pipe removed from the hole during a trip.
Workplace' Any physical location in which work related activities are performed under the 1
control of the organisation
Notes:
1 BSOHSAS18001-2007
2 E&P Forum Guidelines for the Development and Application of Health, Safety and Environmental Management
Systems Report No. 6.36/210
3 United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration - Glossary of Terms
4 Oil and GasUK, Knowledge Centre - Glossary
5 BusinessDirectory.com
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